Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. What is Presupposition Accommodation, Again?Kai Von Fintel - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):137--170.
    In his paper “What is a Context of Utterance?”, Christopher Gauker argues that the phenomenon of informative presuppositions is incompatible with the “pragmatic” view of presuppositions as involving requirements on the common ground, the body of shared assumptions of the participants in a conversation. This is a surprising claim since most proponents of this view have in fact dealt with informative presuppositions by appealing to a process called presupposition accommodation. Gauker’s attack shows the need to clarify the nature of this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  • What is Said?Andreas Stokke & Anders J. Schoubye - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):759-793.
    It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning using the notion of a question under discussion. This account explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined, provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences can come to have enriched meanings in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
  • Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
    Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ?must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not?. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   622 citations