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  1. Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation.Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.
    In a series of recent papers, Jane Heal (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) has developed her own quite distinctive version of simulation theory and offered a detailed critique of the arguments against simulation theory that we and our collaborators presented in earlier papers. Heal's theory is clearly set out and carefully defended, and her critique of our arguments is constructive and well informed. Unlike a fair amount of what has been written in this area in recent years, her work is (...)
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  • The Simulation Theory: Objections and Misconceptions.Robert M. Gordon - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.
  • Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
  • Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - Oxford University Press USA.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  • Logic and Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1984 - Synthese 60 (1):107-127.
  • Folk Psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.
    For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. (...)
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  • Simulation and Interpersonal Utility.A. Goldman - 1996 - In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Ethics. MIT Press. pp. 709-726.
  • Does One Size Fit All? Hurley on Shared Circuits.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):27-28.
    Hurley's high level of generality suggests that a control-theoretic framework underpins all of the phenomena in question, but this is problematic. In contrast to the action-perception domain, where the control-theoretic framework certainly applies, there is no evidence that this framework equally applies to feelings and emotions, such as pain, touch, and disgust, where mirroring and simulational mindreading are also found.
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  • Simulation and Interpersonal Utility.Alvin I. Goldman - 1995 - Ethics 105 (4):709-726.
  • Functionalism and Replication.Jane Heal - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
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  • Empathy, Mind, and Morals.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.