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Addressing Circular Definitions via Systems of Proofs.Riccardo Bruni - 2019 - In Stefania Centrone, Sara Negri, Deniz Sarikaya & Peter M. Schuster (eds.), Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Some Remarks on the Finite Theory of Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 169-187.details
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Two types of deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.details
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On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the next stable set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.details
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Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions: Parameters, Complexity and Games.Philip Welch, Kai–Uwe Kühnberger, Benedikt Löwe & Michael Möllerfeld - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79-98.details
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Theories of Abstract Objects without Ad Hoc Restriction.Wen-Fang Wang - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (1):1-15.details
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Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.details
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On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.details
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Contraction and revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.details
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How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.details
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Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth.Benedikt Löwe & Philip D. Welch - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):21-41.details
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Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.details
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Kripke and the logic of truth.Michael Kremer - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):225 - 278.details
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Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):739-789.details
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Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods.Ming Hsiung - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914.details
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The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth.Leon Horsten - 2011 - MIT Press.details
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Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.details
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Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.details
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Naive semantics and the liar paradox.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.details
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The Revision Theory of Truth.A. Gupta & N. D. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.details
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Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.details
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Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.details
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The Complexity of Revision.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):67-72.details
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Alternative revision theories of truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.details
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Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth.Catrin Campbell-Moore, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112.details
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Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.details
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A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):419-448.details
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Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.details
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Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Nuel Belnap - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.details
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Vagueness and revision sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.details
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The Complexity of Revision, Revised.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.details
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Non-well-founded sets via revision rules.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):633 - 679.details
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The liar speaks the truth: a defense of the revision theory of truth.Aladdin Mahmūd Yaqūb - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Empiricism and Experience.Anil Gupta - 2006 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too.Greg Restall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.details
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An application of circular definitions: Rational Decision.André Chapuis - 2003 - In Benedikt Löwe, Thoralf Räsch & Wolfgang Malzkorn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Ii. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--54.details
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