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  1. Analyticity and Implicit Definition.Kathrin Glüer - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):37-60.
    Paul Boghossian advocates a version of the analytic theory of a priori knowledge. His defense of an "epistemic" notion of analyticity is based on an implicit definition account ofthe meaning of the logical constants. Boghossian underestimates the power of the classical Quinean criticisms, however; the challenge to substantiate the distinction between empirical and non-empirical sentences, as forcefully presented in Two Dogmas, still stands, and the regress from Truth by Convention still needs to be avoided. Here, Quine also showed that there (...)
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  • Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  • Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249–293.
    The paper challenges the inferentialist account of concept possession that Paul Boghossian takes as a premise in his account of the transmission of justification by deductive reasoning in his paper 'Blind Reasoning'. Unorthodox speakers who reject the inferences in an alleged possession condition can still have the concept by understanding a word for it. In that sense, the inferences are not analytic. Inferentialist accounts of logical constants, theoretical terms (using the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method) and pejorative expressions such as 'Boche' are examined (...)
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  • Elements of Intuitionism.Michael A. E. Dummett - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a long-awaited new edition of one of the best known Oxford Logic Guides. The book gives an informal but thorough introduction to intuitionistic mathematics, leading the reader gently through the fundamental mathematical and philosophical concepts. The treatment of various topics has been completely revised for this second edition. Brouwer's proof of the Bar Theorem has been reworked, the account of valuation systems simplified, and the treatment of generalized Beth Trees and the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic rewritten. Readers (...)
  • Blind Reasoning.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
    [Paul Boghossian] The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ’blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible. (...)
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  • Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents a series of influential essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. The essays are organized under four headings: the nature of content; content and self-knowledge; knowledge, content, and the a priori; and colour concepts.
     
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  • Transmission of Warrant-Failure and the Notion of Epistemic Analyticity.Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.
    In this paper I will argue that Boghossian's explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit definitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, I will briefly outline Boghossian's account, followed by an explanation of what a transmission of warrant-failure consists in. I will also show that this charge is independent of the worry of rule-circularity which has been raised concerning the justification of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. My (...)
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  • Carnap and Logical Truth.W. V. Quine - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):350--74.
    Kant's question 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' pre- cipitated the Critique of Pure Reason. Question and answer notwith- standing, Mill and others persisted in doubting that such judgments were possible at all. At length some of Kant's own clearest purported.
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  • Yes and No.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.
    In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if (...)
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  • XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre.Nathan Salmon - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):193-218.
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  • Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
  • The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
    Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...)
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  • Analyticity Regained?Gilbert Harman - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):392-400.
  • What's So Logical About the “Logical” Axioms?J. H. Harris - 1982 - Studia Logica 41 (2-3):159 - 171.
    Intuitionists and classical logicians use in common a large number of the logical axioms, even though they supposedly mean different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers — conquans for short. But Wittgenstein says The meaning of a word is its use in the language. We prove that in a definite sense the intuitionistic axioms do indeed characterize the logical conquans, both for the intuitionist and the classical logician.
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  • Reply to Professor Marcus.W. V. Quine - 1961 - Synthese 13 (4):323 - 330.
  • Rejection.Timothy Smiley - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):1–9.
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  • Meaning Approached Via Proofs.Dag Prawitz - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):507-524.
    According to a main idea of Gentzen the meanings of the logical constants are reflected by the introduction rules in his system of natural deduction. This idea is here understood as saying roughly that a closed argument ending with an introduction is valid provided that its immediate subarguments are valid and that other closed arguments are justified to the extent that they can be brought to introduction form. One main part of the paper is devoted to the exact development of (...)
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  • Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophical Issues. Routledge. pp. 15 - 35.
  • Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  • Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge.Paul Horwich - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):423-440.
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  • Boghossian on Analyticity.E. Margolis & S. Laurence - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):293-302.
    Paul Boghossian (1997) has argued that there is much to be said on behalf of the notion of analyticity so long as we distinguish epistemic analyticity and metaphysical analyticity. In particular, (1) epistemic analyticity isn’t undermined by Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, (2) it can explain the a prioricity of logic, and (3) epistemic analyticity can’t be rejected short of embracing semantic irrealism. In this paper, we argue that all three of these claims are mistaken.
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  • Logical Knowledge and Gettier Cases.Corine Besson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):1-19.
    Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is (...)
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  • How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1):1-40.
    Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...)
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  • Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  • Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role.J. A. Fodor & E. Lepore - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:15-35.
    It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression (...)
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  • Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.
    It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression (...)
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  • Reflections on Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2005 - Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
  • Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
    _Naming and Necessity_ has had a great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is (...)
     
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  • Conventionalism: From Poincare to Quine.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This is the first comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincare;'s geometric conventionalism. She argues that the (...)
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  • The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station.Alberto Coffa - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...)
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  • Implicit Definition and the a Priori.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2000 - In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. pp. 286--319.
  • Truth -- Meaning -- Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
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  • Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Carrie Jenkins presents a new account of arithmetical knowledge, which manages to respect three key intuitions: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. Jenkins argues that arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts, non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world.
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  • Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  • How to Measure the Standard Metre.Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:193 - 217.
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  • Analyticity.P. A. Boghossian - 1997 - In B. Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. pp. 331-368.
  • Classical Harmony: Rules of Inference and the Meaning of the Logical Constants.Peter Milne - 1994 - Synthese 100 (1):49 - 94.
    The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain, cannot be justified (...)
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  • Truth in Virtue of Meaning.Gillian Kay Russell - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. -/- (...)
  • VII—Equivocation and Existence.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):109-128.
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  • New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
  • Knowledge of Logic.Paul Boghossian - 2000 - In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori.
     
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  • Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian & Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 77:225-293.
    [Paul Boghossian] The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of 'blind but blameless' reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible. (...)
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  • Blind Reasoning.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):249-293.
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  • Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.
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  • Equivocation And Existence.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:109-127.
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  • The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  • The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen.Gerhard Gentzen - 1969 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
  • I—Paul Boghossian.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225-248.
  • II—Timothy Williamson: Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.
  • Sentence Connectives in Formal Logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.