- Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
|
|
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
|
|
Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.details
|
|
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
|
|
The Problem of Consciousness by Colin McGinn. [REVIEW]William Seager - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (6):327-330.details
|
|
Mind the gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:373-89.details
|
|
Mind the Gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):373-388.details
|
|
Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts.Macdonald Cynthia - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):503-524.details
|
|
The Problem of Consciousness.Andrew Jack & Colin McGinn - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):106.details
|
|
Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.details
|
|
The knowledge argument and higher-order properties.Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2005 - Ratio 18 (1):48-64.details
|
|
Mary Mary, quite contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.details
|
|
A defense of the knowledge argument.Brie Gertler - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.details
|
|
Consciousness Reconsidered.Raw Feeling: a Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness.Owen Flanagan & Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):417-421.details
|
|
Consciousness Reconsidered.Owen J. Flanagan - 1992 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.details
|
|
The (multiple) realization of psychological and other properties in the sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.details
|
|
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
|
|
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory.Clive Vernon Borst (ed.) - 1970 - New York,: Macmillan.details
|
|
What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.details
|
|
Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.details
|
|
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.details
|
|
The knowledge argument.Torin Alter - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 396--405.details
|
|
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
|
|
Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
|
|
Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars.Tamler Sommers - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.details
|
|
Goodbye to qualia and all that? Review article.David Hodgson - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):84-88.details
|
|
Goodbye To Qualia And All That?: Review Article.David Hodgson - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):84-89.details
|
|
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.details
|
|
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The knowledge argument.Torin Alter - 1999 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.details
|
|
When a problem for all is a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem.Kenneth E. Himma - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):81-92.details
|
|