Albertus Magnus favours the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the first actuality or perfection of a natural body having life potentially. But he interprets Aristotle's vocabulary in a way that it becomes compatible with the separability of the soul from the body. The term “perfectio” is understood as referring to the soul's activity only, not to its essence. The term “forma” is avoided as inadequate for defining the soul's essence. The soul is understood as a substance which exists independently (...) of its actions and its body. The article shows that Albertus' terminological decisions continue a tradition reaching from the Greek commentators, and John Philoponos in particular, to Avicenna. Albertus' position on another important issue is also influenced by Arabic sources. His defense of the unity of the soul's vegetative, animal and rational parts rests on arguments from Avicenna and Averroes. It is shown that Averroes' position on the problem is not clearcut: he advocates the unity thesis, but also teaches the plurality of the generic and individual forms in man. This double stance is visible in the Latin reception of Averroes' works, and also in Albertus, who presents Averroes both as supporter and opponent of the plurality thesis. (shrink)

L’œuvre d’Albert le Grand représente un système théologico-philosophique ambitieux, dont l’anthropologie avec sa doctrine de l’intellect forme le noyau. La recherche sur la théorie albertinienne de l’intellect, conduite dans une perspective diachronique, montre qu’elle reçoit un développement systématique par intégration et reformulation d’éléments doctrinaux augustiniens et dionysiens, platoniciens et aristotéliciens-péripatéticiens. Elle explicite la montée de l’homme vers l’accomplissement suprême de son intellect.