Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Extended Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
    I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • The Nature of the Physical World.Arthur Stanley Eddington - 1928 - London: Dent.
    1929. The course of Gifford Lectures that Eddington delivered in the University of Edinburgh in January to March 1927.
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   176 citations  
  • The Mind and its Place in Nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Routledge.
  • Space, Time and Deity.S. Alexander - 1920 - Macmillan.
  • Realistic Monism - Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
  • Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism.William Seager - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):272-88.
    The generation problem is to explain how material configurations or processes can produce conscious experience. David Chalmers urges that this is what makes the problem of consciousness really difficult. He proposes to side-step the generation problem by proposing that consciousness is an absolutely fundamental feature of the world. I am inclined to agree that the generation problem is real and believe that taking consciousness to be fundamental is promising. But I take issue with Chalmers about what it is to be (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1408 citations  
  • Structural Realism.James Ladyman - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
    Structural realism is considered by many realists and antirealists alike as the most defensible form of scientific realism. There are now many forms of structural realism and an extensive literature about them. There are interesting connections with debates in metaphysics, philosophy of physics and philosophy of mathematics. This entry is intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field.
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • The Mathematical Structure of the World: The World as Graph.Randall R. Dipert - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (7):329-358.
    Direct download (7 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Troubles with Functionalism.Block Ned - 1978 - In W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 9--261.
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):59-71.
    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Neutral Monism.Leopold Stubenberg - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   32 citations