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  1. The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...)
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  • Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism.Torin Nagasawa, Yujin, Alter (ed.) - 2015 - Oup Usa.
    Consciousness in the Physical World collects historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces on Russellian monism, a unique alternative to the physicalist and dualist approaches to the problem of consciousness.
     
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  • Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism.Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Consciousness in the Physical World collects historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces on Russellian monism, a unique alternative to the physicalist and dualist approaches to the problem of consciousness.
     
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  • Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  • Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  • Can the Panpsychist Get Around the Combination Problem?(Chapter 6).P. Goff - 2009 - In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. John Benjamins. pp. 129--135.
     
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  • The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - 2016 - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
  • The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  • The Unity of Consciousness, Within Subjects and Between Subjects.Luke Roelofs - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3199-3221.
    The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such ‘between-subjects unity’. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of ‘experience-sharing’, in which the same token experience belongs to more (...)
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  • The View From Nowhere.Christopher Peacocke - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):772-774.
  • Consciousness and Its Objects.Colin Mcginn - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):679-681.
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  • The Phenomenologically Manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.
    Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I (...)
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  • I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  • Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
  • The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
     
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  • Mind, Brain and the Quantum.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):509-514.
  • Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - 2016 - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  • Mind, Brain, and the Quantum.Michael Lockwood - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
  • Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
  • The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.
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  • Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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  • The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
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  • Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre‐theoretical reason to believe in.
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  • Our Idea of God.Richard Swinburne & Thomas V. Morris - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):515.
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  • Review of Consciousness and its Place in Nature. [REVIEW]Barry Dainton - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):238-261.
  • Phenomenal States II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.