References in
Luca Moretti (2016). Evidence of Expert's Evidence is Evidence.

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  1. Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems.Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.) - 1994 - Krieger Pub. Co..
  2. Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
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    The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise: Science Education and the Limits of Intellectual Independence.Stella Gaon & Stephen P. Norris - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (2):187–201.
  4. The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise: Science Education and the Limits of Intellectual Independence.Stella Gaon & Stephen P. Norris - 2001 - Journal of the Philosophy of Education 35 (2):187-201.
  5.  83
    Epistemology Futures.Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contributors: Paul M. Churchland, Catherine Z. Elgin, Richard (...)
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  6.  68
    Evidence of Evidence is Evidence Under Screening-Off.William Roche - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):119-124.
    An important question in the current debate on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is whether evidence of evidence is evidence. Fitelson argues that, at least on some renderings of the thesis that evidence of evidence is evidence, there are cases where evidence of evidence is not evidence. I introduce a condition and show that under this condition evidence of evidence is evidence.
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    A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
    Probabilistic support is not transitive. There are cases in which x probabilistically supports y , i.e., Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y ), y , in turn, probabilistically supports z , and yet it is not the case that x probabilistically supports z . Tomoji Shogenji, though, establishes a condition for transitivity in probabilistic support, that is, a condition such that, for any x , y , and z , if Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y (...)
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    Reflexive Predictions.George D. Romanos - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):97-109.
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    A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
    It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that (...)
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