- Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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An Epistemic Theory of Democracy.Robert E. Goodin & Kai Spiekermann - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Kai Spiekermann.details
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The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):17-35.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Group beliefs.Raimo Tuomela - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):285-318.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.details
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Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.details
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The Epistemic Benefi ts of Multiple Biased Observers.Robert E. Goodin - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):166-174.details
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On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers.Liam Kofi Bright, Haixin Dang & Remco Heesen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252.details
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Voting methods.Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Social Choice Theory.Christian List - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Disagreement. [REVIEW]Nathan Ballantyne & Nathan L. King - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):808-812.details
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Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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The Will to Believe.W. James - 1896 - Philosophical Review 6:88.details
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