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Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2021 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mona Simion.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Naturalism and intuitions.Hilary Kornblith - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):27-49.details
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Knowledge, Pragmatics, and Error.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57.details
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Steps to an Ecology of Knowledge: Continuity and Change in the Genealogy of Knowledge.Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):67-82.details
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Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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WAMs: Why Worry?Peter Baumann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.details
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Contextualism Contested.Earl Conee - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 47-56.details
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Adverbs of quantification.David K. Lewis - 1975 - In Edward Louis Keenan (ed.), Formal semantics of natural language: papers from a colloquium sponsored by the King's College Research Centre, Cambridge. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3--15.details
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Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.details
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Der Logische Aufbau der Welt.Rudolf Carnap - 1928 - Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.details
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Innovation and Certainty.Mark Wilson - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Knowledge, Stakes and Error: A Psychological Account.Alexander Dinges - 2019 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Klostermann.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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On Folk Epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualising Knowledge: Epistemology and Semantics.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.details
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Skeptical arguments from underdetermination.Ümit D. Yalçin - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (1):1 - 34.details
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Methodology, ontology, and interventionism.James Woodward - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3577-3599.details
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A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness.James Woodward - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):691-713.details
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What's so special about human knowledge?Michael Williams - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):249-268.details
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Philosphical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.details
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Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses.Michael Williams - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):315-343.details
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Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Knowledge, ascriptivism and defeasible concepts.Michael Williams - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 87 (1):9-36.details
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Groundless belief: an essay on the possibility of epistemology.Michael Williams - 1977 - New Haven: Yale University Press.details
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Are all conversational implicatures cancellable.Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):127-130.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):557-567.details
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Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):385-392.details
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Knowledge, certainty, and assertion.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):293-299.details
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Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.details
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Experimental work on the norms of assertion.John Turri - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (7):e12425.details
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Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
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Reason's Reach.Charles Travis - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):225-248.details
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A sense of occasion.Charles Travis - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314.details
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Quantifiers and Context Dependence.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):291-295.details
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On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context-Sensitivity of 'Knows'.Robert Stainton - 2010 - In Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Assertion: knowledge is enough.Mona Simion - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Why subject naturalists need pragmatic genealogy.Paul D. G. Showler - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4313-4335.details
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Epistemic comparativism: a contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer & Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):491-543.details
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