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Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative).

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  1. Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  2. Finlay and Schroeder on Promoting a Desire.Jeff Behrends & Joshua DiPaolo - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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  3. What Ought Probably Means, and Why You Can't Detach It.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.
    Some intuitive normative principles raise vexing 'detaching problems' by their failure to license modus ponens. I examine three such principles (a self-reliance principle and two different instrumental principles) and recent stategies employed to resolve their detaching problems. I show that solving these problems necessitates postulating an indefinitely large number of senses for 'ought'. The semantics for 'ought' that is standard in linguistics offers a unifying strategy for solving these problems, but I argue that an alternative approach combining an end-relational theory (...)
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  4. The Reasons That Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
    Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgements, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers an intermediary view, reformulating scepticism about external reasons as the claim not that they don't exist but rather that they don't matter. The end-relational theory of normative reasons is proposed, according to which a reason for an action is a fact that explains why the action would be good relative to some end, (...)
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  5. Direction of Fit.I. L. Humberstone - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):59-83.
  6. Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.William G. Lycan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
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    In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire.John Milliken - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):563-571.
    Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the (...)
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  8. Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...)
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  9. Is There a Nexus Between Reasons and Rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
    When we say that a subject has attitudes that she is rationally required to have, does that entail that she has those attitudes for reasons? In other words, is there a deep nexus between being rational and responding to reasons? Many have argued that there is. For example, Derek Parfit tells us that 'to be rational is to respond to reasons '. But I am not so sure. I begin by considering this question in the domain of theoretical rationality. The (...)
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  10. The Humean Theory of Motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  11. Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire.D. Sobel & D. Copp - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):44-53.
    The authors argue against direction of fit accounts of the distinction between belief and desire.
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  12. Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 235-64.
    The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show (...)
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  13. Desires Are Not Propositional Attitudes.Paul R. Thagard - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):151-156.
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  14. Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.
    What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of.
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