Order:
Disambiguations
F. H. Bradley [126]Richard Bradley [64]James Bradley [41]Ben Bradley [40]
Raymond D. Bradley [38]M. C. Bradley [32]Darren Bradley [27]Ritamary Bradley [26]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
Richard Bradley
London School of Economics
Ben Bradley
Syracuse University
Darren Bradley
University of Leeds
3 more
Other users were found but are not shown.
  1. Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (3).
    What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? Several philosophers have argued that some epistemic rules are indefeasible. I will argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting descriptive and normative facts. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
  3.  57
    Naturalness as a Constraint on Priors.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind.
    I argue that epistemologists should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  2
    Unresolved and Unresolvable? Tensions in the Refugee Regime.Megan Bradley - 2019 - Ethics and International Affairs 33 (1):45-56.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  11
    Emotion, Attention, and the Startle Reflex.Peter J. Lang, Margaret M. Bradley & Bruce N. Cuthbert - 1990 - Psychological Review 97 (3):377-395.
  6. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  7.  53
    Doing Away with Harm1.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  8. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  9. Should Explanations Omit the Details?Darren Bradley - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences can provide better explanations than lower level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested that higher level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
    How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  11. Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
    I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  12. Is Death Bad for a Cow?Ben Bradley - 2015 - In The Ethics of Killing Animals. pp. 51-64.
  13. Against Satisficing Consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
    The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  14. Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
    Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15. Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind:fzy046.
    Beliefs that locate you in space or time are self-locating beliefs. These cause a problem for Bayesian models of belief. Miriam Schoenfield (2016) offers a solution – that on learning x, agents should update on the fact that they learned x. I will argue that Schoenfield’s suggestion does not solve the problem.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?Ben Bradley - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17. Counterfactual Desirability.Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):485-533.
    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. We (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18.  8
    Attentional Bias for Threatening Facial Expressions in Anxiety: Manipulation of Stimulus Duration.Brendan P. Bradley, Karin Mogg, Sara J. Falla & Lucy R. Hamilton - 1998 - Cognition and Emotion 12 (6):737-753.
  19.  14
    Orienting of Attention to Threatening Facial Expressions Presented Under Conditions of Restricted Awareness.Karin Mogg & Brendan P. Bradley - 1999 - Cognition and Emotion 13 (6):713-740.
  20. Four Problems About Self-Locating Belief.D. Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.
    This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - unknown
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga, that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  22. What Is Risk Aversion?H. Orri Stefánsson & Richard Bradley - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):77-102.
    According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.Monton Bradley & Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  24. How Should We Feel About Death?Ben Bradley - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (1):1-14.
    This paper examines the implications of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals for the correctness of emotions and attitudes towards death. I argue that the correctness of an attitude such as fear must be explained by appeal to its causal relations to certain preferences.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects.Darren Bradley - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):72.
    The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  28. Desires.Kris McDaniel & Ben Bradley - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):267-302.
    We argue that desire is an attitude that relates a person not to one proposition but rather to two, the first of which we call the object of the desire and the second of which we call the condition of the desire. This view of desire is initially motivated by puzzles about conditional desires. It is not at all obvious how best to draw the distinction between conditional and unconditional desires. In this paper we examine extant attempts to analyse conditional (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  29.  12
    Covert and Overt Orienting of Attention to Emotional Faces in Anxiety.Brendan P. Bradley, Karin Mogg & Neil H. Millar - 2000 - Cognition and Emotion 14 (6):789-808.
  30.  17
    Rapid Learning in a Children's Museum Via Analogical Comparison.Dedre Gentner, Susan C. Levine, Raedy Ping, Ashley Isaia, Sonica Dhillon, Claire Bradley & Garrett Honke - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (1):224-240.
    We tested whether analogical training could help children learn a key principle of elementary engineering—namely, the use of a diagonal brace to stabilize a structure. The context for this learning was a construction activity at the Chicago Children's Museum, in which children and their families build a model skyscraper together. The results indicate that even a single brief analogical comparison can confer insight. The results also reveal conditions that support analogical learning.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability and Decision.Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson & Brian Hill - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):500–522.
    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings published in their periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a normative decision model.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  13
    Brief Report Time Course of Attentional Bias for Threat Scenes: Testing the Vigilance‐Avoidance Hypothesis.Karin Mogg, Brendan Bradley, Felicity Miles & Rachel Dixon - 2004 - Cognition and Emotion 18 (5):689-700.
  33. How Valuable Are Chances?H. Orii Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):602-625.
    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true, its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this article is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centerpiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23–31.
    We give an analysis of the Monty Hall problem purely in terms of confirmation, without making any lottery assumptions about priors. Along the way, we show the Monty Hall problem is structurally identical to the Doomsday Argument.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  35. Functionalism and The Independence Problems.Darren Bradley - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):545-557.
    The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist.Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele - unknown
    This paper considers a puzzling conflict between two positions that are each compelling: it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid `free' evidence before making a decision, and rational agents may have imprecise beliefs and/or desires. Indeed, we show that Good's theorem concerning the invariable choice-worthiness of free evidence does not generalise to the imprecise realm, given the plausible existing decision theories for handling imprecision. A key ingredient in the analysis, and a potential source of controversy, is the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Wilson.Darren Bradley - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):683-693.
    In Bradley, I offered an analysis of Sleeping Beauty and the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. I argued that one can avoid a kind of easy confirmation of EQM by paying attention to observation selection effects, that halfers are right about Sleeping Beauty, and that thirders cannot avoid easy confirmation for the truth of EQM. Wilson agrees with my analysis of observation selection effects in EQM, but goes on to, first, defend Elga’s thirder argument on Sleeping Beauty and, second, argue (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38.  26
    A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.
    There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent's degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions. I show that decision rules recently discussed by Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard and Rohan Sud all suffer from the same defect: they all struggle to rationalize diachronic ambiguity aversion. Since ambiguity aversion is among the motivations for imprecise credence, this suggests that the search for an adequate imprecise decision rule is not yet over.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. The Fine-Tuning Argument: The Bayesian Version.M. C. Bradley - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (4):375-404.
    This paper considers the Bayesian form of the fine-tuning argument as advanced by Richard Swinburne. An expository section aims to identify the precise character of the argument, and three lines of objection are then advanced. The first of these holds that there is an inconsistency in Swinburne's procedure, the second that his argument has an unacceptable dependence on an objectivist theory of value, the third that his method is powerless to single out traditional theism from a vast number of competitors. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40.  39
    Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices.Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du & Leonard A. Smith - unknown
    The sensitive dependence on initial conditions associated with nonlinear models imposes limitations on the models’ predictive power. We draw attention to an additional limitation than has been under-appreciated, namely structural model error. A model has SME if the model-dynamics differ from the dynamics in the target system. If a nonlinear model has only the slightest SME, then its ability to generate decision-relevant predictions is compromised. Given a perfect model, we can take the effects of SDIC into account by substituting probabilistic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion.M. M. Bradley, P. J. Lang, R. Lane & L. Nadel - 2000 - In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
  42.  46
    Modelling Inequality.Karim Thébault, Seamus Bradley & Alexander Reutlinger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):691-718.
    Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticized some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealizations involved, and a particular target are ‘kinetic exchange’ approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  85
    Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but leaves one’s (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  44.  75
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death.Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45.  75
    Combining Probability with Qualitative Degree-of-Certainty Metrics in Assessment.Casey Helgeson, Richard Bradley & Brian Hill - 2018 - Climatic Change 149:517-525.
    Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) employ an evolving framework of calibrated language for assessing and communicating degrees of certainty in findings. A persistent challenge for this framework has been ambiguity in the relationship between multiple degree-of-certainty metrics. We aim to clarify the relationship between the likelihood and confidence metrics used in the Fifth Assessment Report (2013), with benefits for mathematical consistency among multiple findings and for usability in downstream modeling and decision analysis. We discuss how our (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Weisberg on Design: What Fine-Tuning's Got to Do with It.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):435-438.
    Jonathan Weisberg (2010 ) argues that, given that life exists, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life does not confirm the design hypothesis. And if the fact that life exists confirms the design hypothesis, fine-tuning is irrelevant. So either way, fine-tuning has nothing to do with it. I will defend a design argument that survives Weisberg’s critique — the fact that life exists supports the design hypothesis, but it only does so given fine-tuning.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on the grounds (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48.  10
    Manipulating the Alpha Level Cannot Cure Significance Testing.David Trafimow, Valentin Amrhein, Corson N. Areshenkoff, Carlos J. Barrera-Causil, Eric J. Beh, Yusuf K. Bilgiç, Roser Bono, Michael T. Bradley, William M. Briggs, Héctor A. Cepeda-Freyre, Sergio E. Chaigneau, Daniel R. Ciocca, Juan C. Correa, Denis Cousineau, Michiel R. de Boer, Subhra S. Dhar, Igor Dolgov, Juana Gómez-Benito, Marian Grendar, James W. Grice, Martin E. Guerrero-Gimenez, Andrés Gutiérrez, Tania B. Huedo-Medina, Klaus Jaffe, Armina Janyan, Ali Karimnezhad, Fränzi Korner-Nievergelt, Koji Kosugi, Martin Lachmair, Rubén D. Ledesma, Roberto Limongi, Marco T. Liuzza, Rosaria Lombardo, Michael J. Marks, Gunther Meinlschmidt, Ladislas Nalborczyk, Hung T. Nguyen, Raydonal Ospina, Jose D. Perezgonzalez, Roland Pfister, Juan J. Rahona, David A. Rodríguez-Medina, Xavier Romão, Susana Ruiz-Fernández, Isabel Suarez, Marion Tegethoff, Mauricio Tejo, Rens van de Schoot, Ivan I. Vankov, Santiago Velasco-Forero, Tonghui Wang, Yuki Yamada, Felipe C. M. Zoppino & Fernando Marmolejo-Ramos - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49.  7
    Pernicious Publication Practices.James V. Bradley - 1981 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 18 (1):31-34.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  50. Philosophers Should Prefer Simpler Theories.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3049-3067.
    Should philosophers prefer simpler theories? Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) argues that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 816