Caregivers should usually accede to parents’ requests for life-sustaining treatment. For such decision-making, the best interests standard is too limited. John Arras’s “relational potential standard,” con-joined to a contemporary care ethics framework, provides a better guide.

Suffering is a ubiquitous yet elusive concept in health care. In a field devoted to the pursuit of objective data, suffering is a phenomenon with deep ties to subjective experience, moral values, and cultural norms. Suffering’s tie to subjective experience makes it challenging to discern and respond to the suffering of others. In particular, the question of whether a child with profound neurocognitive disabilities can suffer has generated a robust discourse, rooted in philosophical conceptualizations of personhood as well as the (...) academic and experiential expertise of practiced health-care professionals. The issue remains unresolved because it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to ever truly know an infant’s lived experience. But what if this is not the best question? What if instead of asking “can this infant suffer?” the discourse is broadened to ask “is there suffering here?” This latter question demands attention to patients’ subjective experiences of suffering, but also to the web of relationships that envelop them. Without losing sight of the importance of patients’ experiences, consideration of their relationships may elucidate the presence of suffering when the patients themselves are unable to provide the same clarity. In this essay, care ethics frames an examination of how suffering manifests in the loving and caring relationships that surround an infant with profound neurocognitive disabilities, changing those relationships and affecting the individuals within them. Exploring suffering through these relationships may offer clarity on the presence and content of suffering for infants with profound cognitive disabilities, in turn offering moral guidance for responding to suffering and supporting flourishing in this context. (shrink)

Evidence points to nurses as possessing particular skills which are important for public health leadership; in particular, investigators have found that a nurse public health director is strongly associated with positive health department performance. To better understand this association and to guide the effective deployment of nurse leaders, researchers sought to explore the specific leadership strategies used by nurse public health directors, using a critical thematic analysis approach to examine these leadership strategies in the context of certain ideologies, power differentials, (...) and social hierarchies. Data were collected via semistructured interviews conducted from July to September 2020 with 13 nurse public health directors from across the United States. Major themes illustrate a distinct picture of the nursing approach to public health leadership: (a) approaching their work with an other-focused lens, (b) applying theoretical knowledge, (c) navigating the political side of their role, and (d) leveraging their nursing identity. Findings articulate the nurse public health director's distinctive combination of skills which reflect the interprofessional nature of public health nursing practice. Such skills demonstrate a specialized approach that may set nurse leaders apart from other types of leaders in carrying out significant public health work. (shrink)

The fist and the open hand -- The sisyphean and the Tantalic : an ontological personality typology -- Separant and participant cultures : the social component of the Tantalus ratio -- Jews and Arabs : the relationship between personality types and social characters -- Interaction, objectlessness, and the self-contiuum -- Self, choice, and uniqueness -- Man, other, and things : the phenomenology of interaction -- The Isaac syndrome -- Rebellion and yearning.

As the subtitle indicates, this book intends to discuss Descartes’ attempt of laying a new foundation of knowledge. In a lively and critical interpretation of Descartes’ writings, especially of his Discours de la Méthode and of his Meditationes, and a competent use of the corresponding philosophical literature the success of this attempt of enlightenment and its shortcomings, identified with the Cartesian re-introduction of the traditional metaphysics, are explained in order to allow the author in a concluding discussion to present his (...) ideas of the necessary revision of Descartes philosophy. Presenting the I as the subject not only for the first time but in an unique way, and concentrating upon the problem of the self-originating human knowledge in an exemplary manner, Descartes is found to have become the founder of subjective philosophy. As knowledge of knowledge, philosophy is not concerned primarily with objects, but with knowledge and has self-foundation as its main task. So it has to start with human knowledge and to place the self as the fountain from which all knowledge proceeds. The demands of subjective philosophy dictate its method described in the Discours. The foundation of knowledge, which as such can only be true and certain knowledge, leads to enlightenment, i.e., to the rebellion against and to the great confrontation with the culture of the time, that is, with the guiding principles of understanding and evaluating the world of his society, and to the introduction of self-experience as the primary source of knowledge. Appointing human reason as the only leader of his intellectual life, Descartes determines the program and future order of his thoughts; the method, in the form of the four rules, has "correctly to direct his reason and to seek the truth in the sciences." It brings Descartes over the methodical doubt to the unquestionable and unsurpassed foundation of human knowledge, the absolute certitude of the self in the Cogito. His analysis of the poor, unprotected I, related to itself knowingly, is unique and of priceless philosophical value. However, the further stations of the philosophical way of Descartes who, unable to stand the ontological loneliness of this philosophically determined self-awareness, sacrificed the idea of scientific progress to a rational theology, cannot be followed. The claim of the metaphysician to be able to discover or, at least, to test every humanly possible knowledge in terms of the absolute knowledge, disintegrates in view of the progress of the new sciences. Not eternal, necessary truth, but the finite human I is the origin of subjective philosophy. The stability of rational relations does not lie in these relations themselves as if they were existing for themselves, but in the strict consequence of logical reason. "'God’ is... the title for the transcendental-philosophical background of consciousness, for the conditions to which the I-think is always already subjected." All contents which allegedly are already given in the infinite knowledge and can always be deduced from it, have to be produced and developed out of the first human knowledge by way of scientific research. Science which received its new foundation in subjective philosophy and is sought in the efforts of communication of the scientists, is not characterized by truth, but by certitude. "'Truth’ is the concern of metaphysics or better of religion. It is of the essence of such truth, not to be capable of demonstration. The absolutely true has no need to prove itself; it is entitled to faith." Differences between metaphysics and religion, and the nature and possible justification of such metaphysical and religious faith are regrettably not discussed.—M. S. (shrink)

The Morality of Civil Disobedience is a clear, direct, well-written analysis of the concept of civil disobedience. Professor Hall proposes a minimal definition of civil disobedience on which he then builds a theoretical framework alleged to be morally neutral. He concludes by presenting a substantive method for amending the present legal system to permit a more direct responsiveness to moral issues. The minimal defining characteristics are "the illegality of the act, and the alleged moral nature of its justification." This eliminates (...) as constitutive elements such factors as: agent’s willingness to be arrested and punished, use of nonviolence, full publicity of act, etc. Several benefits accrue. First, this minimal definition permits cogent and useful distinctions between legal injustices and immoral laws, disobedience and revolution or rebellion, disobedience and crime. Second, a morally neutral definition allows a theoretical formulation which can encompass a number of diverse moral stances. Third, by limiting the defining characteristics to the above, the author can effectively distinguish between the concept of civil disobedience and what counts as grounds for justification. Further, by introducing the notion of prima facie obligation as necessary elements of justification, Professor Hall gives the problem a flexible and useful framework. The analysis is coherent and relatively complete. Whatever moral commitments are presumed within this theory seem minimal, easily acceptable to the reader, and quite necessary for any kind of substantive program. The author has made extensive and judicious use of legal as well as philosophical works in this field. He has defended and explicated his theoretical proposals with numerous relevant case studies. These practical illustrations tend not only to clarify the issue, but to direct the reader’s attention to dealing creatively with a contemporary problem of paramount political importance. An extensive bibliography refers the reader to important source materials from both legal and philosophical works.—S. C. (shrink)

Marx's Rebellion Against Lenin is a representative of the contemporary revitalization of the thought of Marx. It fulfils this task in three ways. First, it overthrows the dialectical materialism of Engels and of Stalinist Bolshevism by exploring 18th century historical thought and illustrating how these Enlightenment historians and political theorists first explored method of historical explanation that were later adopted by Marx. It is shown that contrary to the theory of Stalinist Bolshevism, Hegel was a vital influence on Marx. (...) Second, Levine's book represents Marx as an exponent of Classical Humanism. Marx did not define communism as a form of materialism, as economic egalitarianism, but rather related communism to the Classical ethics of Aristotle, to the Aristotelian ideas of polis citizenship and the ethics of distributive justice. Third, it is argued that the 17th and 18th Century Enlightenment was not simply a liberal center extolling property, individual rights and capitalism. Instead it is shown that the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment was divided between an Enlightenment Center and an Enlightenment Left, with the Enlightenment Left challenging the domination of capitalism and private property. Marx's Rebellion Against Lenin traces the flow of the theories of the Enlightenment Left into Marx and in doing so liberates Marxist thought from its imprisonment in 19th century materialism and relocates it within the traditions of Classical Humanism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:148 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 199o David D. Roberts. BenedettoCroceand the Usesof Historicism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, a987. Pp. xii + 449- NP. This book is a remarkably good survey of Croce's enormous output on the general topics of philosophy, politics, and history. Roberts shows an outstanding mastery not only of Croce's voluminous writings, but of the whole secondary literature about (...) him since the first rebellion of his Italian "followers" in the early years of this century. Roberts's aim is to restore Croce to his proper place in the continuing dialogues and debates about historicism and hermeneutics. So far as one writer can achieve such a goal with one book, he has achieved it; if there are reasons to fear (nevertheless) that his achievement may not have the full effect that he hopes for, they are rooted in Croce's own personality and background, not in any failure on the part of Roberts. "[I]f we are to grasp the dominant concerns of Croce's intellectual life, we must approach him primarily as a Western intellectual who was seeking to address the central challenges facing our culture, not confine him to... his particular Italian, or Neapolitan context.... [O]n the deepest level he would have faced the same challenges had he been reared in The Hague or Philadelphia" (24). The final rhetorical flourish here is one of Roberts's rare tumbles into outright absurdity, for what is (perhaps) true in 1987 was not true in 1887. So we should be glad that the Italian background is never really lost sight of. Roberts's treatment of Croce's intellectual formation is rather impressionistic, but we do always have a vivid image of the mature Don Benedetto, the bourgeois Neapolitan worthy who was made a Senator of the Realm in 191o (a biographical fact that is not mentioned). The one serious fault in Roberts's account of Croce's formation--which is excellent on the influence of Vico and Marx--is his failure to take a properly European view of Hegel. He remains a prisoner of Croce's critique of Hegel, so that he is never able to see clearly how deeply Hegelian Croce was. He sees only the differences, and, as far as "historicism" is concerned, they are largely differences from a straw man. Having said that, almost nothing remains but praise. Croce maintained that philosophy was only the tool-bag of the historian. Roberts, who is an intellectual historian rather than a philosopher, takes Croce at his word, with the results that his book is the first (in English at least) to present Croce's thought in the way that Croce himself saw it. He gives us an insightful review of the "philosophy of the spirit" in about sixty pages, including the development of the concept of"utility" into "vitality" in Croce's last years. Then he embarks on a study of how Croce used his philosophical instruments in the theory and practice of historical and political interpretation. The theory of "absolute historicism" (and of how it can be "absolutely" true) is followed by "the religion of history." This was a kind of historicized Buddhism, in my view, until Croce startled everyone, in a942, by announcing that "we cannot but call ourselves Christians"; but it is only the comparison of Croce's historicism with Buddhism that enables us to see it as a "religion" at all. Roberts does not say this, but he does show clearly how far removed from any faith-religion Croce was. After this comes a long chapter on "Historicist Politics." I think this is the best thing in the book, because Roberts not only clearly displays the near-bankruptcy of Croce's BOOK REVIEWS ~49 actual politics as President of the Italian Liberal Party from 1944 to i947, but demonstrates through a study of Piero Gobetti that neither Croce's own conservatism nor his doctrinal rigidity was a necessary corollary of "absolute historicism" in politics. As the main intellectual beacon of opposition to Fascism during its twenty years of power, Croce enjoyed enormous prestige in 1944; but as Don Benedetto, with his great family estates... (shrink)

The idea that we might be robots is no longer the stuff of science fiction; decades of research in evolutionary biology and cognitive science have led many esteemed scientists to the conclusion that, according to the precepts of universal Darwinism, humans are merely the hosts for two replicators that have no interest in us except as conduits for replication. Richard Dawkins, for example, jolted us into realizing that we are just survival mechanisms for our own genes, sophisticated robots in service (...) of huge colonies of replicators to whom concepts of rationality, intelligence, agency, and even the human soul are irrelevant. Accepting and now forcefully responding to this decentering and disturbing idea, Keith Stanovich here provides the tools for the "robot's rebellion," a program of cognitive reform necessary to advance human interests over the limited interest of the replicators and define our own autonomous goals as individual human beings. He shows how concepts of rational thinking from cognitive science interact with the logic of evolution to create opportunities for humans to structure their behavior to serve their own ends. These evaluative activities of the brain, he argues, fulfill the need that we have to ascribe significance to human life. We may well be robots, but we are the only robots who have discovered that fact. Only by recognizing ourselves as such, argues Stanovich, can we begin to construct a concept of self based on what is truly singular about humans: that they gain control of their lives in a way unique among life forms on Earth—through rational self-determination. (shrink)

Responds to the idea that humans are merely survival mechanisms for their own genes, providing the tools to advance human interests over the interests of the replicators through rational self-determination.

The Rebellion of Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya in 145/762: Ṭālibīs and Early ʿAbbāsīs in Conflict. By Amikam Elad. Islamic History and Civilization, vol. 118. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Pp. xi + 527. $245, €176.

There are two aims to the present paper. The first is to support the assertion that traditional justifications of revolution, rebellion and civil disobedience, though not wrong, are culturally inappropriate. The second is to outline, in the most basic of forms, what a “culturally appropriate” form of political resistance would require. The latter aim will be attempted by offering a counter-enlightenment model of resistance, derived in a large part from a Hegelian reading of Sartre's later work on groups, appropriate (...) to the cultural conditions of late modernity. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: From Absurdity to Revolt Metaphysical Revolt Historical Revolt From Phenomenological Ethics to Virtue Ethics notes further reading.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recovering Aquinas's Common-Good-Oriented Right of RebellionNathaniel A. MoatsIntroductionAs recent events have woefully displayed, armed rebellion is not a topic of merely theoretical interest.1 While theory seemingly has very little impact on the citizens participating in armed rebellions, theory still remains of paramount importance, providing crucial criteria to evaluate, restrain, apply, and respond to such force. Criteria such as legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, necessity, proportionality, and likelihood (...) of success have been offered by thinkers advocating "just war" theory from across diverse political, philosophical, and religious backgrounds, garnering widespread agreement over the centuries. Contemporary scholars who identify as "historically oriented" just war thinkers have continued to defend that historical tradition as a sufficient and substantial guide for contemporary practice.2 Yet some have questioned whether the it can provide useful aid for dealing with contexts of political tyranny. In a 2013 article, Valeria Morkevičius describes [End Page 175] Western culture as divided over the moral permissibility of armed rebellion, with advocates basing their views on the Enlightenment ideas found in John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whereas traditional just war theorists have generally denied a right to armed rebellion.3 In Morkevičius's perspective, she argues that there can be justified use of armed force against tyranny and calls upon other scholars to help create a "just rebellion theory" that would "radically reimagine" traditional just war thinking.4 She claims that there is a "lack of a systematic and rigorous ethical framework for evaluating the justness of rebellions"5 and that "a new theory of just rebellion—a systematic way of evaluating the justness of real world rebellions, of determining appropriate state responses to domestic rebellions, and of weighing the pros and cons of intervention" is needed.6In line with Morkevičius' sentiments, the last ten years has seen the increasing rise of self-proclaimed just war revisionists.7 Jeff McMahan, the figurehead for this movement, claims that the classical just war criteria "can no longer stand."8 McMahan argues that traditional just war theory has [End Page 176] depicted war as a morally sui generis category of violence in which unique moral principles apply.9 The moral asymmetry of war is also reinforced by a "statist" and "collectivist" orientation that overrides the importance of individuals and their rights of life, liberty, property, and other fundamental goods. Instead of seeing war as a distinct category of violence, McMahan argues that war and self-defense are morally symmetrical. Further, he argues that combatants should be depicted as individuals distinct from their political or collective identity.10 In other words, McMahan offers a theory of war oriented around individuals and their rights based in the concept of justified self-defense.11 Extending McMahan's theory, Cécile Fabre has particularly targeted the criterion of legitimate authority as morally problematic.12 Rejecting the exclusive authorization of armed force by political authorities, she argues in favor of an individual's right to war, and by extension the right to rebellion.13 Therefore, given the historical just war tradition's emphasis on the criterion of legitimate authority (i.e., the restriction of armed force [End Page 177] to established authorities) and resistance to support armed rebellions due to the lack of recognized political leaders, revisionists conclude that traditional just war thinking is inadequate for providing contemporary guidance in the context of rebellion.14To challenge revisionist claims, I analyze Thomas Aquinas's ingenuity and relevance for future "just rebellion" thinking. First, I argue that classical just war thinking is not as antithetical to armed rebellion as suggested.15 One just rebellion theory has coexisted alongside the classical formation of just war theory, albeit often neglected or ignored by contemporary thinkers.16 It is well known that Aquinas formalized the Augustinian classical just war theory revolving around the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention. Much less known, however, is the fact that Aquinas also crafted criteria for justified armed rebellions. While Aquinas's just war thinking rearticulates Augustine's perspective, Aquinas appropriated his mentor's views to allow for justified armed rebellions. Aquinas's originality was displayed not only in allowing justified armed... (shrink)

Rogue One is a complex film that invites a wide range of philosophical questioning. This chapter focuses on the film's political aspect. Rogue One powerfully illustrates an essential and timely claim made about the nature of democracy by John Dewey. Rogue One is significantly different from earlier Star Wars films. It does not offer a simple, mythic morality tale, where the difference between right and wrong is as stark as the contrast between Leia's white gown and Vader's black mask. Rogue (...) One takes place in a messy and unfair world in which traditional moral frameworks appear naive and ill‐suited. The rest of Rogue One is exceptionally powerful not only because of amazing acting, sound design, and cinematography, but because it uses the tropes and setting of gritty war cinema to tell a universal story about the power of hope and faith in others. (shrink)

In this paper I draw on Thaddeus Metz’s pioneering work in African ethics, and particularly his account of the concept described by the terms ubuntu, botho, hunhu or utu, to sketch an African normative understanding of the act of rebellion against the authority of the state. Most commonly articulated in the phrase “a person is a person through other persons”, ubuntu is interpreted by Metz as a unique communitarian moral principle which can be described in its essence as the (...) claim that “actions are right, or confer ubuntu on a person, insofar as they prize communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other, or share a way of life, and exhibit solidarity toward one another, or care about each other’s quality of life”. On the face of it, this principle appears at odds with rebellions against state authority. Following Metz, I argue, however, that a deeper grasp of this principle does, in fact, provide a justification for instances of civilian rebellion against state authority, under appropriate circumstances. (shrink)

Ispoljavanje dobra u Hegelovim Osnovnim crtama filozofije prava nije postizanje srece ili malogradjanskog komfora, nego hrabro i odlucno, gotovo slucajno i spolja posmatrano neosnovano ispoljavanje partikularne volje. Ovakav pojam dobra je upravo suprotan pojmu dobra u smislu dobara i uzivanja koji sprecava stvaranje subjektivnosti kod onih koji su neprepoznati od datog drustvenog sistema, urusavajuci mogucnost partikularnog delanja kod ovih, i time ih podrzavajuci u mentalitetu rulje, to jest mase. Nadomestavanje nedostatka slobode komforom je pre karakteristika faze apstraktnog prava, koju faza (...) moralnosti tezi da prevazidje. U fazi apstraktnog prava, zbog slepog postovanja suvog legaliteta, ono sto je pravo u sebi i za sebe ne moze nikako biti ispoljeno u pravom smislu reci jer je izjednaceno sa ugovornom pravdom, cija je prava osnova nista drugo do pravo jaceg. (shrink)

In this piece I will focus on what I think is a central aspect of Albert Camus’s thinking, embodied in the distinction he makes in The Rebel between rebel and revolutionary. His is a philosophy of rebellion and he thinks that revolutions are a distorted expression of our need to rebel against that which we cannot accept. His views should serve as a counterpoint to those who think that an all-or-nothing approach to social change is desirable. And the issue (...) here is not that embodied crudely in the reactionary /radical dichotomy. Rather, it is a defence of the need to rebel within limits, not so much to preserve the old against the threat of the new but, instead, to preserve basic human decency from the dark side of outrage, without dismissing what is crucial about outrage and emancipatory struggles. (shrink)

This thesis aims to explain why art is the ideal agent for overcoming the absurdity and the meaninglessness of existence. The focus is Camus’ Rebellion in conjunction with Sartre’s notion of Authenticity. Together they provide an adequate answer to the fundamental questions of human existence. Together Camus’ rebellion and Sartre’s authenticity provide the necessary foundations for the overall authenticity of art, facilitating the emergence of purpose from the abyss of absurdity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rebellion and the SacredSacrifice in Camus's RebelBrian Harding (bio)René Girard has argued, in "Camus's Stranger Retried," that Camus's later novel The Fall represents a kind of novelistic conversion on Camus's part: an admission that the ethics of The Stranger were faulty. This is a criticism not only of a character (Mersault) but of the author's own views. In fact, on the Girardian reading, The Fall recognizes that Camus's (...) own activism was never purely altruistic, but partook of a kind of unstated competition, seeking to outstrip others in care for the downtrodden, and thereby prove his supremacy. Both Camus and Clamence, the lawyer in The Fall, recognize that (as Girard puts it)Mercy, in his hands, was a secret weapon against the unmerciful, a more complex form of self-righteousness. His real desire was not to save his clients but to prove his moral superiority by discrediting the judges.1The drama of The Fall is this realization and its ramifications. Beyond this, Girard argues, it represents Camus's judgment on his own work; it represents [End Page 29] the realization that his writings hitherto lacked self-criticism. Until The Fall, Camus revolted against everything but his pride, but in The Fall he turns his critical powers inward, writing the novel as a kind of auto-criticism. I think there is a lot of truth to this, and in what follows, it guides my interpretations of The Rebel.Girard's comments on The Plague suggest that he sees it as essentially "romantic" in the technical sense he gives that term. Like The Stranger, it falls into the illusion of authenticity and autonomy: Dr. Rieux stands apart from the city, paternalistically guiding it without succumbing to the infections circulating around him.2 To the extent that The Rebel is often paired with The Plague (in the same way The Myth of Sisyphus is joined to The Stranger) one might expect that the same could be said of that philosophical essay—that is, that it persists in a romantic delusion of being above or separate from the problems it diagnoses and that The Rebel's defense of the oppressed only serves to assuage the author's conscience, reassuring him that he is one of the good ones—just as did Clamence's work as a defense attorney.That expectation is, I think, only half right. The Rebel, I believe, oscillates between romantic lie and novelistic truth; Camus senses that he is not above the fray and that the very act of rebellion itself unleashes furies that one struggles to tame. Whether he has reached the full consciousness represented by The Fall is uncertain, but it is clear to me that, at times at least, this awareness rises to the surface in The Rebel. Indeed, the emergence and repression of this awareness are part of the book's fascination and flaws. The apparent inconstancy between Camus's lionization of rebellion and his profound worries about what it unleashes is rooted in this oscillation. Because of this oscillation, The Rebel is too complex a text to be treated in a paper of a reasonable length. To simplify matters, I focus on two parts whose interest to readers of Contagion will need no explanation: first, Camus's gnomic remarks on the relationship between rebellion and the sacred, and second, Camus's discussion of the killing of King Louis and the Terror. Following that, I close with some general remarks.REBELLION AND THE SACREDCamus's rebellion is intimately related to the sacred [le sacré]. To be sure, we should not assume that just because Camus and Girard use the same word that they mean the same thing by it. In fact, Camus primarily uses the term to refer to a religious sensibility without developing, for example, a theory of the violent origins of the sacred. Nevertheless, Camus seems to sense that there is a [End Page 30] connection between the sacred and violence. Moreover, it is of course impossible that Camus intended to refer to Girard's work when he alludes to the sacred. Nevertheless, if Girard is right about the meaning and function of the sacred... (shrink)

The works of Hannah Arendt and Albert Camus--two of the most compelling political thinkers of the "resistance generation" that lived through World War II--can still provide penetrating insights for contemporary political reflection. Jeffrey C. Isaac offers new interpretations of these writers, viewing both as engaged intellectuals who grappled with the possibilities of political radicalism in a world in which liberalism and Marxism had revealed their inadequacy by being complicit in the rise of totalitarianism. According to Isaac, self-styled postmodern writers who (...) proclaim the death of grandiose ideologies often fail to recognize that such thinkers as Camus and Arendt had already noted this. But unlike many postmodernists, these two sought to preserve what was worthy in modern humanism--the idea of a common human condition and a commitment to human rights and the dignity of individuals. Isaac shows that both writers advanced the idea of a democratic civil society made up of self-limiting groups. Although they criticized the typical institutions of mass democratic politics, they endorsed alternative forms of local and international organization that defy the principle of state sovereignty. Isaac also shows how Arendt's writings on the Middle East, and Camus's on Algeria, urged the creation of such institutions. The vision of a "rebellious politics" that Arendt and Camus shared is of great relevance to current debates in democratic theory and to the transformations taking place in Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union. (shrink)

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as evidence that that Mengzi endorsed a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to (...) the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of justificatory labor, and note some of the advantages of this account. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the ways in which Kenneth Anger’s Scorpio Rising (1963) and Steven Spielberg’s Duel (1971) draw on and challenge selected road movie conventions by adhering to the genre’s traditional reliance on cultural critique revolving around the themes of rebellion, transgression and roguery. In particular, the films seem to confront the classic road movie format through their adoption of nomadic narrative structure and engagement in a mockery of subversion where the focus on social critique is intertwined with a (...) deep sense of alienation and existential loss “laden with psychological confusion and wayward angst” (Laderman 83). Following this trend, Spielberg’s film simultaneously depoliticizes the genre and maintains the tension between rebellion and tradition where the former shifts away from the conflict with conformist society to masculine anxiety, represented by middle class, bourgeois and capitalist values, the protagonist’s loss of innocence in the film’s finale, and the act of roguery itself. Meanwhile, Anger’s poetic take on the outlaw biker culture, burgeoning homosexuality, myth and ritual, and violence and death culture approaches the question of roguery by undermining the image of a dominant hypermasculinity with an ironic commentary on sacrilegious and sadomasochistic practices and initiation rites in the gay community. Moreover, both Duel’s demonization of the truck, seen as “an indictment of machines” or the mechanization of life (Spielberg qtd. in Crawley 26), and Scorpio Rising’s (homo)eroticization of a motorcycle posit elements of social critique, disobedience and nonconformity within a cynical and existential framework, hence merging the road movie’s traditional discourse with auteurism and modernism. (shrink)

This article presents a broad analysis of the political economy and dynamics of social change during the first year of the Evo Morales government in Bolivia. It situates this analysis in the wider historical context of left-indigenous insurrection between 2000 and 2005, the changing character of contemporary capitalist imperialism, and the resurgence of anti-neoliberalism and anti-imperialism elsewhere in Latin America. It considers at a general level the overarching dilemmas of revolution and reform. Part II of this three-part essay addresses four (...) major themes. First, it reviews the literature on revolution in contemporary Bolivia. Second, it explains why the 2000 to 2005 period is best conceived as a revolutionary epoch in which left-indigenous social forces were engaged in a combined liberation struggle against racial oppression and class exploitation. However, it argues that this revolutionary epoch has not led to social revolution. Third it examines in detail the electoral rise of Evo Morales and his Movimiento al Socialismo party in the December 2005 elections. Fourth, it explores the historical trajectory of the MAS in terms of its changing class composition, ideology, and political strategies since the party's inception in the late 1990s. (shrink)

One of the important domestic developments during the Umayyad period is the rebellions carried out by members of the Ahl al-bayt. After the rebellion of Zayd b. ʿAlī in Kufa, his father, Yaḥyā was intensely prosecuted by the governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar, so he moved to Khurāsān, where he would feel more secure and his supporters were located. In fact, ʿAbbāsids, Kaysānī and Zayd b. ʿAlī’s supporters were active in Khurāsān. Under these circumtances, Yaḥyā left Iraq and (...) followed the road Nineveh, Madāʾin, Ray, Nīshāpūr towards the east and came to Sarakhs and resided here about six months. Here, a group from the Khārijites came and made a revolt proposal, but this proposal was rejected by those with Yahya. After this, Yaḥyā continued on his way to the east and came to Balkh and he stayed until the death of the caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik. The general purpose of Yaḥyā’s journey from Iraq to Balkh is probably to get rid of the prosecution of Iraqi governor Yūsuf, and to establish the appropriate political atmosphere for the rebellion by contacting the Ahl al-bayt supporters in Khurāsān. The governor of Iraq Yūsuf b. ʿUmar determined the location of Yaḥyā in Balhk, and he ordered the governor of Khurāsān Naṣr b. Sayyār that he ensured Yaḥyā was imprisoned in Marw. However, as his imprisonment was reported to the caliph al-Walīd b. Yazīd, he ordered him to be released. Governor Naṣr advised Yaḥyā to go directly to the caliph and avoid situations that could cause sedition. In this case, Yaḥyā first came to Sarakhs, and then reached Nīshāpūr via Ṭūs. Meanwhile, the Khurāsān governor Naṣr wrote a letter to the governors on the route and ordered them to follow the movements of Yaḥyā and to not allow him to stay in the cities for a long time. Yaḥyā did not advance further west from the city of Bayhaq because he was afraid he might be killed by the Iraqi governor. Therefore, he returned from Bayhaq and came to Nīshāpūr. Here, they confiscated the mounts of a caravan they encountered on the way along with seventy other people, but they also paid their fees. Due to this incident, the governor of Nīshāpūr sent soldiers to Yaḥyā and his entourage, but in the clash that broke out, the supporters of Yaḥyā were successful against the soldiers, who were more than them. Yaḥyā and his followers continued their movements towards Balkh in the east after that. Even though the sources do not fully state the reason for Yaḥyā 's movement to Balkh, the geographical distance and the possible Shīʿī potential in the region may have guided him. However, this time Yaḥyā aimed to reach Balkh via Herat and Jūzjān by traveling in the southeast direction, not via Marw. Upon the news that Yaḥyā reached Jūzjān, the governor Naṣr sent an army of eight thousand men on him. Yaḥyā had to fight against the Umayyad army with his small number of supporters, consisting of seventy or one hundred and twenty people. As a result, he and his supporters were killed. Yaḥyā's head was cut off from his body and sent to the caliph, and his body was hung over the entrance gate of the city of Jūzjān. There are some reasons why the revolt of Yaḥyā failed. First of all, Yaḥyā did not prepare a road map to follow in advance for the rebellion movement, and he could not communicate with a large mass of people and did not set his goal. Secondly, Yaḥyā did not have enough support to resist the Umayyad armies in the rebellion. As a result, we can conclude that Yaḥyā was hidden during the three-year period he spent in Khurāsān because he was under prosecution and therefore could not operate openly. In addition, he could not get enough support from the Shīʿī communities in the region. Although Yaḥyā's rebellion was unsuccessful, it had some effects on the peoples of the region in the following process. Especially the murder of Yaḥyā in Khurāsān helped to create a suitable ground for the ʿAbbāsid revolution. In addition, it ensured that all Shīʿī groups were gathered under the invitation of the ʿAbbāsid "Āl-i Muḥammad”. (shrink)