- Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.[author unknown] - 2002 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (4):775-776.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.[author unknown] - 1968 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 27 (2):217-217.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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1. the mind-body problem after Kripke.Thomas Nagel - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 433.details
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Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. [REVIEW]Michael Strevens - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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On Imagism about Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):43-95.details
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The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.details
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Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature.Paul M. Pietroski - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):488-491.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.details
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A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
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Précis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness.John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
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Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657.details
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Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (3):337-352.details
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Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.details
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The Nature of the Physical World. [REVIEW]Arthur E. Murphy - 1930 - Philosophical Review 39 (5):502.details
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How to Explain the Explanatory Gap.Neil Mehta - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):117-135.details
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Can we solve the mind-body problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.details
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Should a materialist believe in qualia?David K. Lewis - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.details
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An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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Nagel vs. Nagel on the nature of phenomenal concepts.Janet Levin - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):293–307.details
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Imagining Experiences.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2016 - Noûs:561-586.details
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Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis.Christopher Hill - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.details
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There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts.Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2105-2124.details
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The Nature of the Physical World. [REVIEW]Arthur E. Murphy - 1930 - Philosophical Review 39 (5):502.details
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Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
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Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?E. Diaz-Leon - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):933-951.details
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Consciousness.Willem A. Devries - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):263.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.details
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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Color and the Mind‐Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.details
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Color and the Mind-Body Problem.Alex Byrne - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):223-244.details
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