Results for 'Hallucination'

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  1. The Obscure Object of Hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
    Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination (...)
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  2. The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction.Fiona Macpherson - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press.
  3. Silencing the Argument From Hallucination.István Aranyosi - 2013 - In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press). MIT Press.
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what (...)
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  4. Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”.Costas Pagondiotis - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 361.
    In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different kinds of states. Finally, I (...)
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  5. Explaining Schizophrenia: Auditory Verbal Hallucination and Self‐Monitoring.Wayne Wu - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):86-107.
    Do self‐monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, explain auditory verbal hallucination? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer crucial questions any explanation of auditory verbal hallucination must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make the case for an alternative explanation: auditory verbal hallucination is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self‐monitoring, but, rather, of the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a (...)
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  6. Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination.Andrew Stephenson - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508.
    Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination (...)
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  7.  46
    Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt Bower - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the (...)
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  8. Hallucination as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most vicious debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between ‘relationalists’ and ‘representationalists’. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychiatry routinely does), then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination (...)
     
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  9. The Immersive Spatiotemporal Hallucination Model of Dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is (...)
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  10. Mechanisms of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia.Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho - 2013 - Frontiers in Schizophrenia 4.
    Recent work on the mechanisms underlying auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) has been heavily informed by self-monitoring accounts that postulate defects in an internal monitoring mechanism as the basis of AVH. A more neglected alternative is an account focusing on defects in auditory processing, namely a spontaneous activation account of auditory activity underlying AVH. Science is often aided by putting theories in competition. Accordingly, a discussion that systematically contrasts the two models of AVH can generate sharper questions that will lead (...)
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  11.  57
    Accounting for the Phenomenology and Varieties of Auditory Verbal Hallucination Within a Predictive Processing Framework.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:142-155.
    Two challenges that face popular self-monitoring theories (SMTs) of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are that they cannot account for the auditory phenomenology of AVHs and that they cannot account for their variety. In this paper I show that both challenges can be met by adopting a predictive processing framework (PPF), and by viewing AVHs as arising from abnormalities in predictive processing. I show how, within the PPF, both the auditory phenomenology of AVHs, and three subtypes of AVH, can be (...)
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  12.  93
    Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition.Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin - 2012 - WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the (...)
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  13. Hallucination, Sense-Data and Direct Realism.David R. Hilbert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual (...)
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  14. On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  15. Characterizing Hallucination Epistemically.Charlie Pelling - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):437 - 459.
    According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being 'introspectively indiscriminable', in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in (...)
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  16.  36
    Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW]Rami Ali - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):455-460.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of (...)
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  17. Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.David Lewis - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):239-249.
  18. The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination.Benj Hellie - 2013 - In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.
    Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but (...)
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  19. Is Inner Speech the Basis of Auditory Verbal Hallucination in Schizophrenia?Wayne Wu & Raymond Cho - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 14:1-3.
    We respond to Moseley and Wilkinson's defense of inner speech models of AVH.
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  20. Some Reflections on an Argument From Hallucination.Paul F. Snowdon - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):285-305.
  21.  47
    Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination, and Memory.Edward S. Casey - 2003 - In J. Philips & James Morley (eds.), Imagination and its Pathologies. MIT Press.
  22. Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth.Daya Krishna - 2003 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.
     
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  23.  50
    Review of Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (Eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. [REVIEW]Clare Batty - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
  24.  92
    Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, by William Fish.Anders Nes - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):856-859.
  25. Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination.Philip Bretzevonl - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.
  26. Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination.William C. Fish - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167.
    In the eyes of some of its critics, disjunctivism fails to support adequately the key claim that a particular hallucination might be indistinguishable from a certain kind of veridical perception despite the two states having nothing other than this in common. Scott Sturgeon, for example, has complained that disjunctivism ‘‘offers no positive story about hallucination at all’’ (2000: 11) and therefore ‘‘simply takes [indistinguishability] for granted’’ (2000: 12). So according to Sturgeon, what the disjunctivist needs to provide is (...)
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  27. Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In D. Platchias & F. E. Macpherson (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press. pp. 291.
    There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s (...)
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  28. The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic (...)
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  29. Hallucination And Imagination.Keith Allen - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):287-302.
    What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of (...)
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  30.  11
    The Sense of Deception: Illusion and Hallucination as Nullified, Invalid Perception.Andrea Cimino - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (1):27-49.
    The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which (...)
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  31. Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination.Brad J. Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.
    Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism.
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  32.  14
    Suggested Visual Hallucination Without Hypnosis Enhances Activity in Visual Areas of the Brain.William J. McGeown, Annalena Venneri, Irving Kirsch, Luca Nocetti, Kathrine Roberts, Lisa Foan & Giuliana Mazzoni - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):100-116.
    This functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging study investigated high and low suggestible people responding to two visual hallucination suggestions with and without a hypnotic induction. Participants in the study were asked to see color while looking at a grey image, and to see shades of grey while looking at a color image. High suggestible participants reported successful alterations in color perception in both tasks, both in and out of hypnosis, and showed a small benefit if hypnosis was induced. Low suggestible (...)
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  33.  19
    Sense of Agency Over Thought: External Misattribution of Thought in a Memory Task and Proneness to Auditory Hallucination.Eriko Sugimori, Tomohisa Asai & Yoshihiko Tanno - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):688-695.
    Previous studies have suggested that auditory hallucination is closely related to thought insertion. In this study, we investigated the relationship between the external misattribution of thought and auditory hallucination-like experiences. We used the AHES-17, which measures auditory hallucination-like experiences in normal, healthy people, and the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, in which false alarms of critical lure are regarded as spontaneous external misattribution of thought. We found that critical lures elicited increased the number of false alarms as AHES-17 scores increased (...)
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  34. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  35.  64
    Hallucination.Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) - 2013 - MIT Press.
    Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
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  36.  46
    Colour Hallucination: A New Problem for Externalist Representationalism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):695-704.
    Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual experience is determined by the representational content of that experience. Their deployment of the idea that perceptual experience is transparent shows that they account for representational content with reference to the properties which are represented – the properties out there in the world. I explain why this commits the externalist representationalist to objectivism and realism about colour properties. Colour physicalism has proved to be the position of choice for externalist (...)
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    Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena.Takuya Niikawa - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):353-381.
    In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing (...)
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  38.  9
    Auditory Verbal Hallucination and the Sense of Ownership.Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):183-196.
    About 75% of subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia experience auditory-verbal hallucination and report "hearing voices" that are not actually present. One notable feature of AVH is that it seems involuntary and not directly in the subject's control. With regard to content, these represented voices make utterances, typically commands and evaluations, and either are directed to the patient or speak about her in the third person. Voices may echo the subject's thoughts or comment on the subject's behavior and, in some cases, (...)
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  39.  16
    Modelling Empty Representations: The Case of Computational Models of Hallucination.Marcin Miłkowski - 2017 - In Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Raffaela Giovagnoli (eds.), Representation and Reality in Humans, Other Living Organisms and Intelligent Machines. Springer, Cham. pp. 17--32.
    I argue that there are no plausible non-representational explanations of episodes of hallucination. To make the discussion more specific, I focus on visual hallucinations in Charles Bonnet syndrome. I claim that the character of such hallucinatory experiences cannot be explained away non-representationally, for they cannot be taken as simple failures of cognizing or as failures of contact with external reality—such failures being the only genuinely non-representational explanations of hallucinations and cognitive errors in general. I briefly introduce a recent computational (...)
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  40.  24
    Error, Hallucination and the Concept of 'Ontology' in the Early Work of Heidegger.Denis McManus - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (278):553 - 575.
    Recently the attempt has been made to demonstrate Heidegger's relevance to the concerns of analytic philosophers. A focus for this effort has been the criticism in his early work of Cartesian ontology. While a number of important works have mapped out this area of Heidegger's thought, a crucial task has not been carried out, namely that of assessing how Heidegger can accommodate those phenomena which motivate the Cartesian to adopt his highly counter-intuitive ontology. As long as we fail to examine (...)
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  41.  76
    Perception, Illusion, and Hallucination.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 1982 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):159-191.
    Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.
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  42.  25
    Heidegger and Hallucination.David Batho - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (4):675-696.
    ABSTRACTCan Heidegger account for hallucination? I argue that while Heidegger does not develop an account of hallucination, he gives us all the resources we need to develop such an account. I first discuss a prominent argument against the very possibility of such an account. I argue that this argument is mistaken. I then discuss Heidegger's brief remarks on hallucination. In analysing a particular case study, Heidegger claims that the subject hallucinates for two reasons. First, he fails to (...)
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  43.  34
    If Vision is “Veridical Hallucination,” What Keeps It Veridical?Peter Ulric Tse - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):426-427.
    If perception is constructed, what keeps perception from becoming mere hallucination unlinked to world events? The visual system has evolved two strategies to anchor itself and correct its errors. One involves completing missing information on the basis of knowledge about what most likely exists in the scene. For example, the visual system fills in information only in cases where it might be responsible for the data loss. The other strategy involves exploiting the physical stability of the environment as a (...)
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  44. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three ...
  45. Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  46. Out-of-Body Experience, Heautoscopy, and Autoscopic Hallucination of Neurological Origin. Implications for Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Corporeal Awareness and Self Consciousness.Olaf Blanke & Christine Mohr - 2005 - Brain Research Reviews 50 (1):184-199.
  47.  64
    Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.
    ABSTRACTThis paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off’ problem for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur, ones that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any particular view about the (...)
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  48.  53
    Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
    Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I conclude by showing (...)
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  49. Merleau‐Ponty's Account of Hallucination.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):76-90.
  50.  47
    Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases.Fiona Macpherson & Clare Batty - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):263-296.
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