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  1. How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims.Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
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  • Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection.Andrew Mason - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):246–254.
    In an important piece of work Derek Parfit distinguishes two different forms of egalitarianism, ‘Deontic’ and ‘Telic’. He contrasts these with what he calls the Priority View, which is not strictly a form of egalitarianism at all, since it is not essentially concerned with how well off people are relative to each other. His main aim is to generate an adequate taxonomy of the positions available, but in the process he draws attention to some of the different problems they face. (...)
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  • The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  • Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
  • Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument Against the Priority View.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):171-199.
    We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for (...)
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  • Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion.Larry S. Temkin - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s1):327 - 353.
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  • Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons.Iwao Hirose - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):182-205.
    Many critics of utilitarianism claim that we should reject interpersonal aggregation because aggregative principles do not take the separateness of persons seriously. In this article, I will reject this claim. I will first elucidate the theoretical structure of aggregation. I will then consider various interpretations of the notion of the separateness of persons and clarify what exactly those critics are trying to reject by appealing to the notion of the separateness of persons. I will argue that none of these interpretations (...)
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  • Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion.Larry S. Temkin - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):327-353.
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  • Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):381-398.
    The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that (...)
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  • Egalitarianism and Responsibility.Richard J. Arneson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (3):225-247.
    This essay examines several possible rationales for the egalitarian judgment that justice requires better-off individuals to help those who are worse off even in the absence of social interaction. These rationales include equality (everyone should enjoy the same level of benefits), moral meritocracy (each should get benefits according to her responsibility or deservingness), the threshold of sufficiency (each should be assured a minimally decent quality of life), prioritarianism (a function of benefits to individuals should be maximized that gives priority to (...)
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  • Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
    One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.
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  • Equality, Priority, and the Levelling-Down Objection.Larry Temkin - 2000 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. Macmillan. pp. 126-61.
  • On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.G. A. Cohen - 1989 - Ethics 99 (4):906-944.
    In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called ‘Equality of What?’ Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental?
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  • The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
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  • Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
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  • The Priority View Bites the Dust?Andrew Williams - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):315-331.
    This article distinguishes between a telic and a deontic version of Derek Parfit's influential Priority View. Employing the distinction, it shows that the existence of variations in how intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts should be resolved fails to provide a compelling case in favour of relational egalitarianism and against all pure versions of the Priority View. In addition, the article argues that those variations are better understood as providing counterevidence to certain distribution-sensitive versions of consequentialism.
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  • Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Michael Otsuka - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):365-380.
    For a prioritarian by contrast to a utilitarian, whether a certain quantity of utility falls within the boundary of one person's life or another's makes the following moral difference: the worse the life of a person who could receive a given benefit, the stronger moral reason we have to confer this benefit on this person. It would seem, therefore, that prioritarianism succeeds, where utilitarianism fails, to ‘take seriously the distinction between persons’. Yet I show that, contrary to these appearances, prioritarianism (...)
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  • Primary Goods Reconsidered.Richard J. Arneson - 1990 - Noûs 24 (3):429-454.
  • Equality.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
  • Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection.A. Mason - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):246-254.