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  1. Why Are Identity Disorders Interesting for Philosophers?Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - In T. Schramme & J. Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter.
    “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content. There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dissociative Identity Disorder_, sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within (...)
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  • Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  • The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.Thomas Metzinger - 2004 - Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
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  • Faster Than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
     
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  • Edmund Husserl: Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität.Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - 2000 - Alber.
  • Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie.Edmund Husserl - 1950 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
    Mit den "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" von 1913, von ihm selbst nur als eine "Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie" angezeigt, zog Edmund Husserl die Konsequenz aus seinen Logischen Untersuchungen , die ihn 1900/01 berühmt gemacht hatten: Ausgehend von der dort entwickelten Phänomenologie der intentionalen Erlebnisse sieht er jetzt in der Aufdeckung der Leistungen des "reinen Bewußtseins", dem die uns bekannte natürliche Welt nur als "Bewußtseinskorrelat" gegeben ist, den eigentlichen Gegenstand philosophischer Erkenntnis und in den von (...)
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  • The Pre-Scientific Concept of a "Soul": A Neurophenomenological Hypothesis About its Origin.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
     
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  • Einleitung in Die Philosophie.Martin Heidegger, Otto Saame & Ina Saame-Speidel - 1996
     
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  • Das "Gehirn-Selbst". Ist die Erste-Person-Perspektive naturalisierbar?Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl - 2004 - Phänomenologische Forschungen.
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  • Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology.Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud & Francisco J. Varela - 1999 - In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
     
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