: With the advent of the Genetic Age comes a unique new set of problems and ethical decisions. There is a tendency to take the scientific developments presented by modern genetics at face value, as if the science itself were value-neutral and not influenced by cultural and religious images. One example of the fallout of the Genetic Age is the development of a "genetic self," the idea that our essential selfhood lies in our genes. It is important to understand the (...) assumptions of the Genetic Age, the development of genetic selfhood, and the broader cultural trends and assumptions that underlie modern genetic thinking. It is equally important, however, to shape a reaction to the concept of a genetic self. Judaism has long carried on a unique discussion about the nature of selfhood in different times and places and about the relation of the corporeal self to the essential self. Insights from Judaism therefore may help to craft a reaction to the modern genetic self that incorporates the best of modern genetics as well as the integrity of a more transcendent selfhood. (shrink)

Discusses contemporary notions of the self, and examines their origins, development, and effects.

: This paper discusses the morality of patenting human genes and genetic technologies. After examining arguments on different sides of the issue, the paper concludes that there are, at present, no compelling reasons to prohibit the extension of current patent laws to the realm of human genetics. However, since advances in genetics are likely to have profound social implications, the most prudent course of action demands a continual reexamination of genetics laws and policies in light of ongoing developments in science (...) and technology. (shrink)

The genome is one of the primordial elements of the human being and is responsible for human identity and its transmission to descendants. The gene as such ought not be appropriated or owned by man. However, any sufficiently complete description of a gene should be capable of being protected as intellectual property. Furthermore, all utilisations of a gene or its elements that permit development of processes or new products should be patentable. Ethics, in the sense of moral action, should come (...) into play from the very first stages of research into the human genome. Protection of intellectual and industrial property is of purely legal concern and need not provoke ethical consideration. By contrast, the use of the results of, and in particular the commercialisation of products deriving from, research into the human genome, ought to be subjected to ethical consideration and control. Considering the economic and societal stakes of such research, ethical analysis ought to be at an international level if mistakes and unforeseen risks of conflict are to be avoided. (shrink)

The decade-long debate over ownership of living human materials has recently intensified with the ability of biomedical research to isolate, purify, and use human genes and gene products as therapeutics, factories for the production of therapeutics, and targets for the identification of therapeutic pharmaceuticals. Indeed, advances in genomic research have resulted in the identification of hundreds of thousands of DNA fragments and hundreds of genes. Many within the scientific and business communities believe genes and gene fragments have commercial value and (...) have filed patent applications on the nucleic acid sequences. This commercialization has amplified the discussion surrounding the ethics of patenting genes and the ownership of the human genome. (shrink)

When one examines the emerging debate about genetic patenting, it becomes clear that those who oppose so-called misunderstand genetics or apply inappropriate moral and jurisprudential theory. In this brief essay I examine some arguments against gene patents of the variety, and conclude that patents on methods for detecting the presence of a genetic correlation with disease-related (and other) phenotypes can be appropriate, and that with several precautions the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office should continue granting patent protection to investigators who (...) generate genetic disease diagnostic innovations. (shrink)

Glenn McGee argues that the time is now for debating the morality of patenting human genes. In one sense he is surely right. While thousands of patents have been issued or are pending on many gene sequences, public policy with respect to ownership of the human genome is still far from settled. So a debate about the ethics of patenting genes is, if nothing else, timely. In another sense however, Professor McGee is wrong.

This book relates work in neuroscience, psychology and psychiatry to questions about what a person is and the nature of a persons unity across a lifetime. The neuropsychiatry is now dated. The philosophy has three themes still perhaps of interest. The first is a response to Derek Parfits powerful and influential work on personal identity, which, like many other people, I discussed with him as he worked it out. I accept his view that there is no ego that owns the (...) stream of our experiences, and the unity of a person over time is constructed out of continuities in our mental life. But I argue against Parfits view that personal unity thereby becomes less deep or less morally important. The second theme is an emphasis on the importance of self-creation and an attempt to work out how far it is possible. The third theme is about the way self-creation is linked to recognition by other people, and the importance of this for understanding the role of tribalism in human life. "This book is about what it is to be a person, to think of oneself as an "I". It is about the ways people think of themselves, and how they use these ideas in shaping their own distinctive characteristics. It is about how far we create ourslves." "When a way of life does not fit with what you think you are really like, you can feel like a plant away from the light, distorted by having to twist and grope towards the sun. This analogy suggests that we might have a genetic programme to unfold, in the way plants do. But no doubt it is too simple to think that "the real me" is genetically laid down. These strong affinities we have for some kinds of life, and the sense of drowning that others give us, are likely to have been created by the interaction of our genetic make-up with thigs we have come across and responded to... We care a bit like trees would be, if they were conscious and could partly choose their direction of growth. Perhaps oaks could not become beeches, and stunted trees could not become giants, but they could influence the angle and direction of their branches. Trees thinking about determinism and free will might find it impossible to assess their own contribution to their final shape.". (shrink)