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  1. Tolerance and Tact: A Critical Thinking Strategy for Dealing with Relativism.James J. Delaney - 2003 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 22 (4):27-31.
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  • On Bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton University Press.
    One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the situation for granted. Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So the phenomenon has not aroused much deliberate concern. We have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so much of it, or what functions (...)
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  • Dealing with Naive Relativism in the Philosophy Classroom.Judith Andre - 1983 - Metaphilosophy 14 (2):179-182.
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  • The Truth, but Not Yet: Avoiding Naïve Skepticism Via Explicit Communication of Metadisciplinary Aims.Jake Wright - 2019 - Teaching in Higher Education 24 (3):361-377.
    Introductory students regularly endorse naïve skepticism—unsupported or uncritical doubt about the existence and universality of truth—for a variety of reasons. Though some of the reasons for students’ skepticism can be traced back to the student—for example, a desire to avoid engaging with controversial material or a desire to avoid offense—naïve skepticism is also the result of how introductory courses are taught, deemphasizing truth to promote students’ abilities to develop basic disciplinary skills. While this strategy has a number of pedagogical benefits, (...)
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  • Student Relativism.Stephen A. Satris - 1986 - Teaching Philosophy 9 (3):193-205.
    In this paper I offer an analysis of, and suggest some methods for dealing with, a quite particular and peculiar problem in teaching philosophy. It is, perhaps,not a problem essential to the discipline or to its teaching, but it is nevertheless one of the most serious, pervasive, and frustrating problems confronting mostphilosophy teachers today. I speak of the problem of student relativism-or, SR for short.
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  • The Natural History of Student Relativism.Roger Paden - 1994 - Journal of Thought 29 (2):47-59.
     
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  • Lazy, Not Biased: Susceptibility to Partisan Fake News is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning Than by Motivated Reasoning.Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand - 2018 - Cognition 188:39-50.
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  • The Student Relativist as Philosopher.Roger Paden - 1987 - Teaching Philosophy 10 (2):97-101.
  • Teaching Ethics to Student Relativists.Richard W. Momeyer - 1995 - Teaching Philosophy 18 (4):301-311.
    Following from the critiques of moral relativism advanced by philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and J.L. Mackie, the author explores philosophical challenges that educators face in philosophy courses. Specifically, the author accounts for the new wave of moral relativism and its effects on classroom discussions in philosophy courses. The purpose of this paper is to outline various pedagogical approaches that help with identifying student relativism. Unlike philosophical relativism, student relativism can be identified as an unreflective response to or attitude towards (...)
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  • The Psychology of Meta-Ethics: Exploring Objectivism.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.
  • Engaging Student Aversions to Moral Obligations.Court D. Lewis - 2015 - Teaching Philosophy 38 (3):273-288.
    This essay examines why some introductory ethics students are averse to any sort of moral requirement. It provides a series of descriptions and techniques to help teachers recognize, diagnose, and engage such students. After discussing the nature of student aversions to moral obligations, I discuss three causes and several ways to engage each: 1) Student Relativism; 2) student fears and misunderstandings of obligations; and 3) the phenomenon of what I call fetishized liberty, which leads to the “liberty paradox”—where students actively (...)
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  • Student Relativism: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.Brian Talbot - 2012 - Teaching Philosophy 35 (2):171-187.
    I present a novel approach to teaching ethics to students who are moral relativists. I argue that we should not try to convince students to abandon moral relativism; while we can and should present arguments against the view, we should not try to use these arguments to change students’ minds. Attempts to convince student relativists to change their minds can be disrespectful, and often overlook the reasons why students are relativists. I explain how instead to show moral relativists that their (...)
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  • The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy. [REVIEW]Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):161-188.
    Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on other properties of the ethical beliefs in question—in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively (...)
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  • Moral Objectivism Across the Lifespan.James R. Beebe & David Sackris - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.
    We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found (...)
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  • Why Are Some Moral Beliefs Perceived to Be More Objective Than Others.Geoffrey Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2012 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1):250-256.
    Recent research has investigated whether people think of their moral beliefs as objectively true facts about the world, or as subjective preferences. The present research examines variability in the perceived objectivity of different moral beliefs, with respect both to the content of moral beliefs themselves (what they are about), and to the social representation of those moral beliefs (whether other individuals are thought to hold them). It also examines the possible consequences of perceiving a moral belief as objective. With respect (...)
     
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  • Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq.Brian J. Gaines, James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Buddy Peyton & Jay Verkuilen - 2007
    Scholars assume that citizens perform better when they know pertinent facts. Factual beliefs, however, become relevant for political judgments only when people interpret them. Interpretations provide opportunities for partisans to rationalize their existing opinions. Using panel studies, we examine whether and how partisans updated factual beliefs, interpretations of beliefs, and opinions about the handling of the Iraq war as real-world conditions changed. Most respondents held similar, fairly accurate beliefs about facts. But interpretations varied across partisan groups in predictable ways. In (...)
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