A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them—not in the form of a mythical past or former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general.1In Difference and Repetition (1968), Gilles Deleuze calls for a new Meno. The Meno is one of (...) the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates asserts that learning is recollection. While Deleuze’s central philosophical writing has not been interpreted as a text on learning, his treatment of Plato’s Meno cannot be reduced .. (shrink)

In a short paper bearing the title “The Deleuzian Fold of Thought” (1996), Jean-Luc Nancy engages a concept that has a prominent place in contemporary continental philosophy, the fold, so as to accentuate a shared tendency that nevertheless estranges his own thought from Gilles Deleuze’s. This shared tendency deals with the shifting conception of thinking through the fold itself, the unfolding and refolding of the fold, which in its discontinuity has transformed the image of what it means to think. I (...) do not seek to reconcile the two thinkers through the fold, but to demonstrate the way in which their estrangement through the fold is what it means to think and defines the exigency of thought. (shrink)

In a short paper bearing the title “The Deleuzian Fold of Thought”, Jean-Luc Nancy engages a concept that has a prominent place in contemporary continental philosophy, the fold, so as to accentuate a shared tendency that nevertheless estranges his own thought from Gilles Deleuze’s. This shared tendency deals with the shifting conception of thinking through the fold itself, the unfolding and refolding of the fold, which in its discontinuity has transformed the image of what it means to think. I do (...) not seek to reconcile the two thinkers through the fold, but to demonstrate the way in which their estrangement through the fold is what it means to think and defines the exigency of thought. (shrink)

It is by now generally understood that the nature of events are central to Deleuze’s philosophical endeavour. This has not meant, however, that the process mapped out by this concept has been adequately grasped. Indeed, the lines mapping out events are obscured, theoretical, even otherworldly, whenever the complexities of the creating of the virtual and the actual as the created, are reductively conceived as giving way to two separated domains; two separated domains whereby the repeater would be forever condemned to (...) be the result of an otherworldly will that “works through it,” one that would signal that they would never be capable of becoming worthy of the events that make a life. [i] The perspectival reality of the virtual with respect to the actual, which despite its fragmentary nature is in its entirety encompassed in each singular event, requires of us that we grasp what it is that Antonin Artaud’s points to when saying, I “am my son, my father, my mother, and myself.” It is not as though events perceived in the form of a virtual complex render beings inconsequential; instead, events are capable of ousting the verb “to be” in a double sense, because they enfold what is most affirmative in the activity of beings, the being of becoming whereby a life is born, always yet again, and as a function of which, as Alfred North Whitehead notes, what an actual being is, is how that entity becomes. It is adequate to its becoming. The actual as present-being expresses the verb “to be” in an ephemeral sense, or it is expressed by it in a restrictive way, while when affirmed as indistinct from the virtual, being, the verb “to be,” implies nothing else than the return of becoming. It is an untimely instant in which what is affirmed is the continuation of becoming; an instant that makes each event be the infinite becoming-finite of an actual being. So as to explore the nature of events in Deleuze’s philosophy, it is this displacement, the ousting of the verb “to be,” that I focus in on in this paper. (shrink)

In his treatise on the essence of human freedom, Schelling recognizes that any true philosophical articulation must begin with the experience of freedom. If freedom as he tells us is the center with respect to which the grounding of all beings emerges, then, the relationship of the human and non-human, along with their taken for granted distinction, must be thought in light of the question of freedom. If such an orientation is to be made within Schelling’s philosophy, the central aspect (...) of the spirit of freedom must be directed away from Heidegger’s generality that “freeing man to himself is a setting free of man in the middle of beings as a whole,” towards the notion that the setting free of the human being in the middle of beings, supposes as its mutual determinant the letting-be free of beings in light of which the human being arrives at a freedom for something. Through a focused evaluation of some of Heidegger’s key texts, this paper seeks to pave the way for an alternative conception of freedom as mutually reflected affirmation, one that would prompt a return to Schelling after Heidegger. (shrink)

There are two ways in which sense has been approached in contemporary philosophy. The dividing line is between those who interpret sense as abiding with models of recognition and those who determine sense and paradox as co-present. In The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze puts forth a paradoxical constitution of sense in order to render that which is new in being something untimely, the always new in being. In placing paradox at the center of the constitution of sense, Deleuze effectively (...) works to displace the two aspects of doxa, good sense and common sense. In relation to paradox, sense moves in two directions simultaneously; it is actualized in the present, and it is continuously reborn in the transcendental field .. (shrink)

Focussed around three core themes - capitalism, the metaphysics of democracy and aesthetics - these 12 essays emphasise the potential of Nancy's political thought, and collectively situate it within a broader intellectual context which includes engagements with Badiou, Ranciere, Foucault, Agamben and Lefort.