- Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.Eric Winsberg - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):111-137.details
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The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):893-904.details
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Epistemic values and the argument from inductive risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.details
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Environmental Justice, Values, and Scientific Expertise.Daniel Steel & Kyle Powys Whyte - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):163-182.details
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Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828.details
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The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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Values in Science.Ernan McMullin - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (4):3-28.details
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On the seriousness of mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.details
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Must the scientist make value judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.details
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Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.details
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Alias Smith and Jones: The testimony of the senses. [REVIEW]Richard C. Jeffrey - 1987 - Erkenntnis 26 (3):391 - 399.details
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Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.details
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Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities.John C. Harsanyi - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (1):1-30.details
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Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.details
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The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.details
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Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science.Kevin C. Elliott & Daniel J. McKaughan - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1-21.details
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Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.details
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Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.details
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Statistics, pragmatics, induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.details
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.details
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Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk.Matthew J. Brown - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.details
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Value judgements and the estimation of uncertainty in climate modeling.Justin Biddle & Eric Winsberg - 2009 - In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 172--197.details
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Science and Human Values.Carl G. Hempel - 1965 - In Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press. pp. 81-96.details
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Epistemic and nonepistemic values in science.Mauro Dorato - 2004 - In Peter K. Machamer & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Science, Values, and Objectivity. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 52--77.details
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