Dopamine is critically important in the neural manifestation of motivated behavior, and alterations in the human dopaminergic system have been implicated in the etiology of motivation-related psychiatric disorders, most prominently addiction. Patients with chronic addiction exhibit reduced dopamine D2 receptor (DRD2) availability in the striatum, and the DRD2 TaqIA (rs1800497) and C957T (rs6277) genetic polymorphisms have previously been linked to individual differences in striatal dopamine metabolism and clinical risk for alcohol and nicotine dependence. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that the (...) variants of these polymorphisms would show increased reward-related memory formation, which has previously been shown to jointly engage the mesolimbic dopaminergic system and the hippocampus, as a potential intermediate phenotype for addiction memory. To this end, we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 62 young, healthy individuals genotyped for DRD2 TaqIA and C957T variants. Participants performed an incentive delay task, followed by a recognition memory task 24 h later. We observed effects of both genotypes on the overall recognition performance with carriers of low-expressing variants, namely TaqIA A1 carriers and C957T C homozygotes, showing better performance than the other genotype groups. In addition to the better memory performance, C957T C homozygotes also exhibited a response bias for cues predicting monetary reward. At the neural level, the C957T polymorphism was associated with a genotype-related modulation of right hippocampal and striatal fMRI responses predictive of subsequent recognition confidence for reward-predicting items. Our results indicate that genetic variations associated with DRD2 expression affect explicit memory, specifically for rewarded stimuli. We suggest that the relatively better memory for rewarded stimuli in carriers of low-expressing DRD2 variants may reflect an intermediate phenotype of addiction memory. (shrink)

En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto y que parece consistir en elegir entre: aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional de esta elección, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Sócrates desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible (...) conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Según mi interpretación, lo que dice Sócrates es que se deben rechazar los dos términos de la “elección imposible”, (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en el que el juicio falso es posible sin tener que aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. (shrink)

For quite a long time now I have argued against the view, widely held, and forcefully expounded by John Burnet, that at Phaedo 102b2-d2 Plato is formulating the notion of essential attribute and contrasting essence with accident. I have claimed that the essence-accident contrast is absent from that passage. This is a view that others have also held. But I have since 1950 found in that passage a formidable theory of relations. Recently, Professor David Gallop has taken me to task (...) for my heterodoxy. His reaction is overwhelming:I confess that I do not see how such a theory, [A] even if the text were to embody it, [B] could be held to provide an adequate account of relational statements in general. Gallop's paper is very tantalizing. Although he establishes neither A nor B, he does offer a series of very extraordinary arguments, whose examination reveals the depth of Plato's thinking on relations. (shrink)

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

¿Porqué la policía del D2 decide fotografiar, dejar sentado, inscripto, aquello que se esforzaba por ocultar?, ¿es posible representar el horror?, ¿qué hacer con las imágenes?, ¿porqué y para qué mostrar las fotografías de los centros clandestinos de detención?, ¿qué sentidos son posibles de construir?, ¿qué efectos subjetivos imprime el encuentro con la imagen de sí mismo?. Estos son algunos de los interrogantes que emergieron entre los trabajadores del Archivo Provincial de la Memoria (APM) ante el fondo fotográfico "Registro de (...) Extremistas", compuesto por imágenes tomadas a hombres y mujeres secuestrados y/o detenidos en el Centro Clandestino de Detención D2. El presente texto intenta compartir algunos análisis en torno a la relación de la fotografía con las memorias, la topografía de las memorias y los efectos de sentido que la imagen torna plausible al ser observada, interpretada, significada. La imagen como fisura, hendija, aquello que se escapa a la pretendida totalidad y que, en el acto de ser miradas, dichas, interpretadas por otro, imprimen la posibilidad del acto de veredicción. (shrink)

In [1] J.-Y. Bèziau formulated a logic called Z. Bèziau’s idea was generalized independently in [6] and [7]. A family of logics to which Z belongs is denoted in [7] by K. In particular; it has been shown in [6] and [7] that there is a correspondence between normal modal logics and logics from the class K. Similar; but only partial results has been obtained also for regular logics. In a logic N has been investigated in the language with negation; (...) implication; conjunction and disjunction by axioms of positive intuitionistic logic; the right-to-left part of the second de Morgan law; and the rules of modus ponens and contraposition. From the semantical point of view the negation used by Došen is the modal operator of impossibility. It is known this operator is a characteristic of the modal interpretation of intuitionistic negation. In the present paper we consider an extension of N denoted by N+. We will prove that every extension of N+ that is closed under the same rules as N+; corresponds to a regular logic being an extension of the regular deontic logic D21. The proved correspondence allows to obtain from soundnesscompleteness result for any given regular logic containing D2, similar adequacy theorem for the respective extension of the logic N+. (shrink)

Reviews of the papers mentioned in the title.

In the late forties, Stanisław Jaśkowski published two papers onthe discursive sentential calculus, D2. He provided a definition of it by an interpretation in the language of S5 of Lewis. The knownaxiomatization of D2 with discursive connectives as primitives was introduced by da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas in 1977. It turns out, however,that one of the axioms they used is not a thesis of the real Jaśkowski’s calculus. In fact, they built a new system, D∗2 for short, that differs from (...) D2 inmany respects. The aim of this paper is to introduce a direct Kripke-type semantics for the system, axiomatize it in a new way and prove soundness andcompleteness theorems. Additionally, we present labelled tableaux for D∗2.1. (shrink)

Prostaglandin (PG) D2 and PGE2 are positional isomers; however, they sometimes exhibit opposite physiological functions, such as in cancer development. Because DP receptors are considered to be a duplicated copy of EP2 receptors, PGD2 and PGE2 cross‐react with both receptors. These prostanoids may act as biased agonists for each receptor. In reviewing this field, a hypothesis was proposed to explain the opposed effects of these prostanoids from the viewpoints of the evolution of, mutations in, and biased activities of their receptors. (...) Previous findings showing more mutations/variations in DP receptors than EP2 receptors among individuals worldwide indicate that DP receptors are still in a rapid evolutionary stage. The opposing effects of these prostanoids on cancer development may be attributed to the biased activity of PGE2 for DP receptors, which may incidentally develop during the process of the old ligand, PGE2 gaining selectivity to newly diverged DP receptors. (shrink)

D2.1 (PL models and assignments) i. A PL model is a pair M = 〈DM, ·M〉 such that (a) DM is a non-empty set, and (b) ·M maps each A ∈ Con to AM ∈ DM, and each B ∈ Prdn to BM  (DM)n. ii. GM = {g| g: Var  DM} is the set of M-assignments. For any g ∈ GM, u ∈ Var, d ∈ DM, g[u/d] := (g\{u, g(u)})  {u, d} is the u-to-d alternative to (...) g. (shrink)

This study investigated the link between meditation, self-reported mindfulness and cognitive flexibility as well as other attentional functions. It compared a group of meditators experienced in mindfulness meditation with a meditation-naïve control group on measures of Stroop interference and the “d2-concentration and endurance test”. Overall the results suggest that attentional performance and cognitive flexibility are positively related to meditation practice and levels of mindfulness. Meditators performed significantly better than non-meditators on all measures of attention. Furthermore, self-reported mindfulness was higher in (...) meditators than non-meditators and correlations with all attention measures were of moderate to high strength. This pattern of results suggests that mindfulness is intimately linked to improvements of attentional functions and cognitive flexibility. The relevance of these findings for mental balance and well-being are discussed. (shrink)

With the continual development of artificial intelligence and smart computing in recent years, quantitative approaches have become increasingly popular as an efficient modeling tool as they do not necessitate complicated mathematical models. Many nations have taken steps, such as transitioning to online schooling, to decrease the harm caused by coronaviruses. Inspired by the demand for technology in early education, the present research uses a radial basis function neural network modeling technique to predict preschool instructors’ technology usage in classes based on (...) recognized determinant characteristics of technology acceptance. In this regard, this study utilized the RBFNN approach to predict preschool teachers’ technology acceptance behavior, based on the theory of planned behavior, which states that behavioral achievement, in our case the actual technology use in class, depends on motivation, intention and ability, and behavioral control. Thus, this research design is based on an adapted version of the technology acceptance model with eight dimensions: D1. Perceived usefulness, D2. Perceived ease of use, D3. Perceived enjoyment, D4. Intention to use, D5. Actual use, D6. Compatibility, D7. Attitude, and D8. Self-efficacy. According to the TAM, actual usage is significantly predicted by the other seven dimensions used in this research. Instead of using the classical multiple linear regression statistical processing of data, we opted for a NN based on the RBF approach to predict the actual usage behavior. This study included 182 preschool teachers who were randomly chosen from a project-based national preschool teacher training program and who responded to our online questionnaire. After designing the RBF function with the actual usage as an output variable and the other seven dimensions as input variables, in the model summary, we obtained in the training sample a sum of squares error of 37.5 and a percent of incorrect predictions of 43.3%. In the testing sample, we obtained a sum of squares error of 14.88 and a percent of incorrect predictions of 37%. Thus, we can conclude that 63% of the classified data are correctly assigned to the models’ dependent variable, i.e., actual technology use, which is a significant rate of correct predictions in the testing sample. This high significant percentage of correct classification represents an important result, mainly because this is the first study to apply RBFNN’s prediction on psychological data, opening up a new interdisciplinary field of research. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (...) (D2) T does not require quantification over intensional entities­i.e., meanings, propositions, properties, relations, or the like­in its treatment of opaque contexts; (D3) T captures the entailment relations that hold in virtue of form between sentences in the language for which it is a theory; (D4) T has a finite number of axioms. If the approach outlined here is correct, it resolves a longstanding complex of problems in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this paper we present an overview, with historical and critical remarks, of two articles by S. Jaśkowski ([20, 21] 1948 and [22, 23] 1949), which contain the oldest known formulation of a paraconsistent logic. Jaśkowski has built the logic – he termed discussive (D2) – by defining two new connectives and by introducing a modal translation map from D2 systems into Lewis’ modal logic S5. Discussive systems, for their formal details and their original philosophical justification, have attracted discrete attention (...) among experts. Indeed, in what follows, after having introduced Jaśkowski methodology of building D2 and his main philosophical motivations for providing such a system, we will explore some of the main contributions to the development of D2. (shrink)

Jaśkowski's discussive (discursive) logic D2 is historically one of the first paraconsistent logics, i.e., logics which 'tolerate' contradictions. Following Jaśkowski's idea to define his discussive logic by means of the modal logic S5 via special translation functions between discussive and modal languages, and supporting at the same time the tradition of paracomplete logics being the counterpart of paraconsistent ones, we present a paracomplete discussive logic D2p.

We outline the rather complicated history of attempts at axiomatizing Jaśkowski’s discussive logic $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 and show that some clarity can be had by paying close attention to the language we work with. We then examine the problem of axiomatizing $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 in languages involving discussive conjunctions. Specifically, we show that recent attempts by Ciuciura are mistaken. Finally, we present an axiomatization of $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2 in the language Jaśkowski suggested in his second paper on discussive logic, by (...) following a remark of da Costa and Dubikajtis. We also deal with an interesting variant of $$\mathbf {D_2}$$ D2, introduced by Ciuciura, in which negation is also taken to be discussive. (shrink)

Author cultivated fermenting cells (Scccharomyces spec.) in must of grapes and measured the various vital phenomena. The data thus received described in a rectangular co-ordinate as a function of time, found three kinds of characteristic curves in every vital phenomenon (whether belonging to the group of feeding, growth or that of increase): I. the curve described bySachs in 1873 and called the curve of the great period of evolution (Fig. 1:s). 2. the one described byM. G. Harting in 1845, and (...) the curve of individual or ontogenetic evolution (Fig. 1:S). 3. the undulatory curve similar to a sinus-cosinus function, deduced in theory by author and later on, in 1915, also found on an experimental basis (Fig. 3). — Analysing these curves, author demonstrates that they are in the closest relationship with each other. The course ofSachs' great period is identical with the function of the aperiodically mitigated vibromotion; the course ofHarting's ontogenetic curve is identical with the integral of the previous aperiodic function; the undulatory curve discovered by the author, and the one belonging to the philogenesis of evolution, consist of two details, one of the members is formed from the function of aperiodically mitigated vibromotion, and the other from a function of periodically mitigated vibration. — Mitigated vibromotion, according to our present knowledge can only arise if a body capable of vibration is simultaneously affected by a force establishing movement and a resistance mitigating the movement. In the living organism, on this basis, there is also a force and a resistance. The living organism obtains this force from food while the resistance is rooted in the construction of the cell. The author proves that the cells which no longer divide (the so-called permanent tissueforming cells) follow an aperiodical vibromotor course in their development while in the development of the continually dividing, so-called meristematic cells, owing to the periodic change of division and regeneration, the potential of the energy accommodates itself to the periodic vibromotor course. Both forms of development are derived from the identical differential equation: d2s/dt2=−w2s−2r ds/dt, the only difference between the two phenomena is that by aperiodic oscillation it is r2>w2 while by periodic it is r2shrink)

This paper is a detailed critical study of Adolf Grünbaum's work on the Duhemian thesis. I show that (a) Grünbaum's geometrical counterexample to the (D1) subthesis is unsuccessful, even with minimal claims made for what the counterexample is supposed to show, and (b) the (D2) subthesis is not a reasonable one (and cannot correctly be attributed to Duhem). The paper concludes with an argument about the relation between the Duhemian thesis, concerning component hypotheses of a scientific theory, and the view (...) that it is impossible to falsify entire theories conclusively. (shrink)

Two questions are the starting point for the discussion contained in this article: (a) Does the future exist? (b) What is the future? A preliminary analysis of these questions leads to the conclusion that their solution needs to introduce three different principal modes of existence characterized for objects belonging to the time sphere of being. They are: real (actual) existence (i.e. existence of „now”), postreal existence (the past) and potential (prereal) existence. In accordance with this differentiation the answer to point (...) (a) is generally determined by the following theses: (1) The future exists in potentiality, (2) The future exists neither in reality nor in postreality. The notion of potential existence includes two categories of objects. The first one - objects which in fact will become real objects (present). They may be described as potential objects sensu stricto. The second category constists of the quasi-potential objects, that is the objects whose potentiality of becoming real (actual) ones will never come into existence. The differentiation of categories mentioned above makes possible to formulate three definitions of the future: (D1) The future is the domain of potential, or quasi-potential objects, (D2) The future is the domain of the potential objects, (D3) The future is the domain of quasi-potential objects. The definition (D3) is obviously inadequate, hence the solution of the problem, what is the future, may be reduced to the choice between definitions (D1) and (D2). The arguments of the paper convince us that the adequate definition of the future is the definition (D2). First - contrary to (D1) - it describes the future as ontologically homogeneous domain containing only objects which will become objects of the present and subsequently past objects. Second, when the future is defined by the competitive definition (D1) it is doubtful whether the language systems, referring to the time sphere of being, can fulfill the basic principles of the classical logig: the principle of contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. (shrink)

The ability to sequence thoughts and actions is impaired in Parkinson’s disease. In PD, a distinct error pattern has been found in the offline performance of sequential working memory. This study examined how PD’s performance of sequential working memory unfolds over time using mouse tracking techniques. Non-demented patients with mild PD and healthy controls completed a computerized digit ordering task with a computer mouse. We measured response dynamics in terms of the initiation time, ordering time, movement time, and area under (...) the movement trajectory curve. This approach allowed us to distinguish between the cognitive processes related to sequence processing before the actual movement and the execution processes of the actual movement. PD patients showed longer initiation times, longer movement times, and more constrained movement trajectories than healthy controls. The initiation time and ordering time negatively correlated with the daily exposure to levodopa and D2/3 receptor agonists, respectively. The movement time positively correlated with the severity of motor symptoms. We demonstrated an altered temporal profile of sequential working memory in PD. Stimulating D1 and D2/3 receptors might speed up the maintenance and manipulation of sequences, respectively. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new reading of Phaedo 99b6-d2. My main thesis is that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleological αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This means that the passage offers no evidence that Socrates abandons teleology or modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, that he could not find or learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, allows an interpretation of (...) the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of the αἰτία of generation and destruction. (shrink)

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...

In 1995 N. C. A. da Costa and F. Doria proposed the modaltype elegant axiomatization of Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2. Yet his ownproblem which was formulated in 1975 in a following way: Is it possible toformulate natural and simple axiomatization for D2, employing classical disjunction and conjunction along with discussive implication and conjunctionas the only primitive connectives? — still seems left open. The matter of factis there are some axiomatizations of D2 proposed, e.g., by T. Furmanowski, J. Kotas and N. (...) C. A. da Costa , G. Achtelik, L. Dubikajtus,E. Dudek and J. Konior , satisfying da Costa’s conditions, but they arerather looking very complicated and unnatural. An attempt is made to solveda Costa’s problem. The new axiomatization of D2 is proposed essentiallybased on da Costa’s-Doria axiomatization from 1995. (shrink)

In February 2010, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) launched their DSM-5 website with details about the development of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). The APA invited “the general public” to review the draft diagnostic criteria and provide written comments and suggestions. This revision marks the first time the APA has solicited public review of their diagnostic manual. This article analyzes reported speech on the DSM-5 draft diagnostic criteria for the classification Posttraumatic Stress (...) Disorder. It demonstrates how textual standardization facilitates the cultural portability of the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria such that a community of speakers beyond the borders of the APA come to be seen as exemplary speakers, writers, and revisers of the professional style. Furthermore, analysis shows how co-authoring practices recontextualize the “voice” and persona of putative patient reported speech on Criterion D2. As a consequence of textual standardization, spoken discourse becomes recontextualized as the product of scientific inquiry and the organization of psychiatric knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Magic Buffalo" and Berkeley's Theory ofVision: Learning in Society David M. Levy Introduction Berkeley's Theory of Vision contains the remarkable claim that the perception ofdistance is learned by experience. This thesis is rooted in Berkeley's doctrine that the physical basic of optical perception is angular. An impression of angle? impacts upon the optic nerve. The interpretative problem confronting an individual is that of reconstructing two pieces ofinformation, distance d (...) and magnitude m, from one datum T. Let the ratio ofm/d form arctan T. How do we come to distinguish between the pair m1,d1 and the pair m2,d2 when m^d 1 = m2/d2? How do we distinguish big objects at a distance from small objects up close? The evidence Berkeley provides for this thesis is of a funny sort. He gives examples that we do, in fact, distinguish large distant objects from small near objects. Since the arctan of the pair m1, d 1 is by hypothesisthe sameas thatofthepairm2, d2thenrecognizingdistance must be alearned abihty. We cannotextractd and m from? alone. The proper interpretation ofBerkeley's philosophy ofscience is a matter of considerable debate.1 Nonetheless, as a working theorist of visual perception he is afairly simple-minded falsificationist. Here is what he says: find a person born blind who comes by surgery to see. If that person can distinguish at a glance big distant objects from small near objects, 111 amend my theory.2 The literature on Berkeley's Theory ofVision can be fairly said to bifurcate between those who "see" the argument and those who don't. Berkeley's most important eighteenth century disciple, Adam Smith, extended Berkeley's teaching to encompass the remarkable claim that we learn to perceive our economic interest (Levy 1992a, 1992b). The negative reaction to Berkeley's theory starts in 1842 with Samuel Bailey who pronounced himself mystified by the very claim that we learn to perceive distance. The debate between Bailey and John Stuart Mill, a debate which has twentieth century counterparts, has all the characteristics ofpeople talking past each other. Volume XLX Number 1 223 DAVID M. LEVY The missing social dimension The problem, as I see it, with Berkeley's proposed critical test—stipulating his own doctrine—is that a blind person would grow up in a sighted community. Perhaps, if he grew up in a blind community, and most of the community became sighted at the same time he did, all the community might be able to perceive distance. The problem with Berkeley's test is that ifhe himself is correct about the importance ofheuristics in making the visual distinctions, the fate of one individual is somewhat beside the point. One individual surely cannot create the necessary heuristics. This learning requires some evolutionary social process. Thus, while Berkeley's thesis requires some claim about some verybasicsocial epistemology(Fuller 1988), his proposed test, asking about a blind person growing up in a community silently presumed to be sighted, does not take into account the social dimension oflearning. Having said this, it is easy to think ofa better test for Berkeley's theoryofvision. Let us find an entire community where life takes place without the visual perception of great distance. Take any individual from this community and ask Berkeleian questions. Now, we know the answer becausejust such a dialogue was reported thirtyyears ago. One society which fulfils the test criterion is that ofthe BaMbuti people who lived their life in a very dense African forest. The American anthropologist Colin Turnbull took his friend from the BaMbuti, Kenge, to the top of a hill. Here is TurnbuH's famous report: Then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far downbelow. He turned to me and said, "Whatinsects are those?" At first I hardly understood; then I realized that in the forest the range of vision is so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, however, Kenge was looking for the first time Over apparently unending miles of unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any basis for comparison. The same thing happened later on... (shrink)

THE ART OF CAUSAL CONJECTURE Glenn Shafer Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction........................................................................................ ...........1 1.1. Probability Trees..........................................................................................3 1.2. Many Observers, Many Stances, Many Natures..........................................8 1.3. Causal Relations as Relations in Nature’s Tree...........................................9 1.4. Evidence............................................................................................ ...........13 1.5. Measuring the Average Effect of a Cause....................................................17 1.6. Causal Diagrams..........................................................................................20 1.7. Humean Events............................................................................................23 1.8. Three Levels of Causal Language................................................................27 1.9. An Outline of the Book................................................................................27 Chapter 2. Event Trees............................................................................................... .....31 2.1. Situations and Events...................................................................................32 2.2. The Ordering of Situations and Moivrean Events.......................................35 2.3. Cuts................................................................................................ ..............39 2.4. Humean Events............................................................................................43 2.5. (...) Moivrean Variables......................................................................................49 2.6. Humean Variables........................................................................................53 2.7. Event Trees for Stochastic Processes...........................................................54 2.8. Timing in Event Trees.................................................................................56 2.9. Intersecting Event Trees...............................................................................60 2.10. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................61 Chapter 3. Probability Trees...........................................................................................63 3.1. Some Types of Probability Trees.................................................................64 ii 3.2. Axioms for the Probabilities of Moivrean Events.......................................68 3.3. Zero Probabilities....................................................................................... ..70 3.4. A Sample-Space Analysis of the Event-Tree Axioms.................................72 3.5. Probabilities and Expected Values for Variables.........................................74 3.6. Martingales......................................................................................... .........79 3.7. The Expectation of a Variable in a Cut........................................................83 3.8. Conditional Expected Value and Conditional Expectation.........................87 Chapter 4. The Meaning of Probability...........................................................................91 4.1. The Interpretation of Expected Value..........................................................92 4.2. The Interpretation of Expectation................................................................95 4.3. The Long Run..............................................................................................98 4.4. Changes in Belief.........................................................................................101 4.5. The Empirical Validation of Probability......................................................106 4.6. The Diversity of Uses of Probability...........................................................108 4.7. Notes on the Literature.................................................................................110 Chapter 5. Independent Events.......................................................................................113 5.1. Independence........................................................................................ .......114 5.2. Weak Independence.....................................................................................118 5.3. The Principle of the Common Cause...........................................................121 5.4. Conditional Independence............................................................................128 5.5. Notes on the Literature.................................................................................133 Chapter 6. Events Tracking Events.................................................................................135 6.1. Tracking............................................................................................ ...........137 6.2. Tracking and Conditional Independence.....................................................142 6.3. Stochastic Subsequence...............................................................................143 6.4. Singular Diagrams for Stochastic Subsequence...........................................147 6.5. Conjunctive and Interactive Forks...............................................................149 Chapter 7. Events as Signs of Events..............................................................................153 iii 7.1. Sign................................................................................................ ..............154 7.2. Weak Sign................................................................................................ ....159 7.3. The Ethics of Causal Talk............................................................................160 7.4. Screening Off...............................................................................................16 2 Chapter 8. Independent Variables...................................................................................167 8.1. Unconditional Independence........................................................................170 8.2. Conditional Independence............................................................................175 8.3. Independence for Partitions.........................................................................177 8.4. Independence for Families of Variables......................................................182 8.5. Individual Properties of the Independence Relations...................................186 Chapter 9. Variables Tracking Variables........................................................................189 9.1. Tracking and Conditional Independence: A Summary...............................190 9.2. Strong Tracking............................................................................................ 192 9.3. Strong Tracking and Conditional Independence..........................................198 9.4. Stochastic Subsequence...............................................................................201 9.5. Functional Dependence................................................................................203 9.6. Tracking in Mean.........................................................................................204 9.7. Linear Tracking............................................................................................ 207 9.8. Tracking by Partitions..................................................................................210 9.9. Tracking by Families of Variables...............................................................212 Chapter 10. Variables as Signs of Variables...................................................................215 10.1. Sign................................................................................................ ............219 10.2. Linear Sign................................................................................................ .222 10.3. Scored Sign................................................................................................ 225 10.4. Families of Variables.................................................................................227 Chapter 11. AnTheory of Event Trees.............................................................229 11.1. Event Trees as Sets of Sets........................................................................230 11.2. Event Trees as Partially Ordered Sets........................................................232 iv 11.3. Regular Event Trees...................................................................................240 11.4. The Resolution of Moivrean Variables......................................................244 11.5. Humean Events and Variables...................................................................246 Chapter 12. Martingale Trees..........................................................................................247 12.1. Examples of Decision Trees......................................................................249 12.2. The Meaning of Probability in a Decision Tree.........................................253 12.3. Martingales......................................................................................... .......257 12.4. The Structure of Martingale Trees.............................................................261 12.5. Probability and Causality...........................................................................265 12.6. Lower and Upper Probability.....................................................................269 12.7. The Law of Large Numbers.......................................................................272 12.8. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................274 Chapter 13. Refining............................................................................................ ...........275 13.1. Examples of Refinement............................................................................277 13.2. A Constructive Definition of Finite Refinement.......................................281 13.3. Axioms for Refinement..............................................................................282 13.4. Lifting Moivrean Events and Variables.....................................................288 13.5. Refining Martingale Trees.........................................................................288 13.6. Grounding........................................................................................... .......294 Chapter 14. Principles of Causal Conjecture..................................................................299 14.1. The Diversity of Causal Explanation.........................................................302 14.2. The Mean Effect of the Happening of a Moivrean Event..........................305 14.3. The Effect of a Humean Variable..............................................................311 14.4. Attribution and Generality.........................................................................316 14.5. The Statistical Measurement of the Effect of a Cause...............................319 14.6. Measurement by Experiment.....................................................................320 14.7. Using Our Knowledge of How Things Work............................................322 v 14.8. Sampling Error...........................................................................................329 14.9. The Sampling Frame..................................................................................329 14.10. Notes on the Literature.............................................................................330 Chapter 15. Causal Models.............................................................................................3 31 15.1. The Causal Interpretation of Statistical Prediction....................................333 15.2. Generalizing to a Family of Exogenous Variables....................................337 15.3 Some Joint Causal Diagrams......................................................................339 15.4. Causal Path Diagrams................................................................................342 15.5. Causal Relevance Diagrams.......................................................................346 15.6. The Meaning of Latent Variables..............................................................352 15.7. Notes on the Literature...............................................................................357 Chapter 16. Representing Probability Trees...................................................................359 16.1. Three Graphical Representations...............................................................361 16.2. Skeletal Simplifications.............................................................................368 16.3. Martingale Trees in Type Theory...............................................................371 Appendix A. Huygens’s Probability Trees.....................................................................379 Huygens’s Manuscript in Translation..................................................................380 Appendix B. Some Elements of Graph Theory..............................................................385 B1. Undirected Graphs........................................................................................385 B2. Directed Graphs............................................................................................38 6 Appendix C. Some Elements of Order Theory...............................................................393 C1. Partial and Quasi Orderings.........................................................................393 C2. Singular and Joint Diagrams for Binary Relations.......................................394 C3. Lattices............................................................................................ .............395 C4. The Lattice of Partitions of a Set..................................................................396 Appendix D. The Sample-Space Framework for Probability.........................................399 D1. Probability Measures....................................................................................399 D2. Variables........................................................................................... ...........400 vi D3. Families of Variables...................................................................................401 D4. Expected Value............................................................................................402 D5. The Law of Large Numbers.........................................................................405 D6. Conditional Probability................................................................................406 D7. Conditional Expected Value........................................................................407 Appendix E. Prediction in Probability Spaces................................................................409 E1. Conditional Distribution...............................................................................411 E2. Regression on a Single Variable...................................................................412 E3. Regression on a Partition or a Family of Variables......................................415 E4. Linear Regression on a Single Variable.......................................................418 E5. Linear Regression on a Family of Variables................................................422 Appendix F. Sample-Space Concepts of Independence.................................................425 F1. Overview............................................................................................ ...........426 F2. Independence Proper.....................................................................................432 F3. Unpredictability in Mean..............................................................................434 F4. Simple Uncorrelatedness..............................................................................437 F5. Mixed Uncorrelatedness...............................................................................438 F6. Partial Uncorrelatedness...............................................................................440 F7. Independence for Partitions..........................................................................442 F8. Independence for Families of Variables.......................................................445 F9. The Basic Role of Uncorrelatedness.............................................................448 F10. Dawid’s Axioms.........................................................................................449 Appendix G. Prediction Diagrams..................................................................................453 G1. Path Diagrams............................................................................................ ..454 G2. Generalized Path Diagrams..........................................................................462 G3. Relevance Diagrams.....................................................................................466 G4. Bubbled Relevance Diagrams......................................................................475 Appendix H. Abstract Stochastic Processes...................................................................479 vii H1. Probability Conditionals and Probability Distributions...............................477 H2. Abstract Stochastic Processes......................................................................479 H3. Embedding Variables and Processes in a Sample Space.............................480 References.......................................................................................... ..............................491. (shrink)

BackgroundAdults with ADHD exhibit a neuropsychological profile that may present deficits in many cognitive domains, particularly attention and executive functions. However, some authors do not consider executive disfunction as an important part of the clinical profile of the syndrome; this could be related to the use of inappropriate neuropsychological tests, probably not adapted and not sufficiently ecological. Moreover, new data are required on specific correlation of attentive-executive symptoms with socio-demographic factors. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze the (...) neuropsychological performance of a group of adults with ADHD, also evaluating the influence of gender, age and education level.MethodsWe retrospectively collected health-related personal data of 40 adult ADHD patients, clinically diagnosed and evaluated via a battery of 4 neuropsychological tests and 1 self-administered questionnaire. Gender, age and years of education differences were assessed.ResultsAttention and EFs deficits have been highlighted mainly on the d2-R and 5-point neuropsychological tests, which therefore seem to be more sensitive in measuring the attention-executive dysfunction in an adult ADHD population, than TAP Go/No-go and ROCFT. ADHD patients also manifested subjective behavioral impulsivity disorders on BIS-11. There were no statistically significant gender differences in cognitive performance. On the contrary, younger patients performed worse on subscales TAP Go/No-go errors and 5-points number of drawings, while participants with a higher education level performed better on subscales d2-R speed of execution and d2-R errors. This supports a reduction in the number of errors and the execution time as a function of older age and a higher level of education. Finally, patients with higher education also self-reported greater impulsivity in planning.ConclusionOur preliminary findings suggest that adult ADHD is not a lifelong stable disorder, but it may change over time. Moreover, attention-executive deficits may be influenced and partially counterbalanced by experience and a higher level of education. This could underlie the development of specific psycho-behavioral and cognitive compensatory strategies. The use of self-administered questionnaires is therefore recommended to highlight attentional and executive difficulties that may not result in neuropsychological tests. (shrink)

Se realizó el análisis curricular de los planes de estudios D y modificados D1 y D2 y el análisis cuantitativo de las mallas curriculares o plan del proceso docente a partir de la organización de las asignaturas por ciclos, distribución de los componentes académico y laboral, frondosidad y quantum de flexibilidad del currículo. El objetivo de la investigación es evaluar el diseño curricular del plan de estudios de la carrera de Bioanálisis Clínico. Se concluye que hay deficiencias en el nuevo (...) plan al no definirse los aspectos que deben integrarse en el macro, meso y micro currículo de una carrera universitaria, no están diseñadas las estrategias curriculares, los programas de las disciplinas ni el plan de la bibliografía básica, lo cual atenta contra la planificación y organización del proceso docente educativo, una asimilación consciente y por ende una correcta formación de conocimientos y habilidades que permitan solucionar exitosamente los problemas profesionales. The curriculum analysis of the syllabus D, D1 and D2 were performedas well as the quantitative analysis of the curricular nets or plan of the teaching process from the organization of the subjects by cycles, distribution of academic and labour components, luxuriance and quantum of flexibility within the curriculum. The objective of the research is to evaluate the curriculum design of the syllabus for the Bioanalysis Clinical Degree. It is concluded that there are lacks in the new plan as the aspects that should be integrated in the macro, meso and micro curriculum of a college degree are not well defined, the curricular strategies are not designed neither the disciplines programs nor the plan of the basic bibliography, which infringes on the planning and organization of the educational teaching process. A conscious assimilation and therefore a correct formation of knowledge and skills that allow to solve successfully the professional problems. (shrink)

This study investigated the neuropsychological profile of college students who engage in binge drinking using comprehensive neuropsychological tests evaluating verbal/non-verbal memory, executive functions, and attention. Groups were determined based on scores on the Korean version of the Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test and Alcohol Use Questionnaire. There were 79 and 81 participants in the BD and non-BD groups, respectively. We administered the Korean version of the California Verbal Learning Test and Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test to evaluate verbal and non-verbal memory, (...) respectively, and measured executive functions using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Trail-Making Test, Controlled Oral Word Association Test and Stroop Color-Word Test. We administered the d2 test to evaluate attention. Neuropsychological performance was analyzed by multivariate analysis of variance. The BD group showed significantly poorer performance in the long-term free recall condition of the K-CVLT and delayed recall condition of the RCFT and completed significantly fewer categories on the WCST than the non-BD group. In addition, there were significant negative associations among the AUDIT-K total score, AUQ binge score, and long-term free recall score of the K-CVLT. There were significant negative associations between the total AUDIT-K score and delayed recall RCFT score, and between the total AUDIT-K total score and numbers of completed categories on the WCST. These results indicate that college students who participate in BD have difficulties with verbal/non-verbal memory and executive functions, and further suggest that excessive alcohol use could have detrimental effects on the hippocampal-prefrontal circuit even with a relatively short period of alcohol use. (shrink)

Fanconi anaemia (FA) is a cancer‐prone genetic disorder that is characterised by cytogenetic instability and redox abnormalities. Although rare subtypes of FA (B, D1 and D2) have been implicated in DNA repair through links with BRCA1 and BRCA2, such a role has yet to be demonstrated for gene products of the common subtypes. Instead, these products have been strongly implicated in xenobiotic metabolism and redox homeostasis through interactions of FANCC with cytochrome P‐450 reductase and with glutathione S‐transferase, and of FANCG (...) with cytochrome P‐450 2E1, as well as redox‐dependent signalling through an interaction between FANCA and Akt kinase. We hypothesise that FA proteins act directly (via FANCC and FANCG) and indirectly (via FANCA, BRCA2 and FANCD2) with the machinery of cellular defence to modulate oxidative stress. The latter interactions may co‐ordinate the link between the response to DNA damage and oxidative stress parameters (3, 6–12). BioEssays 25:589–595, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively (...) D1 and D2 differ, then D1-propositions and D2-propositions are true in different ways (if true). The aim of the paper isto present a monist challenge to this principle. The gist of the challenge is this: even if metaphysical pluralism (i.e. the antecedent) is granted, truth can be given a uniform account within a correspondence framework. The basic argument is this: every domain that the alethic pluralist is interested in is truth-apt. But any domain that deals in truth-apt propositions likewise deals in facts – after all, it seems a mere platitude that facts are what makes propositions true (if true). Once facts are admitted, the monist can argue as follows: a proposition is true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Now, a proposition corresponds to reality if, and only if, it represents reality correctly – and a proposition represents reality correctly if, and only if, what is says is a fact, or is the case. However, since the notion of fact is available for any truth-apt domain, a proposition – whatever its (truth-apt) domain – can be taken to be true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Thus, metaphysical pluralism does not imply alethic pluralism. (shrink)

In Plato's Philebus the last section of the discussion on the falseness of pleasure is dedicated to those pleasures intrinsically mixed with pain. This paper focuses specifically on bodily mixed pleasures, an analysis that extends from 44d to 47c, while its focal point is 46-47c. By adopting the anti-hedonists' methodology, Socrates cunningly transforms his entire analysis of bodily mixed pleasures into a discourse on human disease, in which medical terminology prevails. Two major points are made in the reading suggested here. (...) Despite Socrates' quasi-medical language, a substratum of poetic discourse is underlying his analysis. Thus, a network of poetic associations—probably promptly recalled by Plato's audience—not only reveals the intertextual encounter between medical, philosophic and poetic discourses but also contributes to the interpretation of Socrates' analysis. Hence, the pathology of love as expressed through poetry illuminates the meaning, questionable in straightforward medical terms, of passage 46c6-d2, while it also reveals the unfolding unity underlying Socrates' analysis, otherwise thought to comprise three distinct medical cases. Ancient medical lore is important for the understanding of passage 46d7-47a1 on the affliction of knêsis and psôra, not only because it confirms the analogy between the physiology of knêsis and that of sexual arousal and climax, but also because it illuminates the specific medical treatment Socrates is describing. Thus, in the crucial debate about whether Plato uses the term aporiais or pyriais in 46e2, medical evidence seems to support the latter. The reading pyriais makes this complicated paragraph more comprehensible in terms of meaning and syntax, while stressing the importance of heat in the processes of both the curing of knêsis and of human orgasm. Besides, it further confirms the intertextual encounter between the Phaedrus and the Philebus. (shrink)

ObjectivePrevious research has shown reduced interoceptive accuracy in depression. Attention deficit represents a key symptom of depression. Moreover, IAcc is positively correlated with attention. There is no study that investigates the effect of depression on IAcc and attention. The aim of this study is to examine the mediating effect of IAcc on depression and attention.MethodsThirty-six depressed patients from the Psychosomatic Clinic in Windach were matched with 36 healthy controls according to age and sex and were assessed at Ulm University. All (...) participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory-II, the heartbeat perception task to examine IAcc, and the d2 test assessing selective attention.ResultsDepressed patients showed attention deficits—both for general visual attention and IAcc—compared to healthy controls. The mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between depression and attention is not mediated via IAcc. Furthermore, depression predicts IAcc and attention, but these effects are direct and largely unaffected by the respective other variable.DiscussionThe results of the present study highlight both interoceptive as well as attention deficits in depressed patients. No clear mediation between these variables could be shown in this study. More elaborative research is needed to clarify whether different approaches to improve IAcc are effective for these deficits in depressed patients and could therefore be of importance as an additional aspect of therapy in depression. (shrink)

L’expression « subsidiarité » apparaît ces dernières années dans la littérature managériale pour conseiller des voies organisationnelles innovantes. La reprise d’un concept élaboré pour rendre compte initialement de communautés politiques, pose problème. Ce travail vise à mettre en lumière la difficulté principale du passage du champ politique au champ managérial. En effet, la subsidiarité rend au niveau inférieur un pouvoir qui lui revient de droit. Or, l’approche économique de théorie des organisations, notamment à travers la théorie de l’agence, présuppose une (...) constitution descendante de l’entreprise : ce n’est donc pas l’échelon inférieur qui attribue un pouvoir au supérieur, mais l’inverse. À moins de remettre en cause les présupposés de l’approche économique de la théorie des organisations, le principe de subsidiarité ne semble donc pas être applicable à l’entreprise. Dès lors, le principe de subsidiarité pourrait être agité comme un leurre pour faire croire au salarié qu’il est le détenteur légitime d’un pouvoir, afin d’arraisonner ce qu’il a de plus intérieur pour domestiquer sa liberté à des fins managériales. Classification JEL : A12, D2, L2. (shrink)

Discursive (or discussive) logic, D₂, introduced by Jaśkowski, is widely recognized as a first formal approach to paraconsistency. Jaśkowski applied a quite extraordinary technique at that time to describe his logic. He neither gave a set of the axiom schemata nor presented a direct semantics for D₂ but used a translation function to express his philosophical and logical intuitions. Discursive logic was defined by an interpretation in the language of S₅ of Lewis. The aim of this paper is to present (...) a modified system of the discursive logic that allows some of the weaker versions of Duns Scotus's thesis to be valid. The initial idea is to consider a different characteristic of the connective of negation. We introduce both a direct semantics and an axiomatization of the new system, prove the key metatheorems, and describe labeled tableaux for the system. (shrink)