Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Emergence of Novelty.C. Lloyd Morgan - 1933 - London: Williams & Norgate.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Space, Time and Deity: The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918.Samuel Alexander - 1920 - London, England: Dover Publications.
  • A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  • Weak Emergence.Mark A. Bedau - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:375-399.
    An innocent form of emergence—what I call "weak emergence"—is now a commonplace in a thriving interdisciplinary nexus of scientific activity—sometimes called the "sciences of complexity"—that include connectionist modelling, non-linear dynamics (popularly known as "chaos" theory), and artificial life.1 After defining it, illustrating it in two contexts, and reviewing the available evidence, I conclude that the scientific and philosophical prospects for weak emergence are bright.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  • A System of Logic.John Stuart Mill - 1874 - Longman.
    Reprint of the original, first published in 1869.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   533 citations  
  • Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
    "This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   451 citations  
  • Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   814 citations  
  • Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Space, Time and Deity.S. Alexander - 1920 - Macmillan.
  • The Case for Emergent Evolution.C. Lloyd Morgan - 1929 - Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 (13):23-38.
    The word “emergent” was suggested by George Henry Lewes for specialized use in contradistinction to “resultant.” Little came of the suggestion, so far as I know, for some forty years. All that Lewes had to say on the matter is comprised within half a dozen, or at most eleven, pages, at the close of a long-winded, but at that time not negligible, discussion of Force and Cause, and is preceded by a section on Hume's Theory of Causation. This leads up (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Properties.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:115-118.
  • Emergence.Robert Michael Francescotti - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.
    Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Functionalism and Causal Exclusion.D. Gene Witmer - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):198-214.
    Recent work by Jaegwon Kim and others suggest that functionalism leaves mental properties causally inefficacious in some sense. I examine three lines of argument for this conclusion. The first appeals to Occam's Razor; the second appeals to a ban on overdetermination; and the third charges that the kind of response I favor to these arguments forces me to give up "the homogeneity of mental and physical causation". I show how each argument fails. While I concede that a positive theory of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
  • Emergence, Not Supervenience.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (S4):S337-S345.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Reduction and Properties: Response to Merricks.Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (3):161-164.
  • Do Causal Powers Drain Away.Ned Block - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue that such a consequence (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • The Search for Ontological Emergence.Michael Silberstein & John Mcgeever - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):201-214.
    We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism.Dwayne Moore - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.
    The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists.Carl Gillett - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):261-296.
    Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):547-559.
    This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a “positive” characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim’s Master Argument.Sven Walter - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • A Non-Reductive Model of Component Forces and Resultant Force.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):359-380.
    While there are reasons to believe that both component forces and a resultant force operate on a body in combined circumstances, the threat of overdetermination largely prevents adoption of this view. Accordingly, a lively debate has arisen over which force actually exists and which force is eliminated in combined circumstances, the components or the resultant. In this article I present a non-reductive model of resultant force which ensures the existence of both the resultant force and the component forces without overdetermination. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Barry Loewer & Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):315.
  • Mind -- Dust or Magic?James Van Cleve - 1990 - Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.
  • XIV—Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?Jaegwon Kim - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (3):281-297.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
  • Supervenient Properties and Micro-Based Concepts: A Reply to Noordhof.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-118.
  • Does the Problem of Mental Causation Generalize?Jaegwon Kim - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (3):281-97.
  • Emergence, Not Supervenience.Paul W. Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim: Discussion.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):109-114.
  • VII.—A Concept of the Organism, Emergent and Resultant.C. Lloyd Morgan - 1927 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27 (1):141-176.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Mind – Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence.James van Cleve - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence.James Van Cleve - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:215 - 226.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?Byeong-Uk Yi - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):141-160.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • The Generalization Problem and the Identity Solution.Dwayne Moore - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):57-72.
    For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not take long for his critics (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Composition as Identity.Peter van Inwagen - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:207 - 220.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation.Achim Stephan - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):77-93.
    Several theories of emergence will be distinguished. In particular, these are synchronic, diachronic, and weak versions of emergence. While the weaker theories are compatible with property reductionism, synchronic emergentism and strong versions of diachronic emergentism are not. Synchronice mergentism is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. For such a theory, a system's property is taken to be emergent if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reductively explainable. Furthermore, we have to distinguish two different types of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?Nancy Cartwright - 1998 - In M. Curd & J. A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. Norton. pp. 865-877.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations