Results for 'Epistemic agency'

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  1. Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency.András Szigeti - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how (...)
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  2. A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.
    This paper attempts to answer two questions: What is epistemic agency? And what are the motivations for having this concept? In response to the first question, it is argued that epistemic agency is the agency one has over one’s belief-forming practices, or doxastic dispositions, which can directly affect the way one forms a belief and indirectly affect the beliefs one forms. In response to the second question, it is suggested that the above conception of (...) agency is either implicitly endorsed by those theorists sympathetic to epistemic normativity or, at minimum, this conception can make sense of the legitimacy of the normative notions applicable to how and what one should believe. It is further contended that belief formation in some respects is a skill that can be intentionally developed and refined. Accepting this contention and the existence of certain epistemic norms provide inconclusive yet good reasons to endorse this concept. Recent challenges to this concept by Hillary Kornblith and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij are also considered. (shrink)
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  3. Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons.Michael Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
    In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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  4. Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention: A Theory of Epistemic Agency.Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic (...)
     
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  5. Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.
    Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.
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  6. Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
    This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
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  7.  47
    “Epistemological Communities” and the Problem of Epistemic Agency.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (4):341 - 360.
    There is a tendency, a bad tendency, to make epistemic agency the central focus of epistemology. In brief, epistemologists have traditionally elevated epistemic agency as the crucial issue to be addressed, and ask all other epistemological questions in light of that issue. This is not surprising given the Cartesian influence on epistemology, but I argue that epistemic agency should not always be the central focus of epistemology. There are times when giving central place to (...)
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  8.  60
    Is Epistemic Agency Possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.
    There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons (...)
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  9.  23
    A Neo‐Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency.Sarah Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275.
    What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In (...)
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  10.  11
    Epistemic Agency and the Generality Problem.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):107-120.
    I present and motivate a new solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. I suggest that we shift our focus from process-types that can be characterized independently of a subject’s epistemic concerns to process-types that play important roles in the life of the epistemic agent. Once we do so, a simple, promising solution suggests itself: the C-Typing Thesis. According to the C-Typing Thesis, how an epistemic agent forms her degree of confidence in a believed proposition determines the (...)
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    Questioning the Role of Epistemic Agency: A Response to Calvert-Minor.Heidi Grasswick - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (4):361 - 369.
    In ??Epistemological communities? and the problem of epistemic agency? (Social Epistemology 25 (4): 341?360), Chris Calvert-Minor outlines Lynn Hankinson Nelson?s theory of evidence and her claims with respect to communities as primary epistemic agents, and criticizes both Nelson and her critics (including myself) for their undue emphasis on epistemic agency. Calvert-Minor argues instead for an epistemology framed around practises rather than epistemic agents. I argue that Calvert-Minor?s criticism that epistemic agency plays too (...)
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  12.  64
    Contra Collective Epistemic Agency.Heimir Geirsson - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):163-166.
    In a couple of recent papers Deborah Tollefsen has argued that groups should be viewed as having some of the intentional and epistemic properties as do individuals. In “Organizations as True Believers” she argues that corporations really do have intentional states.1 In “Collective Epistemic Agency”2 she continues her development of group agency and she now argues that collectives can be genuine knowers. The target of her arguments is, naturally, the wide spread view that “knowers are individuals, (...)
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  13.  19
    The Role of Consciousness For Epistemic Agency.Frank Hofmann - unknown
    In this presentation, I argue for a conception of rational capacities that makes us epistemic agents without essential reference or appeal to self-consciousness/self-knowledge, contrary to McDowell, Moran, and others. At the same time, his conception of rational capacities as powers at the personal level saves our epistemic agency against worries that Hilary Kornblith has put forward.
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  14.  4
    Epistemic Agency Naturalized: The Protocol of Testimony Acceptance.Thomas E. Uebel - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):89-105.
    This response considers the question whether empiricists are condemned to silence about the epistemic agency their theories attribute or presuppose. It is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry. If this is correct, it underscores once more the need to distinguish between the various strands of logical positivism which show different strengths and weaknesses.
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  15. On Epistemic Agency.Kristoffer Ahlstrom - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
    Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant (...)
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  16. Philosophical Issues: Epistemic Agency.Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva & Baron Reed - 2013 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.
     
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  17. Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the (...)
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  18. Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention: A Theory of Epistemic Agency.Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic (...)
     
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  19. Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention: A Theory of Epistemic Agency.Fairweather Abrol & Montemayor Carlos - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic (...)
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  20.  19
    Collective Epistemic Agency: Virtue and the Spice of Vice.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2011 - In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. pp. 45.
    The paper evaluates Christopher Hookway's claim that individual epistemic vice can enhance the value of collective epistemic virtue. I suggest that this claim can be defended on the grounds of a dynamic account of collective intentional properties that is supplemented by an account of a spontaneous ordering mechanism such as the "intangible hand". Both these accounts try to explain how individual traits integrate into collective traits by way of aggregation. In this respect, they are different from normative and (...)
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  21. Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: Decentralizing Epistemic Agency.Patrick J. Reider (ed.) - 2016 - Rowman & Littlefield International.
    This book offers a comprehensive overview of the arguments relating to the extent and manner to which social influences enable epistemic agents.
     
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  22.  69
    Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
  23. Epistemic Agency.Ernest Sosa - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (11):585-605.
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  24.  93
    Collective Epistemic Agency.Deborah Tollefsen - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (1):55-66.
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  25.  37
    Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues.Baron Reed - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):507-526.
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  26. Epistemic Agency Naturalized: The Protocol of Testimony Acceptance.T. Uebel - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79:89-105.
     
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  27. Collective Epistemic Agency and the Need for Collective Epistemology.D. Tollefsen - 2007 - In Nikolaos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos. pp. 309--329.
  28.  1
    XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.
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  29.  9
    Chapter Two. Epistemic Agency.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Knowing Full Well. Princeton University Press. pp. 14-34.
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  30.  2
    More New Essays on Epistemic Agency.Kristina Rolin - 2017 - Metascience 26 (3):463-466.
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  31.  19
    Thomas E. Uebel. Epistemic Agency Naturalized: The Protocol of Testimony Acceptance.Alan W. Richardson & Thomas E. Uebel - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):89–105.
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  32. Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche.Regina E. Fabry - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  33.  64
    The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?J. Habermas - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):13 – 50.
    In this essay, I address the question of whether the indisputable progress being made by the neurosciences poses a genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency. I begin by situating free will as an ineliminable component of our practices of attributing responsibility and holding one another accountable, illustrating this via a discussion of legal discourse regarding the attribution of responsibility for criminal acts. I then turn to the practical limits on agents' scientific self-objectivation, limits that turn out (...)
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  34.  77
    Epistemic Normativity and Cognitive Agency.Matthew Chrisman - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):508-529.
    On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief-formation to answer this question, to (...)
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  35.  76
    Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I (...)
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  36.  42
    Group Agency and Epistemic Dependency.Aaron Dewitt - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):235-244.
    Modern epistemic questions have largely been focused around the individual and her ability to acquire knowledge autonomously. More recently epistemologists have begun to look more broadly in providing accounts of knowledge by considering its social context, where the individual depends on others for true beliefs. Hardwig explains the effect of this shift starkly, arguing that to reject epistemic dependency is to deny certain true beliefs widely held throughout society and, more specifically, it is to deny that science and (...)
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  37.  21
    Ethical and Epistemic Issues in Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising: Where is Patient Agency[REVIEW]Catherine A. Womack - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):275-280.
    Arguments for and against direct-to-consumer drug advertising (DTCA) center on two issues: (1) the epistemic effects on patients through access to information provided by the ads; and (2) the effects of such information on patients’ abilities to make good choices in the healthcare marketplace. Advocates argue that DTCA provides useful information for patients as consumers, including information connecting symptoms to particular medical conditions, information about new drug therapies for those conditions. Opponents of DTCA point out substantial omissions in information (...)
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  38.  54
    Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201-227.
    A prominent issue in mainstream epistemology is the controversy about doxastic obligations and doxastic voluntarism. In the present paper it is argued that this discussion can benefit from forging links with formal epistemology, namely the combined modal logic of belief, agency, and obligation. A stit-theory-based semantics for deontic doxastic logic is suggested, and it is claimed that this is helpful and illuminating in dealing with the mentioned intricate and important problems from mainstream epistemology. Moreover, it is argued that this (...)
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  39.  99
    Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
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  40.  42
    Agency of Belief and Intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.
    In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis (...)
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  41.  29
    Introduction to the Special Issue “Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility”.Andrea Kruse & Heinrich Wansing - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2667-2671.
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  42. Agency, Ontology, and Epistemic Justification: A Response to Freedman.Marilyn Nissim-Sabat - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):13-17.
  43.  6
    Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues.Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč & Vojko Strahovnik - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-15.
    We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues (...)
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    Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility (...)
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  45. Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2012 - Hypatia 27 (4):715-735.
    I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention (...)
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  46. The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as (...)
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  47.  12
    Epistemic Freedom Revisited.Gregory Antill - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs constitute an important counter-example to the widely accepted theses that we ought not and cannot believe at will. Cases of self-fulfilling belief are thought to constitute a special class where we enjoy the epistemic freedom to permissibly believe for pragmatic reasons, because whatever we choose to believe will end up true. In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim (...)
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  48. Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
    Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility of (...)
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    The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.
    Credit theories of knowledge have to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. The most promising way to explain these conditions is to offer an account of cognitive agency that is a plausible development of the uncontroversial notion that we are believing subjects. This article develops and defends a Structuralist model of cognitive agency.
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  50. Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.
    Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I (...)
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