This essay argues that in linguistic communication, nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as summarized by the three principles of first meaning in language: that first meaning is systematic, first meanings are shared, and first meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. There is no such a thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language users (...) acquire and then apply to cases, as well as the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions. (shrink)

I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universitat Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat's at tempt to bring together analytical and continental philosophy has never ceased to fascinate me, and even though in more recent years other influences have perhaps been stronger, I should like to look upon the present study as still being indebted to Tugendhat's initial incentive. It was my good fortune (...) that for personal reasons I had to con tinue my academic training from 1981 onwards in Finland. Even though Finland is a stronghold of analytical philosophy, it also has a tradition of combining continental and Anglosaxon philosophical thought. Since I had already admired this line of work in Tugendhat, it is hardly surprising that once in Finland I soon became impressed by Professor Jaakko Hintikka's studies on Husserl and intentionality, and by Professor Georg Henrik von Wright's analytical hermeneu tics. While the latter influence has-at least in part-led to a book on the history of hermeneutics, the former influence has led to the present work. My indebtedness to Professor Hintikka is enormous. Not only is the research reported here based on his suggestions, but Hintikka has also commented extensively on different versions of the manuscript, helped me to make important contacts, found a publisher for me, and-last but not least-was a never failing source of encouragement. (shrink)

"Eco wittily and enchantingly develops themes often touched on in his previous works, but he delves deeper into their complex nature... this collection can be read with pleasure by those unversed in semiotic theory." —Times Literary Supplement.

Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...) and psychologists. (shrink)