In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...) should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Diese fünfbändige Aristoteles-Ausgabe in griechischer Sprache ist (mit Ausnahme von Bd III) ein fotomechanischer Nachdruck der maßgeblichen Aristoteles-Ausgabe von 1831-1870. Band I und II enthält die Werke Aristoteles. In Band III wird die durch O. Gigon besorgte Bearbeitung und Ergänzung der Fragmente des Aristoteles wiedergegeben. Band IV bietet eine Auswahl der bedeutendsten Stücke aus den antiken Kommentaren zu Aristoteles, sowie eine Konkordanz mit den Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. In Band V ist der Index Aristotelicus von H. Bonitz nachgedruckt.