In this essay, Benjamin Endres examines how teaching is caught between the ideals of formal, systemic institutions, on the one hand, and the ideals of more intimate or personal relations, on the other. Endres uses Anthony Giddens’s account of “abstract systems” and “pure” relations to suggest that the tension that teachers face is not only the result of opposing ideologies or philosophies of teaching, but it is the product of conflicting undercurrents in modern social and economic life. Although (...) there is no simple solution to the ambiguous and contested status of teaching, Endres points to two examples of how the interpersonal dimensions of teaching may gain recognition and support by the institutional system of schooling: research on the effects of class size and legal guarantees for individualized educational plans in the area of special education. He concludes by emphasizing the particular challenge of cultivating interpersonalrelations for the most disadvantaged students. (shrink)
First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a (...) difficult field in a consistent manner, sensitive to insights from other behavioural and social sciences. This collection represents an important contribution to a growing research agenda in the social sciences. (shrink)
The paper outlines a structuralist unification between two existing relational theories of the self, i.e., Beni's Structural Realist theory of the Self and Gallese's Embodied Relational Self. Each one of these theories provides a structuralist account of some aspects of the self but leaves out some other aspects which are indispensable to a comprehensive account of the self. SRS accounts for the reflective aspects of the self, and ERS accounts for the environmental and social aspects of the self. In this (...) paper, I argue that when paired with one another, SRS and ERS could amend one another's shortcomings, without giving way to a non-relational conception of the self. I draw on neurology of the connection between Cortical Midline Structures and the mirror neuron system to inform my unifying proposal. I also show that an informational framework can underlie the union. (shrink)
A good summary of Merleau-Ponty's theory of intersubjectivity, drawn from the Phénoménologie de la perception and La structure du comportement. Barral sees Merleau-Ponty's work in this area more as a groundwork for further investigation than as a satisfactory philosophy of the person-in-relation itself; since this topic is a central one in Merleau-Ponty, her study is a helpful introduction to much of his philosophy.—J. J.
According to Haidt’s “social intuitionist model”, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons doesn’t entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else our reasoning is (...) purely strategic and manipulative in nature. Reason-giving also, I argue, performs other important functions in moral and social life. A robust willingness to offer reasons in favor of our convictions is itself a virtue we seek and appreciate in others. Others’ willingness to reason with us is itself a good we enjoy at their hands, or that they confer upon us. What we give each other in being willing and determined to reason together is, among other things, respect for, and good-will towards, each other. (shrink)
This book brings together scholars from a variety of disciplines to explore Kierkegaard's continuing relevance to political and social issues. Kierkegaard is often portrayed as an out-and-out individualist with no concern for interpersonalrelations. These essays not only refute this caricature, they bring out the complex nature of Kierkegaard's engagements with questions of selfhood and society. What Kierkegaard has to say about love, the church, politics and justice is shown to test the limits of what we take for (...) granted in the modern (and postmodern) world. (shrink)
Recent imaging results suggest that individuals automatically share the emotions of others when exposed to their emotions. We question the assumption of the automaticity and propose a contextual approach, suggesting several modulatory factors that might influence empathic brain responses. Contextual appraisal could occur early in emotional cue evaluation, which then might or might not lead to an empathic brain response, or not until after an empathic brain response is automatically elicited. We propose two major roles for empathy; its epistemological role (...) is to provide information about the future actions of other people, and important environmental properties. Its social role is to serve as the origin of the motivation for cooperative and prosocial behavior, as well as help for effective social communication. (shrink)
La réelle généralisation du téléphone en France, outil technique de médiation de la communication interpersonnelle ordinaire, date, après une longue gestation, d’une génération. Revisiter les enquêtes et analyses sur les usages sociaux du téléphone pendant le quart de siècle écoulé facilite, en prenant du recul, le suivi de l’évolution d’une appropriation, par les Français, qui ne fut pas seulement technique mais culturelle. Ce travail de remémorisation et de synthèse d’une révolution invisible préalable à la visibilité soudaine du téléphone portable dans (...) les médias et les espaces publics s’appuie sur les jalons suivants : processus de diffusion dans la société ; alternative au courrier et au face-à-face ; représentations sociales ; mécanismes de compétence interlocutoire ; normes et tactiques d’usage ; différenciation du genre masculin vs féminin ; usages privés sur le lieu de travail ; visite à distance ; réseaux de sociabilité ; répondeur ; téléphone mobile.In France, the telephone, a technical interpersonal communication tool, underwent a long gestation period and became widely used one generation ago. A study of the surveys and analyses of the social uses of the telephone in the last 25 years makes it easier to follow the evolution of its appropriation by the French, which was not merely technical but also cultural. The present history and analysis of the invisible revolution that took place prior to the sudden emergence of the mobile phone in the media and in public places focuses on the following themes : spreading process in society ; alternative to mail or to face-to-face communication ; social representations ; speaking skill mechanisms ; rules and tactics of usage ; differences between sexes ; private uses in the workplace ; remote visits ; social networks ; answering-machines ; mobile phones. (shrink)
Fei Xiaotong's thoughts on the Confucian system of interpersonal relationships actually indicated that the Confucian theory of social cooperation leads itself to an unsettled paradox, that is, there is a lack of universal theoretical construction in the Confucian moral system. Confucian theory does not extend beyond practical circumstances. Instead, its universal principles always disappear in specific circumstances. Because of its long established position in mainstream dialogue, Confucianism failed to reflect on its flaws, but this paradox has been revealed in (...) the face of modern challenges. (shrink)
This paper addresses two research questions. The first is theoretical: What is trust? In the first half of this paper we present a distinctive tripartite analysis. We describe three attitudes, here called reliance, specific trust and general trust, each of which is characterised and illustrated. We argue that these attitudes are related, but not reducible, to one another. We suggest that the current impasse in the analysis of trust is in part due to the fact that some writers allude to (...) these distinctions, but unclearly so, whilst others elide them altogether. The second research question focuses on doctor–patient interaction. Trust is often said to be central in medical encounters but this strikes us as too vague. The success of doctor–patient relations in part depends on adopting the most appropriate of the three attitudes we delineate. We argue that reliance is the appropriate attitude for most medical encounters. When circumstances do require trust, the distinction between specific trust and general trust is crucial. We describe medical encounters requiring specific trust. General trust is less often required in medicine; but it is appropriate in some cases and, when called for, it is called for strongly. (shrink)
Presents a sustained and original challenge to the orthodox understanding of the relationship between morality and voluntary choice. The two main theses of the book are that we can be morally responsible for aspects of our character that we have not chosen or otherwise authored, and that we can enter into interpersonal commitments to which we have not voluntarily consented.
In this paper I discuss the role played by disturbed phenomenology in accounting for the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Whilst endorsing a two-stage model to explain the condition, I nevertheless argue that traditional accounts prioritise the role played by some form of second-stage cognitive disruption at the expense of the significant contribution made by the patient’s disturbed phenomenology, which is often reduced to such uninformative descriptions as “anomalous” or “strange”. By advocating an interactionist model, I argue that (...) the delusional belief constitutes an attempt on the part of the patient to explain his/her initially odd and somewhat disturbed phenomenal content and, moreover, that the delusion then structures the patient’s experience such that what he/she perceives is an impostor. This fact is used to explain the delusional belief’s maintenance and resistance to revision. Thus, whilst accepting that second-stage cognitive disruption has a part to play in explaining the Capgras delusion, the emphasis here is placed on the role played by the patient’s changing phenomenal content and its congruence with the delusional belief. Unlike traditional two-stage models, which posit a unidirectional progression from experience to belief, the interactionist model advocates a two-way interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes. The application of this model to other delusional beliefs is also considered. (shrink)
The mystery of Aquinas's virtue ethics -- The gifts as second-personal dispositions -- Virtues and the second-person perspective -- The fruition of the virtues and gifts -- Conclusions and implications.
This is the second volume of Professor Macmurray's Gifford Lectures on The Form of the Personal. The first volume, The Self as Agent, was concerned to shift the center of philosophy from thought to action. Persons in Relation, starting from this practical standpoint, sets out to show that the form of personal life is determined by the mutuality of personal relationship, so that the unit of human life is not the "I" alone, by the "You and I.".
Despite clear parallels between Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics and recent scholarship in feminist ethics, feminists are often suspicious of discourse ethics and have kept themselves mostly separate from the field. By developing a sustained application of Habermas's discourse ethics to friendship, Keller demonstrates that feminist misgivings of discourse ethics are largely misplaced and that Habermas's theory can be used to develop a compelling moral phenomenology of interpersonalrelations.
This book is an inquiry into the extent to which human relationships are foundational in morality. J. Kellenberger seeks to discover, first, how relationships between persons, and ultimately the relationship that each person has to each person by virtue of being a person, underlie the various traditional components of morality—obligation, virtue, justice, rights, and moral goods—and, second, how relationship morality is more fully consonant with our moral experience than other forms of human morality. Kellenberger traces the implications of relationship morality (...) for an understanding of religious duty to God and for the status of our obligations to animals. He also examines issues relating to a feminist "ethics of caring." While this book is a work in ethics, its approach is not limited to an examination of theories of obligation, such as utilitarianism, nor is it limited to the traditional areas covered by wider philosophical treatments of ethics. It embraces these but examines such moral categories as love, respect for persons, shame, and their place in morality. (shrink)
Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonalrelations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, (...) as well as believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)
Despite clear parallels between Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics and recent scholarship in feminist ethics, feminists are often suspicious of discourse ethics and have kept themselves mostly separate from the field. By developing a sustained application of Habermas’s discourse ethics to friendship, Keller demonstrates that feminist misgivings of discourse ethics are largely misplaced and that Habermas’s theory can be used to develop a compelling moral phenomenology of interpersonalrelations.
Qualitative research is largely dependent on building good interpersonalrelations between researcher and participant. This is necessary for generating rich data, while at the same time ensuring respect is maintained between researcher and participant. We argue for a better understanding of researcher–participant relations in research practice. Codes of ethics, although important, do not address these kinds of ethical challenges. Negotiating the ethical relations between researcher and participant is paramount in maintaining ethical rigour in qualitative research. In (...) this paper we propose concepts that can assist in understanding how the ethics of research relations are negotiated in practice; the ‘zone of the untouchable’ from the Danish philosopher, Løgstrup, is combined with the notion of ‘ethical mindfulness’. We argue how and why these concepts in tandem can heighten awareness and offer ways to address the ethically important moments in research. (shrink)