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  1. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  • Preconscious Free Will.Max Velmans - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):42-61.
    This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will. Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile (...)
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  • Perceptual Symbol Systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  • From Monkey-Like Action Recognition to Human Language: An Evolutionary Framework for Neurolinguistics.Michael A. Arbib - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):105-124.
    The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a “mirror system” active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 (...)
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  • Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.
    Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to (...)
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  • Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  • Free Will as Transcending the Unidirectional Neural Substrate.Joseph F. Rychlak - 1983 - Zygon 18 (4):439-442.
  • Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. By Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown. [REVIEW]Daniel Lim - 2008 - Zygon 43 (3):748-753.
  • Free Will has a Neural Substrate: Critique of Joseph F. Rychlak's Discovering Free Will and Personal Responsibility.Robert B. Glassman - 1983 - Zygon 18 (1):67-82.
    . Ably marshalling ideas from theology, philosophy, and neurology, personality theorist Joseph F. Rychlak criticizes mechanistic psychologists' neglect of will and responsibility; these human qualities involve dialectically considering alternatives. I disagree with Rychlaks suggestion of fundamental mystery in the minds transcendence of the body and believe transcendent mind is intimately related to biological evolution and the brain. For example, dialectics, seen in simpler forms in lower animals, may require neural inhibition, feedback circuits, and topographic mappings. However, epistemologically speaking, neuroscientists strongly (...)
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  • Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. By John R. Searle.Dennis Bielfeldt - 2009 - Zygon 44 (4):999-1002.
  • A Framework for Representing Knowledge.Marvin Minsky - unknown
    It seems to me that the ingredients of most theories both in Artificial Intelligence and in Psychology have been on the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account–either practically or phenomenologically–for the effectiveness of common-sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language, memory, and "perception" ought to be larger and more structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more intimately connected in order to explain the apparent power and speed of mental activities.
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  • The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.Julian Jaynes - 1981 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 14 (2):127-129.
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  • Symbols: Integrated Cognition and Language.Leonid I. Perlovsky - 2007 - In R. Gudwin & J. Queiroz (eds.), Semiotics and Intelligent Systems Development. Idea Group. pp. 121--151.
  • Modeling Field Theory of Higher Cognitive Functions.L. I. Perlovsky - 2006 - In A. Loula, R. Gudwin & J. Queiroz (eds.), Artificial Cognition Systems. Idea Group Publishers. pp. 64--105.
  • Do We Have Free Will?Benjamin W. Libet - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Oxford University Press. pp. 551--564.
    I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on (...)
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  • Neuroscientific Insights on Biblical Myths.Daniel S. Levine & Leonid I. Perlovsky - 2008 - Zygon 43 (4).
     
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