In this paper, I consider the claim that a corporation cannot be held to be morally responsible unless it is a person. First, I argue that this claim is ambigious. Person flags three different but related notions: metaphysical person, moral agent, moral person. I argue that, though one can make the claim that corporates are metaphysical persons, this claim is only marginally relevant to the question of corporate moral responsibility. The central question which must be answered in discussions of corporate (...) moral responsibility is whether corporations are moral agents or moral persons. I argue that, though we can make a case for saying corporations are moral agents, they are not moral persons, and hence, we can hold them responsible. In addition, we need not treat them the way we would be obligated to treat a moral person; we needn't have the same scruples about holding a corporation morally responsible as we would a moral person. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the moral problems that arise out of the interrelationships between individuals and formal organizations in our society. In particular, I shall be concerned with the moral implications of the so-called ideal of rationality of formal organizations with regard to, on the one hand, the obligations of individuals both inside and outside an organization to that organization and, on the other hand, the moral responsibilities of organizations to individuals and to the (...) public at large. I shall argue that certain facets of the organizational ideal are incompatible with the ordinary principles of morality and that the dilemma created by this incompatibility is one source of alienation in our contemporary, industrial society. The very conception of a formal organization or bureaucracy presents us with an ideological challenge that desperately needs to be met in some way or other. (shrink)

There is a very apparent conflict between economists and ethicists over the moral standards that should be applied to the managers of business firms. The view of most economists is that moral standards in business are not relevant, beyond the normal personal obligations to speak the truth and observe the law, because profit maximizing behaviour, under market and resource constraints, leads inexorably to social welfare optimization. The opposing view of most humanists is that modern markets are not competitive enough to (...) be constraining, that profit maximization often leads to social harm, and that welfare benefits are unjustly distributed. The article examines the moral constructs in microeconomic theory and the ethical objections to that theory at both the pragmatic and theoretic levels, and concludes that inappropriate assumptions about the nature and worth of human beings in the economic paradigm require the use of moral standards for business decisions and actions. (shrink)

During the last decade, the intensity of interest in the subject of business ethics has surprised even the most ardent defenders of the movement. It is easy to become euphoric over such developments. Yet, we should not be lulled into believing that such growth has no limits. The fact is that the movement stands at a watershed where certain alternative courses of action are available. In this paper, I outline what some of those crossroads are and what the consequences will (...) be if certain actions are or are not taken. The key to success is dependent upon a multidisciplinary approach that relies on dialogue and cooperation among colleagues in the academy and in business. This will ensure a true mix of theory and practice. (shrink)