Il secondo volume è dedicato all'edizione critica del testo tibetano del bSam gtan mig sgron (SM). Attualmente sono reperibili due edizioni del SM: quella stampata a Leh e il volume 97 del bKa' ma shin tu rgyas pa in 110 volumi pubblicato a Chengdu. Entrambe le edizioni si basano su una stampa pubblicata nel Khams da 'Jam dbyangs Blo gros rgya mtsho, meglio conosciuto come 'Jam dbyangs Chos kyi blo gros (1893-1959). Il testo proveniva dalla biblioteca di Ka thog ed (...) era la copia di un manoscritto appartenuto a sMin gling mKhan chen Dharma śrī (1654-1718), a sua volta basato su un manoscritto di Jo nang rJe btsun Kun dga' snying po, alias Tāranātha (nato nel 1575). Quest'ultimo nel colofone della propria copia, riprodotto alla fine della stampa, scrive che in un centinaio di fogli mancano alcune parole, tuttavia il senso è completo. La presenza atavica di innumerevoli errori in entrambe le edizioni, nonché di importanti varianti nelle versioni canoniche delle numerose fonti citate, mi ha motivato ad abbozzare un'ipotesi di edizione critica del settimo capitolo, discussa con il dr. Pempa Dorje presso il Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies di Sarnath. Essa costituisce il contenuto di questo secondo volume. (shrink)
The work explores the historical and intellectual context of Tsongkhapa's philosophy and addresses the critical issues related to questions of development and originality in Tsongkhapa's thought. It also deals extensively with one of Tsongkhapa's primary concerns, namely his attempts to demonstrate that the Middle Way philosophy's de-constructive analysis does not negate the reality of the everyday world. The study's central focus, however, is the question of the existence and the nature of self. This is explored both in terms of Tsongkhapa's (...) de-construction of the self and his re-construction of person. Finally, the work explores the concept of reality that emerges in Tsongkhapa's philosophy, and deals with his understanding of the relationship between critical reasoning, no-self, and religious experience. (shrink)
In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrakīrti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapadā, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics (...) on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogācāra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction while claiming both Yogācāra and Prāsaṅgika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Prāsaṅgika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the “content” of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Prāsaṅgika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogācāra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Prāsaṅgika), the discourse of Yogācāra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Prāsaṅgika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. (shrink)
Mipam (‘ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912), an architect of the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition of Tibet in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, articulates two distinct models of the two truths that are respectively reflected in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhist traditions. The way he positions these two models sheds light on how levels of description are at play in his integration of these traditions. Mipam positions one kind of two-truth model as the product of an ontological analysis while (...) another model can be seen as resulting from a phenomenological reduction. He accommodates both models into his systematic interpretation, and for him, each one has an important role to play in coming to understand the nature of the Buddhist truths of emptiness and Buddha-nature. Since each model reflects a different style of analysis, or a different perspective on truth, his presentation reveals how neither model alone has the last word on the nature of what is and how it is experienced. This paper analyzes the means by which he lays out these two models of the two truths, and explores the implications of their integration in his philosophical works. A primary concern for Mipam, and a factor that guides his attempt to integrate these two approaches to truth, is his aim to both induce authentic experience and true knowledge on the one hand, and represent reality and the experience of it on the other. These competing and complimentary objectives are a central focus around which both styles of critical reflection, and both models of the two truths, revolve. (shrink)
Indian schools -- Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism -- The Nyingma tradition -- The Kadam tradition -- The Kagyü tradition -- The Shijé tradition -- The Sakya tradition -- The Jonang and minor traditions -- The Geluk tradition 1: Tsongkhapa -- The Geluk tradition 2: Tsongkhapa's successors -- The Geluk tradition 3: the distinctiveness of Geluk -- The Bon tradition -- Chinese traditions 1: non-Buddhist -- Chinese traditions 2: Buddhist -- Central Asian traditions.
Die Religionsschrift löste nicht nur einen langwierigen Streit mit der Zensur aus, sondern gab – wie Kant ebenso schnell wie überrascht feststellen mußte – seinen Zeitgenossen "viel Anlaß zu reden". Zu keiner Publikation Kants erschienen in so kurzer Zeit so viele Beiträge und Rezensionen wie zu seinen religionsphilosophischen Thesen. Schon allein die Tatsache, daß es sich um die erste große Publikation Kants nach den drei Kritiken handelt, weist darauf hin, daß Kant mehr beabsichtigt hat als eine Gelegenheitsschrift. Er selbst kündigte (...) seine "Philosophische Religionslehre" als Übergang von der Kritik zur Doktrin an und verstand sie genau damit auch ausdrücklich als Antwort auf die Frage: "Was darf ich hoffen?". (shrink)