- Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
Not enough there there evidence, reasons, and language independence.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):477-528.details
|
|
Improbable Knowing. Timothy - 2011 - In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 147--64.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Continuing on.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
|
|
Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
|
|
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
|
|
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
|
|
A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
|
|
Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
|
|
A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
|
|
Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.Gideon Rosen - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):69 - 91.details
|
|
The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
|
|
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
|
|
Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.details
|
|
Evidentialism and its Discontents.Trent Dougherty (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
|
|
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
|
|
A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
|
|
Uniqueness revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.details
|
|
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
|
|
In defense of propositionalism about evidence.Trent Dougherty - 2011 - In Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.details
|
|