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  1. The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
    Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification (...)
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  • Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology.Mylan Engel - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):133-150.
  • On Words.John Hawthorne & Ernest Lepore - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (9):447-485.
    Under what conditions are two utterances utterances of the same word? What are words? That these questions have not received much attention is rather surprising: after all, philosophers and linguists frequently appeal to considerations about word and sentence identity in connection with a variety of puzzles and problems that are foundational to the very subject matter of philosophy of language and linguistics.1 Kaplan’s attention to words is thus to be applauded. And there is no doubt that his discussion contains many (...)
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  • Excusing Crime.Jeremy Horder - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    When should someone who may have intentionally or knowingly committed criminal wrongdoing be excused? Excusing Crime examines what excusing conditions are, and why familiar excuses, such as duress, are thought to fulfil those conditions. Setting himself against the 'classical' view of excuses, which has a long heritage, and is enshrined in different forms in many of the world's criminal codes, both liberal and non-liberal; Jeremy Horder argues that it is now time to move forwards. He contends that a wider range (...)
     
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  • What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
  • Justified Judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
    When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...)
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  • Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  • Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 48: 1962. Oup Oxford. pp. 1-25.
    The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...)
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  • Normativism Defended.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 85--102.
    The aim of this chapter is to defend the claim that “the intentional is normative” against a number of objections, including those that Georges Rey has presented in his contribution to this volume. First, I give a quick sketch of the principal argument that I have used to support this claim, and briefly comment on Rey’s criticisms of this argument. Next, I try to answer the main objections that have been raised against this claim. First, it may seem that the (...)
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  • Another Plea for Excuses.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):259 - 266.
  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.
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  • The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):968-970.
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  • Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.
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  • Deception and Evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
  • Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.
    According to epistemological internalism, the rationality of a belief supervenes purely on "internal facts" about the thinker's mind. But what are "internal facts"? Why does the rationality of a belief supervene on them? The standard answers are unacceptable. This paper proposes new answers. "Internal facts" are facts about the thinker's nonfactive mental states. The rationality of a belief supervenes on such internal facts because we need rules of belief revision that we can follow directly, not by means of following any (...)
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  • What Justification Could Not Be.Mark T. Nelson - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):265 – 281.
    I begin by asking the meta-epistemological question, 'What is justification?', analogous to the meta-ethical question, 'What is rightness?' I introduce the possibility of non-cognitivist, naturalist, non-naturalist, and eliminativist answers in meta-epistemology,corresponding to those in meta-ethics. I devote special attention to the naturalistic hypothesis that epistemic justification is identical to probability, showing its antecedent plausibility. I argue that despite this plausibility, justification cannot be identical with probability, under the standard interpretation of the probability calculus, for the simple reason that justification can (...)
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  • Stick to What You Know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
    I will be arguing that a subject’s belief that p is justified if and only if he knows that p: justification is knowledge. I will start by describing two broad classes of allegedly justified beliefs that do not constitute knowledge and which, hence, cannot be what they are often taken to be if my view is correct. It is far from clear what my view is until I say a lot more about the relevant concept or concepts of justification that (...)
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  • How to Be a Fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
  • Justification and Truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
  • The Normativity of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
  • Contents and Norms.P. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
     
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
     
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  • From E = K to Scepticism?Clayton Littlejohn - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684.
    In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about die external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.
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  • A Rationale for Reliabilism.Kent Bach - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):246-263.
    What bothers people about reliabilism as a theory of justified belief? It has yet to be formulated adequately, but most philosophical theories have that problem. People seem to be bothered by the very idea of reliabilism, with its apparent disregard for believers’ rationality and responsibility. Yet its supporters can’t seem to understand its opponents complaints. I believe that the conflict can be clarified, if not resolved, by drawing certain important distinctions.
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  • ``Strong and Weak Justification&Quot.Alvin Goldman - 1988 - In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co.. pp. 51-71.
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  • Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law.Michael S. Moore - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Originally published: Oxford: Clarendon, 1997.
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  • Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge.Bill Brewer - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):41-55.
  • The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence.Ernest Sosa - 1985 - Synthese 64 (1):3 - 28.
    Polyfacetic epistemology would answer the skeptic, provide how-to-think manuals, explain how we know, and more. To some it is the project of assuring oneself, of validating one's knowledge or supposed knowledge, turning it into real and assured knowledge, thus defeating the skeptic. To others it is a set of rules or instructions, a guide to the perplexed, a manual for conducting the intellect. To others yet it is a meta-discipline, but one whose purpose is not nearly so much guidance as (...)
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