Switch to: Citations

References in:

Basic infobase change

Studia Logica 67 (2):215-242 (2001)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Foundational belief change.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
    This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann's minimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the "supplementary postulates" of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • New operators for theory change.Svenove Hansson - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):114-132.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • In defense of base contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):239 - 245.
    In the most common approaches to belief dynamics, states of belief are represented by sets that are closed under logical consequence. In an alternative approach, they are represented by non-closed belief bases. This representation has attractive properties not shared by closed representations. Most importantly, it can account for repeated belief changes that have not yet been satisfactorily accounted for in the closed approach.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   306 citations  
  • Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • On the logic of iterated belief revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
    We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. We remedy this weakness by proposing four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Contrary to the AGM framework, the proposed postulates characterize belief revision as a process which may depend on elements of an epistemic state that are not necessarily captured by a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   141 citations