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  1. Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
    One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates (...)
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  • Speaker Intentions in Context.Jeffrey C. King - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):219-237.
  • Intention-Sensitive Semantics.A. Stokke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):383-404.
    A number of authors have argued that the fact that certain indexicals depend for their reference-determination on the speaker’s referential intentions demonstrates the inadequacy of associating such expressions with functions from contexts to referents (characters). By distinguishing between different uses to which the notion of context is put in these argument, I show that this line of argument fails. In the course of doing so, I develop a way of incorporating the role played by intentions into a character-based semantics for (...)
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  • On Recanati’s Mental Files.Dilip Ninan - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):368-377.
    In his book Mental Files , Francois Recanati develops a theory of mind and language based on the idea that Fregean senses should be identified with ‘mental files’, mental representations whose primary function is to store information about objects. I discuss three aspects of Recanati’s book. The first concerns his use of acquaintance relations in individuating mental files, and what this means for ‘file dynamics’. The second concerns his comments on a theory that I have elsewhere advocated, the ‘sequenced worlds’ (...)
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  • Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):570-572.
    In this short, clear and engaging book, Neil Feit defends the unorthodox view that the contents of beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are properties, and not, as is usually held, propositions. The core of his argument has to do with de se beliefs, beliefs about the self. Based on examples and arguments due to Perry, Lewis and Chisholm, along with considerations about internalism and physicalism, Feit offers a battery of arguments for the conclusion that the contents of de se beliefs (...)
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  • Relevance, Communication and Cognition.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Oxford: Blackwell.
     
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  • Putting Things in Contexts.Ben Caplan - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214.
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  • Putting Things in Contexts.Ben Caplan - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214.
    Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...)
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  • Mental Files and Rational Inferences.Andrea Onofri - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):378-392.
    My goal in this paper is to discuss the 'Fregean' account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his 'Mental Files' (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve 'the same file' in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are 'the same' only in a loose (...)
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  • Bare-Boned Demonstratives.Stefano Predelli - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.
    This essay proposes a novel semantic account of demonstratives, aimed at clarifying the sense in which demonstratives are semantically dependent on demonstrations. Its first two sections summarize the main views currently on the market. Section 3 argues that they are all vitiated by the same shortcomings, and yield incorrect results of ‘truth in virtue of character’ and entailment. Section 4 proposes a different account of the relationships between demonstratives and demonstrations, grounded on the idea of truth-conditionally irrelevant aspects of the (...)
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