§ 1. Begriff der juristischen Logik 1. Wenn im folgenden von juristischer Logik und einigen ihrer Probleme die Rede sein soll, so bedarf es zunächst einer Angabe dessen, was im Zu sammenhang dieser Untersuchungen unter Logik verstanden wird. Der Aus druck Logik wird im Rahmen der Philosophie sowohl als auch innerhalb der Einzelwissenschaften in mehreren, oftmals erheblich voneinander abweichen den Bedeutungen verwandt. Der Sprachgebrauch ist sogar derart schillernd, daß einer scharfen Definition, sofern sie sich an den üblichen Sprachgebrauch anschließen soll, (...) nicht unerhebliche Schwierigkeiten im Wege stehen, denn bekanntlich spricht man von materialer, formaler, transzendentaler, regio naler, reiner, angewandter, theoretischer, praktischer, hermeneutischer, rea ler, natürlicher, klassischer und moderner Logik, um nur einige der zahl 1 reichen Wortverknüpfungen herauszugreifen • Für die hier anzustellenden Überlegungen vereinfacht sich jedoch die Frage nach einer passenden Definition. Während nämlich die Ansichten darüber, was man etwa unter materialer oder transzendentaler Logik zu verstehen habe, weitgehend divergieren, gilt für den Begriff der formalen Logik cum grano salis das Gegenteil. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

This study focuses on current jurisprudential debate between the "positivist" views of Herbert Hart and the "rights thesis" of Ronald Dworkin. MacCormick provides a critical analysis of the Dworkin position while also modifying Hart's. It stands firmly on its own as a contribution to an extensive literature.

There are five basic types of ontology of law identified in relation with the singling out simpIe ontological objects in a strong or weak sense, dualist ontological objects, and complex ontalogical objects in a strong or weak sense. The conceptians of law far mulated in the theories/philosophies/ of law are ascribed to these five types.