Results for 'Centipede game'

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  1. Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's (...)
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  2.  31
    The Evolution of Cooperation in the Centipede Game with Finite Populations.Rory Smead - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open (...)
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  3.  19
    Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game.Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):262-280.
    Normative game theory unsatisfactorily explains rational behavior. Real people do not behave as predicted, and what is prescribed as rational behavior is normally unattainable in real-life. The problem is that current normative analysis does not account for people's cognitive limitations – their bounded rationality. However, this paper develops an account of bounded rationality that explains the rationality of more realistic behavior. I focus on the Centipede Game, in which boundedly rational players explore and test others' immediate behavior, (...)
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  4.  17
    Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game.Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):262-280.
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  5.  72
    Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also (...)
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  6.  24
    Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95.
    According to a standard objection to the use of backward induction in extensive-form games with perfect information, backward induction can only work if the players are confident that each player is resiliently rational - disposed to act rationally at each possible node that the game can reach, even at the nodes that will certainly never be reached in actual play - and also confident that these beliefs in the players’ future resilient rationality are robust, i.e. that they would be (...)
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  7.  36
    Reasoning About Games.Melvin Fitting - 2011 - Studia Logica 99 (1-3):143-169.
    is used to give a formalization of Artemov’s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [ 4 , 5 ]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.
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  8.  14
    Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation.Adam Morton - 1994 - Ratio 7 (1):14-25.
    I discuss how simulating another agent can be useful in some game-theoretical situations, particularly iterated games such as the centipede game.
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  9.  11
    The Soritical Centipede.Terry Horgan & Nathan Ballantyne - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Two philosophical questions arise about rationality in centipede games that are logically prior to attempts to apply the formal tools of game theory to this topic. First, given that the players have common knowledge of mutual rationality and common knowledge that they are each motivated solely to maximize their own profits, is there a backwards-induction argument that employs only familiar non-technical concepts about rationality, leads to the conclusion that the first player is rationally obligated to end the (...) at the first step, is deductively valid, employs premises all of which are prima facie highly plausible, and is prima facie sound and )? Second, if there is such an argument, then is it actually sound, or is it instead defective somehow despite being prima facie sound? Addressing these two questions is our project. We present a backwards-induction argument that is prima facie sound; we argue that it is an instance of the notorious sorites paradox, and hence that the concepts of rational obligatoriness and rational permissibility are vague; and we briefly address the potential consequences of all this for the foundations of game theory and decision theory. (shrink)
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  10. Epitaph for a Legless Centipede? A Paradox of Backward Induction.John Kemp & Bruce Philp - 1996 - Manchester Metropolitan University.
     
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  11.  1
    Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games: Wlodek Rabinowicz.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95-126.
    According to the standard objection to backward induction in games, its application depends on highly questionable assumptions about the players' expectations as regards future counterfactual game developments. It seems that, in order to make predictions needed for backward reasoning, the players must expect each player to act rationally at each node that in principle could be reached in the game, and also to expect that this confidence in the future rationality of the players would be kept by each (...)
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  12. Social Deliberation: Nash, Bayes, and the Partial Vindication of Gabriele Tarde.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):164-184.
    At the very end of the 19th century, Gabriele Tarde wrote that all society was a product of imitation and innovation. This view regarding the development of society has, to a large extent, fallen out of favour, and especially so in those areas where the rational actor model looms large. I argue that this is unfortunate, as models of imitative learning, in some cases, agree better with what people actually do than more sophisticated models of learning. In this paper, I (...)
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  13.  54
    Rationality and Backward Induction.Ken Binmore - 1997 - Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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  14.  13
    Social Deliberation: Nash, Bayes, and the Partial Vindication of Gabriele Tarde.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):164-184.
    At the very end of the 19th century, Gabriele Tarde wrote that all society was a product of imitation and innovation. This view regarding the development of society has, to a large extent, fallen out of favour, and especially so in those areas where the rational actor model looms large. I argue that this is unfortunate, as models of imitative learning, in some cases, agree better with what people actually do than more sophisticated models of learning. In this paper, I (...)
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  15.  5
    Social Deliberation: Nash, Bayes, and the Partial Vindication of Gabriele Tarde.J. Alexander - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):164-184.
    At the very end of the 19th century, Gabriele Tarde wrote that all society was a product of imitation and innovation. This view regarding the development of society has, to a large extent, fallen out of favour, and especially so in those areas where the rational actor model looms large. I argue that this is unfortunate, as models of imitative learning, in some cases, agree better with what people actually do than more sophisticated models of learning. In this paper, I (...)
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  16.  7
    Cognitive Analysis of Educational Games: The Number Game.L. J. Maas Han & Nyamsuren Enkhbold - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (2):395-412.
    We analyze the cognitive strategies underlying performance in the Number task, a Math game that requires both arithmetic fluency and mathematical creativity. In this game all elements in a set of numbers have to be used precisely once to create a target number with basic arithmetic operations. We argue that some instances of this game are NP complete, by showing its relation to the well-known Partition problem. We propose heuristics based on the distinction in forward and backward (...)
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  17.  7
    Cognitive Analysis of Educational Games: The Number Game.Han L. J. Maas & Enkhbold Nyamsuren - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (4).
    We analyze the cognitive strategies underlying performance in the Number task, a Math game that requires both arithmetic fluency and mathematical creativity. In this game all elements in a set of numbers have to be used precisely once to create a target number with basic arithmetic operations. We argue that some instances of this game are NP complete, by showing its relation to the well-known Partition problem. We propose heuristics based on the distinction in forward and backward (...)
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  18.  82
    Optimal Assertions, and What They Implicate. A Uniform Game Theoretic Approach.Anton Benz & Robert van Rooij - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):63-78.
    To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...)
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  19. Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (2):203-221.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some (...)
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  20. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.
    In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies---in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View---are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously (...)
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  21.  11
    On the Relationship Between Philosophy and Game-Playing.Yuanfan Huang & Emily Ryall - 2017 - In Wendy Russell, Emily Ryall & Malcolm MacLean (eds.), The Philosophy of Play as Life. London: Routledge. pp. 80-93.
    This chapter focuses on the relation between ‘philosophy’ and ‘games’ and argues most of philosophy is a form of game-playing. Two approaches are considered: Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance and Suits’ analytic definition of a game. Both approaches support the assertion that the relationship is a close, if not categorical, one but it is the lusory attitude that is the ultimate determinant.
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  22.  78
    Logic and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory: Special Issue.Michael O. L. Bacharach & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):1-6.
    An introduction to the special issue on epistemic logic and the foundations of game theory edited by Michael Bacharach and Philippe Mongin. Contributors are Michael Bacharach, Robert Stalnaker, Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini, Luc Lismont and Philippe Mongin, and Hyun-Song Shin and Timothy Williamson.
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  23.  24
    Epistemic Logic Meets Epistemic Game Theory: A Comparison Between Multi-Agent Kripke Models and Type Spaces.Paolo Galeazzi & Emiliano Lorini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2097-2127.
    In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison (...)
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  24.  92
    Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2010 - Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic (...)
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  25. Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness.Selmer Bringsjord - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is (...)
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  26.  22
    Testing Turing's Parallel-Paired Imitation Game.Huma Shah & Kevin Warwick - 2010 - Kybernetes 39 (3).
    The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel-paired, three-participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury-service” one-to-one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury-service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel-paired in the final phase.
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  27.  54
    A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic Dla {\Mathcal{Dla}} , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory.Emiliano Lorini - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):327-351.
    We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called ( Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency ) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of (...)
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  28.  20
    An Experiential, Game-Theoretic Pedagogy for Sustainability Ethics.Jathan Sadowski, Thomas P. Seager, Evan Selinger, Susan G. Spierre & Kyle P. Whyte - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (3):1323-1339.
    The wicked problems that constitute sustainability require students to learn a different set of ethical skills than is ordinarily required by professional ethics. The focus for sustainability ethics must be redirected towards: (1) reasoning rather than rules, and (2) groups rather than individuals. This need for a different skill set presents several pedagogical challenges to traditional programs of ethics education that emphasize abstraction and reflection at the expense of experimentation and experience. This paper describes a novel pedagogy of sustainability ethics (...)
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  29.  72
    Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme. The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the twentieth century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate solution concept for any normal form and extensive game. The paper explains this (...)
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  30.  75
    Why We Can't All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes's State of Nature.Graham G. Dodds & David W. Shoemaker - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):345-374.
    This paper critically examines several game theoretic interpretations of Hobbes' state of nature, including Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game, and argues instead that the best matrix is that of a combination of the two, an Assurance Dilemma. This move is motivated by the fact that Hobbes explicitly notes two distinct personality types, with different preference structures, in the state of nature: dominators and moderates. The former play as if in a Prisoner's Dilemma, the latter play as if in (...)
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  31. The Irrational Game: Why There’s No Perfect System.Robert Northcott - 2006 - In Eric Bronson (ed.), Poker and Philosophy. Open Court. pp. 105-115.
    This is a chapter written for a popular audience, in which I use poker as a convenient illustration of probability, determinism and counterfactuals. More originally, I also discuss the roles of rationality versus psychological hunches, and explain why even in principle game theory cannot provide us the panacea of a perfect winning srategy. (N.B. The document I have uploaded here is slightly longer than the abbreviated version that appears in the book, and also differs in a few other minor (...)
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  32. The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game.Luc Bovens - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments. Cambridge University Press.
    The Tragedy of the Commons is often associated with an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma. But it can also have the structure of an n-person Game of Chicken, an Assurance Game, or of a Voting Games (or a Three-in-a-Boat Game). I present three historical stories that document tragedies of the commons, as presented in Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume and argue that the descriptions of these historical cases align better with Voting Games than with any other games.
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  33.  13
    The Potential of the Imitation Game Method in Exploring Healthcare Professionals’ Understanding of the Lived Experiences and Practical Challenges of Chronically Ill Patients.Rik Wehrens - 2015 - Health Care Analysis 23 (3):253-271.
    This paper explores the potential and relevance of an innovative sociological research method known as the Imitation Game for research in health care. Whilst this method and its potential have until recently only been explored within sociology, there are many interesting and promising facets that may render this approach fruitful within the health care field, most notably to questions about the experiential knowledge or ‘expertise’ of chronically ill patients. The Imitation Game can be especially useful because it provides (...)
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  34.  14
    Kinship, Family, and Gender Effects in the Ultimatum Game.Shane J. Macfarlan & Robert J. Quinlan - 2008 - Human Nature 19 (3):294-309.
    Kinship and reciprocity are two main predictors of altruism. The ultimatum game has been used to study altruism in many small-scale societies. We used the ultimatum game to examine effects of individuals’ family and kin relations on altruistic behavior in a kin-based horticultural community in rural Dominica. Results show sex-specific effects of kin on ultimatum game play. Average coefficient of relatedness to the village was negatively associated with women’s ultimatum game proposals and had little effect on (...)
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  35.  50
    The Basic Algebra of Game Equivalences.Valentin Goranko - 2003 - Studia Logica 75 (2):221-238.
    We give a complete axiomatization of the identities of the basic game algebra valid with respect to the abstract game board semantics. We also show that the additional conditions of termination and determinacy of game boards do not introduce new valid identities. En route we introduce a simple translation of game terms into plain modal logic and thus translate, while preserving validity both ways game identities into modal formulae. The completeness proof is based on reduction (...)
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  36. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence From a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game.Romina Boarini, Jean-François Laslier & Stéphane Robin - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):341-373.
    This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. (...)
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  37.  91
    Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in (...)
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  38.  52
    Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game.Masanari Asano, Masanori Ohya & Andrei Khrennikov - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (3):538-548.
    In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4–17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225–241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655–1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105–117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have “quantum-like” properties, which can not be explained (...)
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  39. Hayek in the Lab. Austrian School, Game Theory, and Experimental Economics.Gustavo Cevolani - 2011 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 9 (1):429-436.
    Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.
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  40. The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, (...)
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  41. Maximum Shannon Entropy, Minimum Fisher Information, and an Elementary Game.Shunlong Luo - 2002 - Foundations of Physics 32 (11):1757-1772.
    We formulate an elementary statistical game which captures the essence of some fundamental quantum experiments such as photon polarization and spin measurement. We explore and compare the significance of the principle of maximum Shannon entropy and the principle of minimum Fisher information in solving such a game. The solution based on the principle of minimum Fisher information coincides with the solution based on an invariance principle, and provides an informational explanation of Malus' law for photon polarization. There is (...)
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  42.  70
    Does Trust Matter for R&D Cooperation? A Game Theoretic Examination.Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama V. Ramani - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (2):143-180.
    The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, (...)
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  43.  30
    Business is Not a Game: The Metaphoric Fallacy.Maurice Hamington - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 86 (4):473-484.
    Sport and game metaphors are ubiquitous in the culture and language of business. As evocative linguistic devices, such metaphors are morally neutral; however, if they are indicative of a deep structure of understanding that filters experience, then they have the potential to be ethically problematic. This article argues that there exists a danger for those who forget or confuse metaphor with definition: the metaphoric fallacy. Accordingly, business is like a game, but it is not the equivalent of a (...)
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  44.  18
    The Manufacturing Sector's Environmental Motives: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. [REVIEW]Richard John Fairchild - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 79 (3):333 - 344.
    What motivates manufacturing companies to make costly investments in producing in an environmentally clean manner? The traditional argument is that such behaviour is value reducing, and that therefore, firms must be forced by regulation to invest in “green” production processes. A counter-argument is that firms have an incentive to make environmental investments in an attempt to attract “green” consumers and investors, hence gaining competitive advantage over their rivals. In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic approach that demonstrates that competing (...)
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  45.  7
    Teaching Engineering Ethics Using BLOCKS Game.Shiew Wei Lau, Terence Peng Lian Tan & Suk Meng Goh - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (3):1357-1373.
    The aim of this study was to investigate the use of a newly developed design game called BLOCKS to stimulate awareness of ethical responsibilities amongst engineering students. The design game was played by seventeen teams of chemical engineering students, with each team having to arrange pieces of colored paper to produce two letters each. Before the end of the game, additional constraints were introduced to the teams such that they faced similar ambiguity in the technical facts that (...)
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  46.  31
    A, The, Another: A Game of Same and Different. [REVIEW]Atle Grønn & Kjell Johan Sæbø - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (1):75-95.
    Indefinites face competition at two levels: Presupposition and content. The antipresupposition hypothesis predicts that they signal the opposite of familiarity, or uniqueness, namely, novelty, or non-uniqueness. At the level of descriptive content, they are pressured from two sides: definites expressing identity and another phrases expressing difference, and Gricean reasoning predicts that indefinites signal both difference and identity and are infelicitous when definites and another phrases are felicitous. However, occasionally a space opens between the and another, for a to fill. This (...)
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    Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions.Don Ross - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game (...)
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    The Impact of Personal and Organizational Moral Philosophies on Marketing Exchange Relationships: A Simulation Using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game[REVIEW]Alison Watkins & Ronald Paul Hill - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):253 - 265.
    The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground (i.e., realistic altruists, tit-for-tats, and realistic egoists). Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of (...)
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    Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive game theory gives bad (...)
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    On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2009 - In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer.
    I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except (...)
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