Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Fine-Grained Opinion, Probability, and the Logic of Full Belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference.James Hawthorne & David Makinson - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):247-297.
    We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as `preface' and `lottery' rules.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.Wolfgang Spohn - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • A Review of the Lottery Paradox.Gregory Wheeler - 2007 - In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
    Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • I—W Hat is the N Ormative R Ole of L Ogic&Quest.Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • What is the Normative Role of Logic?Hartry Field - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.
    The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Rohit Parikh - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.
    We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey-Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of nonmonotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).'Expectation' is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Horacio Arlo-Costa & Rohit Parikh - manuscript
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.
    Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – amongst them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform. In (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Generalizing the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.
    This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Conditionalizing on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.
    A theory of evidential probability is developed from two assumptions:(1) the evidential probability of a proposition is its probability conditional on the total evidence;(2) one's total evidence is one's total knowledge. Evidential probability is distinguished from both subjective and objective probability. Loss as well as gain of evidence is permitted. Evidential probability is embedded within epistemic logic by means of possible worlds semantics for modal logic; this allows a natural theory of higher-order probability to be developed. In particular, it is (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
  • On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   470 citations  
  • ``The Paradox of the Preface".D. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
  • Propositional Reasoning That Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.
    This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method B p , which specifies an initial belief state B p (T) that is revised to the new propositional belief state B(E) upon receipt of information E. An acceptance rule tracks Bayesian conditioning when B p (E) = B p|E (T), for (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Reason and the Grain of Belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
  • Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Bayesian Personalism, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, and Duhem's Problem.Jon Dorling - 1979 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (3):177.
    The detailed analysis of a particular quasi-historical numerical example is used to illustrate the way in which a Bayesian personalist approach to scientific inference resolves the Duhemian problem of which of a conjunction of hypotheses to reject when they jointly yield a prediction which is refuted. Numbers intended to be approximately historically accurate for my example show, in agreement with the views of Lakatos, that a refutation need have astonishingly little effect on a scientist's confidence in the ‘hard core’ of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • The Paradox of the Preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.
    By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):241-264.
    John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These features suggest principles that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws.Horacio Arló-Costa - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (11):555-593.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Geo-Logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox, with Applications to Conditional Logic.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):531-575.
  • Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic.Risto Hilpinen - 1968 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Commitment and Change of View.Isaac Levi - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press. pp. 209--232.
  • Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.
  • Deductive-Nomological Vs. Statistical Explanation.G. Hempel, H. Feigl & G. Marxwell - 1967 - Critica 1 (3):120-127.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations