I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent of the Doctrine must claim that (...) nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood. Edited by Onora O'Neill and William Ruddick.

This book represents a major new statement on the issue of property rights. It argues for the justification of some rights of private property while showing why unequal distributions of private property are indefensible. Three features of the book are especially salient: it offers a challenging new pluralist theory of justification; the argument integrates perceptive analyses of the great classical theorists Aristotle, Locke, Hegel and Marx with a discussion of contemporary philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls; and the author moves (...) with assurance among philosophy, law and economics to present a very broad, interdisciplinary study. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the appeal of a principle of self-ownership is grounded in the specially intimate relationship that each of us has with our body. I argue that once we appreciate the source of the appeal of a claim of self-ownership, we can see how a differently shaped set of strong rights over our body can do justice to the considerations that ground this appeal, without committing us to the most controversial implications of a claim of self-ownership.

Book reviewed in this article: The Reahn of Rights. By Judith Thomson. Cambridge: Harvard University.

What exactly is it that makes someone a parent? Many people hold that parenthood is grounded, in the first instance, in the natural derivation of one person's genetic constitution from the genetic constitutions of others. We refer to this view as "Geneticism". In Part I we distinguish three forms of geneticism on the basis of whether they hold that direct genetic derivation is sufficient, necessary, or both sufficient and necessary, for parenthood. Parts two through four examine three arguments for geneticism: (...) the property argument, the causal argument, and the parity argument. We conclude that none of these arguments succeeds. (shrink)

When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is (...) whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth. (shrink)

Steiner’s book is an engaging and challenging romp through important issues in rights theory, moral and economic reasoning, theories of freedom, and questions of justice. An Essay on Rights develops and connects themes pursued by Steiner in a series of articles written over the past two decades.

The principle that each person is his own property occupies an almost axiomatic status in right-wing liberal thought as well as in some egalitarian theories. I reject any, full or partial, notion of property with respect to oneself by showing that any appeal and any justifiability which may be associated with self-ownership can at most serve to ground rights which are demonstrably non-property rights. As a contrast to self ownership, I introduce the non-proprietarian notion of Original Freedom. I compare the (...) two with respect to the control, income, and transfer aspects of ownership and suggest that Original Freedom is the more intuitively acceptable. (shrink)