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  1. Elementary Induction on Abstract Structures.Wayne Richter - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (1):124-125.
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  • Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions: Parameters, Complexity and Games.Kai-Uwe Küdhnberger, Benedikt Löwe, Michael Möllerfeld & Philip Welch - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79 - 98.
    Gupta-Belnap-style circular definitions use all real numbers as possible starting points of revision sequences. In that sense they are boldface definitions. We discuss lightface versions of circular definitions and boldface versions of inductive definitions.
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  • Semantics and the Liar Paradox.Albert Visser - 1989 - Handbook of Philosophical Logic 4 (1):617--706.
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  • Supervaluation on Trees for Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):46-74.
    A method of supervaluation for Kripke’s theory of truth is presented. It differs from Kripke’s own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta’s; and – it is argued – is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.
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  • Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost.Toby Meadows - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  • Vagueness and Revision Sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
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  • XV—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1):227-246.
  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  • Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • On Rigorous Definitions.Nuel Belnap - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):115 - 146.
  • Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
    In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of (...)
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  • Alternative Revision Theories of Truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
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  • Notes on Naive Semantics.Hans G. Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
  • Definitions, Consistent and Inconsistent.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):147 - 175.
  • On Revision Operators.P. D. Welch - 2003 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2):689-711.
    We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...)
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  • Notes on the Mathematical Aspects of Kripke's Theory of Truth.Melvin Fitting - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):75-88.
  • Model Theory.Michael Makkai, C. C. Chang & H. J. Keisler - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):1096.
  • Revision.Vann McGee - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:387-406.
  • Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin.Anil Gupta - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.
  • Revision and its Rivals.Donald A. Martin - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:407-418.
  • A Guide to Truth Predicates in the Modern Era.Michael Sheard - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):1032-1054.