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  1. Dreams, agency, and judgement.Matthew Soteriou - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5319-5334.
    Sosa : 7–18, 2005) argues that we should reject the orthodox conception of dreaming—the view that dream states and waking states are “intrinsically alike, though different in their causes and effects”. The alternative he proposes is that “to dream is to imagine”. According to this imagination model of dreaming, our dreamt conscious beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions are not “real” insofar as they are all merely imagined beliefs, experiences, affirmations, decisions and intentions. This paper assesses the epistemic implications of (...)
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  • Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
    Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the (...)
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  • The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
    The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of (...)
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  • The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Hallucination And Imagination.Keith Allen - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):287-302.
    What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive (...)
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  • Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
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  • Consciousness and the World.Brian O’Shaughnessy - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (300):283-287.
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  • Dreaming of a Stable World: Vision and Action in Sleep.Melanie Rosen - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 17):1-36.
    Our eyes, bodies, and perspectives are constantly shifting as we observe the world. Despite this, we are very good at distinguishing between self-caused visual changes and changes in the environment: the world appears mostly stable despite our visual field moving around. This, it seems, also occurs when we are dreaming. As we visually investigate the dream environment, we track moving objects with our dream eyes, examine objects, and shift focus. These movements, research suggests, are reflected in the rapid movements or (...)
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  • Dreaming and Imagination.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):103-121.
    What is it like to dream? On an orthodox view, dreams involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that orthodoxy about dreaming should be rejected in favor of an imagination model of dreaming. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experiences while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. (...)
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  • The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a (...)
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  • The Neural Correlates of Visual Imagery: A Co-Ordinate-Based Meta-Analysis.C. Winlove, F. Milton, J. Ranson, J. Fulford, M. MacKisack, Fiona Macpherson & A. Zeman - 2018 - Cortex 105 (August 2018):4-25.
    Visual imagery is a form of sensory imagination, involving subjective experiences typically described as similar to perception, but which occur in the absence of corresponding external stimuli. We used the Activation Likelihood Estimation algorithm (ALE) to identify regions consistently activated by visual imagery across 40 neuroimaging studies, the first such meta-analysis. We also employed a recently developed multi-modal parcellation of the human brain to attribute stereotactic co-ordinates to one of 180 anatomical regions, the first time this approach has been combined (...)
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  • Dreaming.John Sutton - 2009 - In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    As a topic in the philosophy of psychology, dreaming is a fascinating, diverse, and severely underdeveloped area of study. The topic excites intense public interest in its own right, while also challenging our confidence that we know what the words “conscious” and “consciousness” mean. So dreaming should be at the forefront of our interdisciplinary investigations: theories of mind which fail to address the topic are incomplete. This chapter illustrates the tight links between conceptual and empirical issues by highlighting surprisingly deep (...)
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  • Imagination and Perception.Bence Nanay - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge.
    Look at a red apple. Now close your eyes and visualize this apple. Your perceptual state and your imagery of the apple are very similar in some respects. They are also different in some respects. The aim of this paper is to address three questions about the relation between perception and imagination: -/- (a) How similar are perception and imagination and what explains this similarity? (b) How different are perception and imagination and what explains this difference? (c) How do perception (...)
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  • Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance.Michael G. F. Martin - 2001 - In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 257--284.
    Book description: The capacity to represent and think about time is one of the most fundamental and least understood aspects of human cognition and consciousness. This book throws new light on central issues in the study of the mind by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches dealing with the connection between temporal representation and memory. Fifteen specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers investigate the way in which time is represented in memory, and the role memory (...)
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  • Are Dreams Experiences?Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):151.
  • Dreaming and Skepticism.Norman Malcolm - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (January):14-37.
  • Insight and Dissociation in Lucid Dreaming and Psychosis.Ursula Voss, Armando D’Agostino, Luca Kolibius, Ansgar Klimke, Silvio Scarone & J. Allan Hobson - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • The Neurological Basis of Mental Imagery: A Componential Analysis.Martha J. Farah - 1984 - Cognition 18 (1-3):245-272.
  • Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  • Lucid Dreaming Incidence: A Quality Effects Meta-Analysis of 50 Years of Research.David T. Saunders, Chris A. Roe, Graham Smith & Helen Clegg - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:197-215.
  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
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  • Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency, mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at (...)
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  • I'm Thinking Your Thoughts While I Sleep: Sense of Agency and Ownership Over Dream Thought.Melanie Rosen - 2015 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2 (3):326-339.
  • On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of (...)
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  • Consciousness and Its Objects.Colin Mcginn - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):679-681.
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  • Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
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  • Scepticism and the Imagination Model of Dreaming.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):519–527.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that the solution to dream scepticism lies in an understanding of dreams as imaginative experiences – when we dream, on this suggestion, we do not believe the contents of our dreams, but rather imagine them. Sosa rebuts scepticism thus: dreams don’t cause false beliefs, so my beliefs cannot be false, having been caused by dreams. I argue that, even assuming that Sosa is correct about the nature of dreaming, belief in wakefulness on these grounds is epistemically (...)
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  • Minding the Dream Self: Perspectives From the Analysis of Self-Experience in Dreams.Jennifer Michelle Windt - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):633-633.
  • Are There Levels of Consciousness?Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy & Adrian M. Owen - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (6):405-413.
    The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness (...)
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  • Dreaming.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):399-432.
    The aim is to discover a principle governing the formation of the dream. Now dreaming has an analogy with consciousness in that it is a seeming-consciousness. Meanwhile consciousness exhibits a tripartite structure consisting of understanding oneself to be situated in a world endowed with given properties, the mental processes responsible for the state, and the concrete perceptual encounter of awareness with the world. The dream analogues of these three elements are investigated in the hope of discovering the source of the (...)
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  • Dreaming and the Brain: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Conscious States.J. Allan Hobson, Edward F. Pace-Schott & Robert Stickgold - 2003 - In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 793-842.
    Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between (...)
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  • The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory.Brian O'shaughnessy, Andrew Woodfield, J. Foster & G. F. Macdonald - 1982 - Religious Studies 18 (3):379-397.
     
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  • Dreams and Philosophy.Ernest Sosa - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):7 - 18.
    That conception is orthodox in today’s common sense and also historically. Presupposed by Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, it underlies familiar skeptical paradoxes. Similar orthodoxy is also found in our developing science of sleep and dreaming.[2] Despite such confluence.
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  • Conflicting Intuitions May Be Based on Differing Abilities: Evidence From Mental Imaging Research.Bill Faw - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (4):45-68.
    Much of the current imaging literature either denies the existence of wakeful non-mental imagers, views non-imagers motivationally as 'repressors' or 'neurotic', or acknowledges them but does not fully incorporate them into their models. Neurobiologists testing for imaging loss seem to assume that visual recognition, describing objects, and free-hand drawing require the forming of conscious images. The intuition that 'the psyche never thinks without an image.... the reasoning mind thinks its ideas in the form of images' (Aristotle) has a long tradition (...)
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  • Statistics of Mental Imagery.Francis Galton - 1880 - Mind 5 (19):301-318.
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