- Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Epistemology of disagreement : the good news.David Christensen - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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When to defer to majority testimony - and when not.P. Pettit - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):179-187.details
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Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry.Marc Moffett - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):352-367.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.details
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When rational disagreement is impossible.Keith Lehrer - 1976 - Noûs 10 (3):327-332.details
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The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.details
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Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism.Gary Gutting - 1982 - University of Notre Dame Press.details
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Arguing About Gods.Graham Robert Oppy - 2006 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Critica 31 (93):3-19.details
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A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.details
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The Division of Cognitive Labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.Peter van Inwagen - 1996 - In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom and Rationality. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 137-154.details
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``Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism".Alvin Plantinga - 1995 - In Kevin Meeker & Philip Quinn (eds.), The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 172-192.details
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Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism.Gary Gutting - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (230):544-545.details
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Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism.Gary Gutting - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 15 (1):94-95.details
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