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  1. Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247-273.
  • Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.
  • Social Functions of Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--242.
    Drawing upon work in evolutionary game theory and experimental philosophy, I argue that one of the roles the concept of knowledge plays in our social cognitive ecology is that of enabling us to make adaptively important distinctions between different kinds of blameworthy and blameless behaviors. In particular, I argue that knowledge enables us to distinguish which agents are most worthy of blame for inflicting harms, violating social norms, or cheating in situations of social exchange.
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  • Epistemic Scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
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  • What's the Point of "Knowledge" Anyway?Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.
    In Knowledge and the State of Nature Edward Craig defends the thesis that the function of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants. This paper aims to show that Craig’s thesis is false. In order to establish this, I will point to some data that CT fails to explain in a satisfactory manner. I will then introduce an alternative thesis that is not only able to secure the acclaimed benefits of CT, but also provides a neat explanation of (...)
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  • Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.Richard Boyd - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:613-662.
    A realistic and dialectical conception of the epistemology of science is advanced according to which the acquisition of instrumental knowledge is parasitic upon the acquisition, by successive approximation, of theoretical knowledge. This conception is extended to provide an epistemological characterization of reference and of natural kinds, and it is integrated into recent naturalistic treatments of knowledge. Implications for several current issues in the philosophy of science are explored.
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  • On Saying That Someone Knows: Themes From Craig.Klemens Kappel - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  • Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 31-45.
    The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as ‘what is the purpose of the concept?’, ‘What role has it played in the past?’, or ‘If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?’ The idea behind the teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, and as yet there (...)
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  • Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology.Ram Neta - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):247-280.
    Many epistemologists are interested in offering a positive account of how it is that many of our common sense beliefs enjoy one or another positive epistemological status (e.g., how they are warranted, justified, reasonable, or what have you). A number of philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and/or J. L. Austin, have argued that this enterprise is misconceived. The most effective version of this argument is to be found in Mark Kaplan’s paper “Epistemology on Holiday”. After explaining what this criticism (...)
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  • Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
    Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.
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  • Steps to an Ecology of Knowledge: Continuity and Change in the Genealogy of Knowledge.Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):67-82.
    The present paper argues for a more complete integration between recent "genealogical" approaches to the problem of knowledge and evolutionary accounts of the development of human cognitive capacities and practices. A structural tension is pointed out between, on the one hand, the fact that the explicandum of genealogical stories is a specifically human trait and, on the other hand, the tacit acknowledgment, shared by all contributors to the debate, that human beings have evolved from non-human beings. Since humans differ from (...)
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  • How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
    I discuss Lawlor’s Austinian account of knowledge ascriptions and argue that it is a brand of pragmatic encroachment. I then criticize the motivation for pragmatic encroachment theories that derives from assumptions about the functional role of knowledge ascriptions. I argue that this criticism also apply to contextualist followers of Craig. Finally, I suggest that the central lesson from reflection on the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions is that they, upon reflection, motivate traditional invariantism.
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  • The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some questions that (...)
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  • The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
    The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practical reasoning.
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  • Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):159–177.
    This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...)
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  • What's so Special About Human Knowledge?Michael Williams - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):249-268.
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  • Knowledge and Certainties in the Epistemic State of Nature.Martin Kusch - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):6-23.
    This paper seeks to defend, develop, and revise Edward Craig's “genealogy of knowledge”. The paper first develops the suggestion that Craig's project is naturally thought of as an important instance of “social cognitive ecology”. It then introduces the genealogy of knowledge and some of its main problems and weaknesses, suggesting that these are best taken as challenges for further work rather than as refutations. The central sections of the paper conduct a critical dialogue between Craig's theory and Wittgenstein's claim–familiar from (...)
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  • XII—The Practical Explication of Knowledge.Edward Craig - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1):211-226.
  • Motivated Contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.
    The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of (...)
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  • Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):343-352.
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  • Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
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  • Naturalism and Intuitions.Hilary Kornblith - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.
    This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.
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  • Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice — Power and the Ethics of Knowing.Miranda Flicker - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):117-119.
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  • The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):763-766.
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  • Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):141-144.
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  • Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
     
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  • Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa.Richard Boyd - 1999 - In R. A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press. pp. 141-85.
  • The Myth of Factive Verbs.Allan Hazlett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):497 - 522.
  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • 'Knowledge' Ascriptions, Social Roles and Semantics.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):335-350.
    The idea that the concept ‘knowledge’ has a distinctive function or social role is increasingly influential within contemporary epistemology. Perhaps the best-known account of the function of ‘knowledge’ is that developed in Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature (1990, OUP), on which (roughly) ‘knowledge’ has the function of identifying good informants. Craig’s account of the function of ‘knowledge’ has been appealed to in support of a variety of views, and in this paper I’m concerned with the claim that (...)
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  • Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
    This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
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  • Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge.Barry Barnes & David Bloor - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. Blackwell.
  • Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.Hilary Kornblith & Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):479-482.
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  • Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - Mind 62 (245):86-99.
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  • Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
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  • Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 10--25.
     
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  • Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
  • Other Minds.J. Wisdom, J. L. Austen, J. L. Austin & A. J. Ayer - 1946 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20:122-197.
  • Why Should We Care About the Concept of Knowledge?Hilary Kornblith - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):38-52.
    Can we learn something interesting about knowledge by examining our concept of knowledge? Quite a bit, many argue. My own view, however, is that the concept of knowledge is of little epistemological interest. In this paper, I critically examine one particularly interesting defense of the view that the concept of knowledge is of great epistemological interest: Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. A minimalist view about the value of examining our concept of knowledge is defended.
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  • Testimony and the Value of Knowledge.Martin Kusch - 2009 - In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 60--94.
     
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