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Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma.

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  1.  34
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 154.
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  2. Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  3. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
    1 Knowledge and Justification This book is an investigation of one central problem which arises in the attempt to give a philosophical account of empirical ...
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  4.  87
    Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal Conservatism Phenomenal Conservatism is a theory in epistemology that seeks, roughly, to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds a belief. The theory fits with an internalistic form of foundationalism—that is, the view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially (not on the basis of other beliefs), and that […].
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  5. Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  6. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external..
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  7. Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
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    Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - Hutchinson.
    This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.
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  9. Bergmann's Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists.Jason Rogers & Jonathan Matheson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):55 - 80.
    Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of "weak awareness internalism" that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the "Subject's Perspective Objection" horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of "strong awareness internalism" that do not fall prey to the dilemma's "vicious regress" horn. We note along the way that (...)
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  10.  56
    Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    The primary aim of this book is to understand how seemings relate to justification and whether some version of dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism can be sustained. It also addresses a number of other issues, including the nature of seemings, cognitive penetration, Bayesianism, and the epistemology of morality and disagreement.
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  11. Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification.Chris Tucker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, (...)
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