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  1. Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
    The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of _confirmation_ relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal (...)
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  • On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
  • On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):592-596.
  • On the Provenance of Judgments of Conditional Probability.Jiaying Zhao, Anuj Shah & Daniel Osherson - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):26-36.
  • Another Look at Linda.Wayne S. Messer & Richard A. Griggs - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (3):193-196.
  • The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):1-17.
  • How the Conjunction Fallacy is Tied to Probabilistic Confirmation: Some Remarks on Schupbach (2009).Katya Tentori & Vincenzo Crupi - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):3-12.
    Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if (...)
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  • Probability Judgment in Hierarchical Learning: A Conflict Between Predictiveness and Coherence.D. Lagnado - 2002 - Cognition 83 (1):81-112.
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  • Content-Blind Norms, No Norms, or Good Norms? A Reply to Vranas.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2001 - Cognition 81 (1):93-103.
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  • The Conjunction Fallacy and the Many Meanings of And.Ralph Hertwig, Björn Benz & Stefan Krauss - 2008 - Cognition 108 (3):740-753.
  • A Different Conjunction Fallacy.Nicolao Bonini, Katya Tentori & Daniel Osherson - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):199–210.
    Because the conjunction pandq implies p, the value of a bet on pandq cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as pandnotq, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of pandq. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  • Linda is Not a Bearded Lady: Configural Weighting and Adding as the Cause of Extension Errors.Håkan Nilsson, Anders Winman, Peter Juslin & Göran Hansson - 2009 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 138 (4):517-534.
  • On the Nature of the Conjunction Fallacy.Rodrigo Moro - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):1 - 24.
    In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy (...)
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  • Testing Boundary Conditions for the Conjunction Fallacy: Effects of Response Mode, Conceptual Focus, and Problem Type.Douglas H. Wedell & Rodrigo Moro - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):105-136.
  • Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
  • The Conjunction Fallacy: A Misunderstanding About Conjunction?K. Tentori - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.
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  • Abstraction is Uncooperative.Jonathan E. Adler - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):165–181.
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  • I Think, Therefore I Err.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2005 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 72 (1):1-24.
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