Switch to: Citations

References in:

Which Are the Genuine Properties?

Metaphilosophy 46 (1):104-126 (2015)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Professional philosophers and advanced students working in metaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.
  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
  • A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...)
  • Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics.D. M. Armstrong - 2010 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press UK.
    In his last book, David Armstrong sets out his metaphysical system in a set of concise and lively chapters each dealing with one aspect of the world. He begins with the assumption that all that exists is the physical world of space-time. On this foundation he constructs a coherent metaphysical scheme that gives plausible answers to many of the great problems of metaphysics. He gives accounts of properties, relations, and particulars; laws of nature; modality; abstract objects such as numbers; and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.D. M. ARMSTRONG - 1989 - Westview Press.
    In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...)
  • Abstract Particulars.Keith Campbell - 1990 - Blackwell.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    From an Ontological Point of View is a highly original and accessible exploration of fundamental questions about what there is. John Heil discusses such issues as whether the world includes levels of reality; the nature of objects and properties; the demands of realism; what makes things true; qualities, powers, and the relation these bear to one another. He advances an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us, and applies this account to problems that have plagued recent work (...)
  • Causation: A Realist Approach.Michael Tooley - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    Tooley here sets out and defends realist accounts of traditional empiricist explanations of causation and laws of nature, arguing that since reductionist accounts of causation are exposed to decisive objections, empiricists must break with that tradition.
  • Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other, and whose (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations  
  • Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind–Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
  • Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
  • The Ontological Turn.C. B. Martin & John Heil - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):34–60.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
    Stephen Mumford puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role is in metaphysics and philosophy of science. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties--from the solubility of sugar to the belief that zebras have stripes. Mumford discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. His clear, straightforward, realist account reveals (...)
  • Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
    This article describes a theory of the computations underlying the selection of coordinated motion patterns, especially in reaching tasks. The central idea is that when a spatial target is selected as an object to be reached, stored postures are evaluated for the contributions they can make to the task. Weights are assigned to the stored postures, and a single target posture is found by taking a weighted sum of the stored postures. Movement is achieved by reducing the distance between the (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   585 citations  
  • Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2.David Lewis - 1999 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This volume is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology. Topics covered include properties, ontology, possibility, truthmaking, probability, the mind-body problem, vision, belief, and knowledge. The purpose of this collection, and the volumes that precede and follow it, is to disseminate more widely the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher. The volume will serve as a useful work of reference for teachers and students of philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   154 citations  
  • Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.
    While concerns of the mental being causally excluded by the physical have persistently plagued non-reductive physicalism, such concerns are standardly taken to pose no problem for reductive type physicalism. Type physicalists have the obvious advantage of being able to countenance the reduction of mental properties to their physical base properties by way of type identity, thereby avoiding any causal competition between instances of mental properties and their physical bases. Here, I challenge this widely accepted advantage of type physicalism over non-reductive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
  • From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  • Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.Schaffer Jonathan - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102.
    Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Three Theses About Dispositions.Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
    I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   144 citations  
  • Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):466-479.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Barry Loewer & Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):315.
  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Noûs 24 (1):181-184.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s Mind and the Physical World.Barry Loewer - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):655–662.
    NRP is a family of views differing by how they understand “reduction” and “physicalism.” Following Kim I understand the non-reduction as holding that some events and properties are distinct from any physical events and properties. A necessary condition for physicalism is that mental properties, events, and laws supervene on physical ones. Kim allows various understandings of “supervenience” but I think that physicalism requires at least the claim that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter. Some (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1997 - Philosophy 74 (287):130-134.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   281 citations  
  • Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations.Jeffrey Poland - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):115-118.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Physicalism, the Philosophical Foundations.Jeffrey Poland - 1994 - Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism is a program for building a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. Jeffrey Poland presents a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the philosophical foundations of this program. He investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. He (...)
  • Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):143-147.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes offers an important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim.Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Layered Model: Metaphysical Considerations.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (1):2 – 20.
    This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics as our "basic" (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Clarendon Press.
    E. J. Lowe, a prominent figure in contemporary metaphysics, sets out and defends his theory of what there is. His four-category ontology is a metaphysical system which recognizes four fundamental categories of beings: substantial and non-substantial particulars and substantial and non-substantial universals. Lowe argues that this system has an explanatory power which is unrivalled by more parsimonious theories and that this counts decisively in its favour. He shows that it provides a powerful explanatory framework for a unified account of causation, (...)
  • The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument.Sven Walter - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Universe as We Find It.John Heil - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    What does reality encompass? Is it exclusively physical, or does it include mental and 'abstract' aspects? What are the elements of being, reality's raw materials? John Heil offers stimulating answers to these questions framed in terms of a comprehensive metaphysics of substances and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, and their successors.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • The Determinable-Determinate Relation.Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):548–569.
    The properties colored and red stand in a special relation. Namely, red is a determinate of colored, and colored is determinable relative to red. Many other properties are similarly related. The determination relation is an interesting topic of logical investigation in its own right, and the prominent philosophical inquiries into this relation have, accordingly, operated at a high level of abstraction.1 It is time to return to these investigations, not just as a logical amusement, but for the payoffs such investigation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Philosophy in Mediis Rebus.Rudder Baker Lynne - 2001 - Metaphilosophy 32 (4):378-394.
    How should philosophy be pursued? I want to defend a conception of philosophy in mediis rebus—philosophy in the middle of things. The more familiar Latin phrase is ‘in medias res,’ but Latin distinguishes two readings of ‘in the middle of things.’ There’s the middle of things from which one starts, and there’s the middle of things into which one jumps. ‘In medias res’ is the middle of things into which one jumps; I, however, mean to invoke the middle of things (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Mind-Body Problem: Taking Stock After Forty Years.Jaegwon Kim - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):185-207.
  • Lessons From Causal Exclusion.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):594-604.
    Jaegwon Kim's causal exclusion argument has rarely been evaluated from an empirical perspective. This is puzzling because its conclusion seems to be making a testable claim about the world: supervenient properties are causally inefficacious. An empirical perspective, however, reveals Kim's argument to rest on a mistaken conception about how to test whether a property is causally efficacious. Moreover, the empirical perspective makes visible a metaphysical bias that Kim brings to his argument that involves a principle of non-inclusion.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Thoughts on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization.Jaegwon Kim - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):101 - 112.
    This paper discusses in broad terms the metaphysical projects of Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization . Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of Shoemaker’s novel “subset” account of realization for defusing the problem of mental causation, and compare the “subset” account with the standard “second-order” account. Finally, I discuss the physicalist status of the metaphysical worldview presented in Shoemaker’s important new contribution to philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Supervenience Argument Generalizes.Thomas D. Bontly - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (1):75-96.
    In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues thatpsychophysical supervenience withoutpsychophysical reduction renders mentalcausation `unintelligible'. He also claimsthat, contrary to popular opinion, his argumentagainst supervenient mental causation cannot begeneralized so as to threaten the causalefficacy of other `higher-level' properties:e.g., the properties of special sciences likebiology. In this paper, I argue that none ofthe considerations Kim advances are sufficientto keep the supervenience argument fromgeneralizing to all higher-level properties,and that Kim's position in fact entails thatonly the properties of fundamental physicalparticles are causally efficacious.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Supervenience Deconstructed.John Heil - 1998 - European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):146-155.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  • Physical Realization.Sydney Shoemaker - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, (...)
  • Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).J. A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
  • Do Causal Powers Drain Away.Ned Block - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue that such a consequence (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Principles of Object Perception.Elizabeth S. Spelke - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (1):29--56.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations