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  1. A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
    The paper offers a solution to the semantic paradoxes, one in which we keep the unrestricted truth schema “True↔A”, and the object language can include its own metalanguage. Because of the first feature, classical logic must be restricted, but full classical reasoning applies in “ordinary” contexts, including standard set theory. The more general logic that replaces classical logic includes a principle of substitutivity of equivalents, which with the truth schema leads to the general intersubstitutivity of True with A within the (...)
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  • Some Observations on Truth Hierarchies: A Correction.Philip D. Welch - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):857-860.
    A correction is needed to our paper: to the definition contained within the statement of Lemma 1.5 and thus arguments around it in §3.
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  • Some Observations on Truth Hierarchies.P. D. Welch - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-30.
    We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...)
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  • Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • Truth, Logical Validity and Determinateness: A Commentary on Field’s Saving Truth From Paradox.P. D. Welch - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):348-359.
    We consider notions of truth and logical validity defined in various recent constructions of Hartry Field. We try to explicate his notion of determinate truth by clarifying the path-dependent hierarchies of his determinateness operator.
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  • Ultimate Truth Vis- À- Vis Stable Truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.
    We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...)
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  • Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge.Hartry Field - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    It is “the received wisdom” that any intuitively natural and consistent resolution of a class of semantic paradoxes immediately leads to other paradoxes just as bad as the first. This is often called the “revenge problem”. Some proponents of the received wisdom draw the conclusion that there is no hope of any natural treatment that puts all the paradoxes to rest: we must either live with the existence of paradoxes that we are unable to treat, or adopt artificial and ad (...)
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