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  1. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
  • Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence.John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.) - 2002 - London: Oxford University Press.
  • Reflexive Reflections.Hilary Putnam - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):143-153.
  • The Chinese Room Argument Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong AI. [REVIEW]Jerome C. Wakefield - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):285-319.
    I argue that John Searle's (1980) influential Chinese room argument (CRA) against computationalism and strong AI survives existing objections, including Block's (1998) internalized systems reply, Fodor's (1991b) deviant causal chain reply, and Hauser's (1997) unconscious content reply. However, a new ``essentialist'' reply I construct shows that the CRA as presented by Searle is an unsound argument that relies on a question-begging appeal to intuition. My diagnosis of the CRA relies on an interpretation of computationalism as a scientific theory about the (...)
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  • Is There a Future for AI Without Representation?Vincent C. Müller - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115.
    This paper investigates the prospects of Rodney Brooks’ proposal for AI without representation. It turns out that the supposedly characteristic features of “new AI” (embodiment, situatedness, absence of reasoning, and absence of representation) are all present in conventional systems: “New AI” is just like old AI. Brooks proposal boils down to the architectural rejection of central control in intelligent agents—Which, however, turns out to be crucial. Some of more recent cognitive science suggests that we might do well to dispose of (...)
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  • Hypercomputation.B. Jack Copeland - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (4):461-502.
  • Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.
  • Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
    The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational (...)
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  • Two Dogmas of Computationalism.Oron Shagrir - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (3):321-44.
    This paper challenges two orthodox theses: (a) that computational processes must be algorithmic; and (b) that all computed functions must be Turing-computable. Section 2 advances the claim that the works in computability theory, including Turing's analysis of the effective computable functions, do not substantiate the two theses. It is then shown (Section 3) that we can describe a system that computes a number-theoretic function which is not Turing-computable. The argument against the first thesis proceeds in two stages. It is first (...)
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  • Solving the Symbol Grounding Problem: A Critical Review of Fifteen Years of Research.Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi - unknown
    This article reviews eight proposed strategies for solving the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP), which was given its classic formulation in Harnad (1990). After a concise introduction, we provide an analysis of the requirement that must be satisfied by any hypothesis seeking to solve the SGP, the zero semantical commitment condition. We then use it to assess the eight strategies, which are organised into three main approaches: representationalism, semi-representationalism and non-representationalism. The conclusion is that all the strategies are semantically committed and (...)
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  • The Symbol Grounding Problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.
    There has been much discussion recently about the scope and limits of purely symbolic models of the mind and about the proper role of connectionism in cognitive modeling. This paper describes the symbol grounding problem : How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their shapes, be grounded (...)
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  • A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
    Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation (...)
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  • Computational Modeling Vs. Computational Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the Philosophy of Mind?Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):93 – 115.
    According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified distinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.<br><br>.
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  • The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
    What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness (...)
     
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  • The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244:114-25.
  • Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.
    According to the computational theory of mind , to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are ambiguous, as (...)
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  • What Might Cognition Be If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345-81.
  • Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent Muller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
    The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...)
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  • Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1979 - Basic Books.
  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Synthese 123 (1):131-151.
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  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
  • Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing’s Views on the Mind-Machine Issue.B. Jack Copeland - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-32.
  • Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.
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  • Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science.Margaret Boden - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Cognitive science is the project of understanding the mind by modelling its workings. Its development is one of the most remarkable and fascinating intellectual achievements of the modern era. Mind as Machine is a masterful history of cognitive science, told by one of its most eminent practitioners.
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  • Computers Ltd: What They Really Can't Do.David Harel - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    In Computers Ltd, David Harel, best-selling author of Algorithmics, explains and illustrates one of the most fundamental, yet under-exposed facets of computers - their inherent limitations. Looking at the bad news that is proven, lasting, and robust, discussing limitations that no amounts of hardware, software, talents, or resources can overcome, the book presents a disturbing and provocative view of computing at the start of the 21st century.
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  • The Symbol Grounding Problem has Been Solved. So What's Next.Luc Steels - 2008 - In Manuel de Vega, Arthur Glenberg & Arthur Graesser (eds.), Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 223--244.
  • On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
    A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models (...)
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  • Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.John Haugeland - 1985 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    The idea that human thinking and machine computing are "radically the same" provides the central theme for this marvelously lucid and witty book on...
  • The Broad Conception of Computation.Jack Copeland - 1997 - American Behavioral Scientist 40 (6):690-716.
    A myth has arisen concerning Turing's paper of 1936, namely that Turing set forth a fundamental principle concerning the limits of what can be computed by machine - a myth that has passed into cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, to wide and pernicious effect. This supposed principle, sometimes incorrectly termed the 'Church-Turing thesis', is the claim that the class of functions that can be computed by machines is identical to the class of functions that can be computed by (...)
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  • Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective.Thomas Hofweber & Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
  • Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?.Jerry A. Fodor - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.
  • The Universal Computer. The Road From Leibniz to Turing.Martin Davis - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):65-66.
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  • So How Does the Mind Work?Steven Pinker - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.
    In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that 'the mind doesn't work that way'(in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans' ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our understanding (...)
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  • Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
  • Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
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  • The Elm and the Expert.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
  • Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought.Peter Gärdenfors - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):180-181.
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  • Representation in Digital Systems.Vincent C. Müller - 2008 - In Adam Briggle, Katinka Waelbers & Brey Philip (eds.), Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy. IOS Press. pp. 116-121.
    Cognition is commonly taken to be computational manipulation of representations. These representations are assumed to be digital, but it is not usually specified what that means and what relevance it has for the theory. I propose a specification for being a digital state in a digital system, especially a digital computational system. The specification shows that identification of digital states requires functional directedness, either for someone or for the system of which it is a part. In the case or digital (...)
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  • Defending Realism on the Proper Ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
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  • Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century.Jerry A. Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.
  • Consciousness and Language.John R. Searle - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical (...)
  • Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
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  • The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
  • The Elm and the Expert. Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (3):578-580.
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  • The Phenomenal Content of Experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. M.Üller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
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  • What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345 - 381.
  • The Phenomenal Content of Experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
    We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...)
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  • The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.
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  • Functionalism at Forty.Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
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