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Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.details
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Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Propensities and Pragmatism.Mauricio Suárez - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (2):61-92.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Objective probability as a guide to the world.Michael Strevens - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Resiliency, propensities, and causal necessity.Brian Skyrms - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):704-713.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1995 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (1):189-200.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Stability and justification in hume’s treatise.Louis Loeb - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):233-235.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Fumerton & Richard Foley - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):141.details
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Critical Notices.Michael E. Bratman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):238-244.details
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On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.details
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Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Belief and Probability: A General Theory of Probability Cores.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Horacio Arlo-Costa - 2012 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (3).details
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The context-sensitivity of belief and desire.Richmond Thomason - 1986 - In Michael Georgeff & Amy Lanksy (eds.), Reasoning about actions and plans. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. pp. 341-360.details
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Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.details
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I Intend that We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.details
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Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):444-448.details
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Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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