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Evidence of expert's evidence is evidence

Episteme 13 (2):208-218 (2016)

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  1. The Role of Trust in Knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
  • Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
    find myself believing all sorts 0f things for which I d0 not possess evidence: that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, that my car keeps stalling because the carburetor needs LO be rebuilt, that mass media threaten democracy, that slums cause emotional disorders, that my irregular heart beat is premature ventricular contraction, that students} grades are not correlated with success in the ncmacadcmic world, that nuclear power plants are not safe (enough) . . . The list 0f things I believe, though (...)
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  • Evidence of Evidence is Evidence Under Screening-Off.William Roche - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):119-124.
    An important question in the current debate on the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is whether evidence of evidence is evidence. Fitelson argues that, at least on some renderings of the thesis that evidence of evidence is evidence, there are cases where evidence of evidence is not evidence. I introduce a condition and show that under this condition evidence of evidence is evidence.
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  • Experts, Evidence, and Epistemic Independence.Ben Almassi - 2007 - Spontaneous Generations 1 (1):58-66.
    Throughout his work on the rationality of epistemic dependence, John Hardwig makes the striking observation that he believes many things for which he possesses no evidence (1985, 335; 1991, 693; 1994, 83). While he could imagine collecting for himself the relevant evidence for some of his beliefs, the vastness of the world and constraints of time and individual intellect thwart his ability to gather for himself the evidence for all his beliefs. So for many things he believes what others tell (...)
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  • A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William A. Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
    Probabilistic support is not transitive. There are cases in which x probabilistically supports y , i.e., Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y ), y , in turn, probabilistically supports z , and yet it is not the case that x probabilistically supports z . Tomoji Shogenji, though, establishes a condition for transitivity in probabilistic support, that is, a condition such that, for any x , y , and z , if Pr( y | x ) > Pr( y (...)
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  • Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.
    We have several intuitive paradigms of defeating evidence. For example, let E be the fact that Ernie tells me that the notorious pet Precious is a bird. This supports the premise F, that Precious can fly. However, Orna gives me *opposing* evidence. She says that Precious is a dog. Alternatively, defeating evidence might not oppose Ernie's testimony in that direct way. There might be other ways for it to weaken the support that Ernie's testimony gives me for believing F, without (...)
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  • Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
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  • Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
    My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.
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  • Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  • A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.Tomoji Shogenji - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
    It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that (...)
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  • The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise: Science Education and the Limits of Intellectual Independence.Stella Gaon & Stephen P. Norris - 2001 - Philosophy of Education 35 (2):187-201.
  • The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise: Science Education and the Limits of Intellectual Independence.Stella Gaon & Stephen P. Norris - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (2):187–201.
  • The Undecidable Grounds of Scientific Expertise: Science Education and the Limits of Intellectual In.Stella Gaon & Stephen P. Norris - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 35 (2):187-201.
  • Reflexive Predictions.George D. Romanos - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):97-109.
  • Epistemology Futures.Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contributors: Paul M. Churchland, Catherine Z. Elgin, Richard (...)
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  • Is Evidence Historical?Laura J. Snyder - 1994 - In Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.), Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems. Krieger Pub. Co.. pp. 95--117.
     
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  • Scientific Methods: Conceptual and Historical Problems.Peter Achinstein & Laura J. Snyder (eds.) - 1994 - Krieger Pub. Co..