Results for ' Mental Phenomena'

928 found
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  1.  43
    Awareness, mental phenomena, and consciousness: A synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal.Teed Rockwell - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):463-76.
    Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness . This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question ‘how do you get experience out of meat?’ actually fragments into at least three different questions. How do we get: a unified sense of self, awareness and mental phenomena? In the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained, Dennett shows how MDM has a (...)
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  2.  16
    Emergent Mental Phenomena.Mark H. Bickhard - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 49-63.
    The possibilities, if any, of ‘artificial’ mental phenomena, including consciousness, depend on what the metaphysical nature of such phenomena are. I will outline a model of metaphysical emergence, and, based on that, emergent mental phenomena, with a focus on cognition and consciousness. This model suggests that ‘artificial’ mental phenomena are possible, though not with current technology. Furthermore, such ‘artificial’ mental phenomena would require, in effect, the creation of artificial life, at least (...)
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  3.  96
    Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain functions.Roger W. Sperry - 1975 - Process Studies 5 (4):247-256.
  4.  39
    Mental phenomena and behavior.B. Libet - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):434-434.
  5.  81
    Are only mental phenomena intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):205-215.
    I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I (...)
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  6.  83
    Mechanisms and mental phenomena.Adrian C. Moulyn - 1947 - Philosophy of Science 14 (July):242-253.
    One gains the impression from occasional remarks in the psychiatric literature that there is a feeling of dissatisfaction with the state of flux of the various concepts, serving as tools to help us understand our patients. This paper is submitted as an attempt to point out some of the reasons why psychiatric notions suffer from certain deficiencies. If, for the time being, we set aside the specific psychiatric problems confronting us in our daily work and muse over the structure of (...)
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  7. Analytic philosophy and mental phenomena.John R. Searle - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):405-423.
  8. Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 97-102.
    In Chapter 3 of Book I of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano articulates what he takes to be the four most basic and central tasks of psychology. One of them is to discover the ‘fundamental classification’ of mental phenomena. Brentano attends to this task in Chapters 5-9 of Book II of the Psychology, reprinted (with appendices) in 1911 as a standalone book (Brentano 1911a). The classification is further developed in an essay entitled “A Survey of So-Called Sensory (...)
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  9.  25
    Evaluation of Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena.Ray Hyman - unknown
    Professor Jessica Utts and I were given the task of evaluating the program on "Anomalous Mental Phenomena" carried out at SRI International (formerly the Stanford Research Institute) from 1973 through 1989 and continued at SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation) from 1992 through 1994. We were asked to evaluate this research in terms of its scientific value. We were also asked to comment on its potential utility for intelligence applications.
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  10. Relocating mental phenomena: the philosophy of the spirit of Dewey.Pierre Steiner - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (245):273-292.
     
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  11.  11
    Pain and Mental Phenomena: Thinking at the Limit with Modern Philosophy.Allen Jones - 2015 - Dissertation, Ku Leuven
    Acknowledgements / 4 Introduction / 5 DESCARTES / 1. Cartesian Science and the Instrumentalization of the Body / 35 FREUD / 2. An Introduction to Freud’s Early Attempt at an Eliminative Materialist Psychology / 55 3. The Libido, Trauma, and the Hidden Forces of the Death Drive in Freud’s Metapsychology / 81 HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE / 4. What Does the Master Really Want? Development and Structure in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit / 116 5. Suffering as Negativity or Necessity? Hegel and (...)
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  12. 14 Emerging Mental Phenomena.Alessandro Antonietti - 2010 - In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 6--266.
     
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  13.  75
    Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality.Frederick Kroon - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):377-393.
    Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in (...)
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  14.  23
    (1 other version)The self and mental phenomena.Robert Macdougall - 1916 - Psychological Review 23 (1):1-29.
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  15. Habit as a Law of Mind: A Peircean Approach to Habit in Cultural and Mental Phenomena.Scott Cunningham & Elize Bisanz - 2016 - In Myrdene Anderson & Donna West (eds.), Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit: Before and Beyond Consciousness. Springer Verlag.
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  16. Wittgenstein on the duration and timing of mental phenomena: episodes, understanding and rule-following.Christopher Mole - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):1153-1175.
    Wittgenstein’s later works are full of questions about the timing and duration of mental phenomena. These questions are often awkward ones, and Wittgenstein seems to take their awkwardness to be philosophically revealing, but if we ask what it is that these questions reveal then different interpretations are possible. This paper suggests that there are at least six different ways in which the timing of mental phenomena can be awkward. By identifying these we can give sense to (...)
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  17.  53
    Brentano on the unity of mental phenomena.Chin-Tai Kim - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (December):199-207.
  18. (1 other version)The Time-Relations of Mental Phenomena[REVIEW]Joseph Jastrow - 1890 - Ancient Philosophy (Misc) 1:290.
  19.  19
    On the Problem of the Ontological Status of Mental Phenomena.A. Ivanov - 2007 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 45 (4):73-87.
  20. Experience and expression: The inner-outer conceptions of mental phenomena.Rajakishore Nath & Mamata Manjari Panda - 2014 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (36):77-112.
    Expression is the central concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, and our experiences are reflected in our bodily expressions or gestures, facial expressions, behaviors and linguistic expressions. It seems true that we have no access of other people’s experiences but we can know or talk about them in so far as they are the common experiences of all. This inaccessibility of other’s experiences may create a genuine thinking that one’s experiences are private and the first person present tense psychological utterances (...)
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  21.  38
    The element of time in the emergence of mental phenomena.Erich Harth - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):54-65.
    The ubiquitous pathways of positive feedback in the human brain are generally held to be a necessary condition for the phenomenon of conscious sensation. However, no dynamic mechanism, no causal link has been established between the physical brain and its mental attributes, our sensations, thoughts, our consciousness. I suggest that the missing link between the world of neurons and that of mind is to be found in the transformations the brain performs on the coordinates of physical space and time. (...)
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  22.  3
    Content and Consciousness: An Analysis of Mental Phenomena[REVIEW]Vaughn R. McKim - 1970 - New Scholasticism 44 (3):472-472.
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  23.  16
    The application of calculus to mental phenomena.F. M. Urban - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (1):16-18.
  24.  10
    Śefot ha-guf: le-haʼir tofaʻot nafshiyot ha-mevuṭaʼot ba-guf = Body dialects: illuminating mental phenomena as expressed in the body.Nitza Yarom - 2013 - Ḥefah: Pardes hotsaʼah la-or.
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  25. Unilateral Phenomena of Mental and Nervous Disorders.Robertson Robertson - 1876 - Mind 1:413.
     
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  26.  9
    Psychological Phenomena: From Extensiveness to Intentionality—Based on the Text of Brentano’s “The Difference between Mental and Physical Phenomena”.洪 森 - 2023 - Advances in Philosophy 12 (1):199.
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  27. Phenomena and Mental Functions. Karl Bühler and Stumpf's Program in Psychology.Denis Fisette - 2016 - Brentano Studien 14:191-228.
    This study focuses on the influence of the work of Carl Stumpf on the thought of Karl Bühler. Our working hypothesis is based on the philosophical program that Bühler attributes to Stumpf and to which several of his works are largely indebted. It is divided into five parts. The first is intended to establish a relationship between Bühler and the School of Brentano to which Stumpf belongs. In the second, I show that Bühler became aware of Brentano's ideas and of (...)
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  28. Mental spaces: aspects of meaning construction in natural language.Gilles Fauconnier - 1994 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Mental Spaces is the classic introduction to the study of mental spaces and conceptual projection, as revealed through the structure and use of language. It examines in detail the dynamic construction of connected domains as discourse unfolds. The discovery of mental space organization has modified our conception of language and thought: powerful and uniform accounts of superficially disparate phenomena have become available in the areas of reference, presupposition projection, counterfactual and analogical reasoning, metaphor and metonymy, and (...)
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  29.  57
    (1 other version)The empirical correlation of mental and bodily phenomena.Grace A. de Laguna - 1918 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (20):533-541.
  30. (1 other version)Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism (...)
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  31. Mental Causation for Standard Dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):978-998.
    The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our behaviour is physically necessitated by entirely physical phenomena, there appears to be no room for dualist mental causation. Some argue that dualists can address this problem by making minimal adjustments in their ontology. I argue that no such adjustments are required. Given recent developments in philosophy (...)
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  32. The Phenomena of Love and Hate.D. W. Hamlyn - 1978 - Philosophy 53 (203):5 - 20.
    There has been a good deal of interest in recent years in what Franz Brentano had to say about the notion of ‘intentional objects’ and about intentionality as a criterion of the mental. There has been less interest in his classification of mental phenomena. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano asserts and argues for the thesis that mental phenomena can be classified in terms of three kinds of mental act or activity, all (...)
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  33.  31
    Mentalizing and Religion.Hanneke Schaap-Jonker & Jozef M. T. Corveleyn - 2014 - Archive for the Psychology of Religion 36 (3):303-322.
    Mentalizing is an important actual topic, both in psychodynamic theory and in clinical practice. Remarkably, mentalizing has been explicitly related to religion or psychology of religion only to a limited extent. This article explores the relevance of the concept of mentalizing for psychology of religion by first describing mentalizing, its development, and neuropsychological underpinnings. Second, to illustrate how the concept gives more insight into the psychology of religious phenomena, mentalizing is related to an almost universal religious practice, namely religious (...)
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  34. The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena (Excerpt).Franz Brentano - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
     
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  35.  55
    (1 other version)Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - forthcoming - .
    Philosophy is witnessing an ‘Agential Turn’, characterised by the thought that explaining certain distinctive features of human mentality requires conceiving of many mental phenomena as acts, and of subjects as their agents. We raise a challenge for three central explanatory appeals to mental agency – agentialism about doxastic responsibility, agentialism about doxastic self-knowledge, and an agentialist explanation of the delusion of thought insertion: agentialists either commit themselves to implausibly strong claims about the kind of agency involved in (...)
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  36.  18
    Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience.Bence Nanay - 2023 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book is about mental imagery and the important work it does in our mental life. It plays a crucial role in the vast majority of our perceptual episodes. It also helps us understand many of the most puzzling features of perception (like the way it is influenced in a top-down manner and the way different sense-modalities interact). But mental imagery also plays a very important role in emotions, action execution and even in our desires. In sum, (...)
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  37. Mental Time Travel’: Remembering the Past, Imagining the Future, and the Particularity of Events.Dorothea Debus - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):333-350.
    The present paper offers a philosophical discussion of phenomena which in the empirical literature have recently been subsumed under the concept of ‘mental time travel’. More precisely, the paper considers differences and similarities between two cases of ‘mental time travel’, recollective memories (‘R-memories’) of past events on the one hand, and sensory imaginations (‘S-imaginations’) of future events on the other. It develops and defends the claim that, because a subject who R-remembers a past event is experientially aware (...)
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  38.  16
    Privacy and the Mental.George W. S. Bailey (ed.) - 1979 - Rodopi.
    George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...
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  39. Mental Health Pluralism.Craig French - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy.
    In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon – mental health – denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health (...) denoted by multiple concepts of mental health. Analysis and illumination of mental health may still be possible, but there isn’t a single phenomenon or concept to be analysed in addressing the question of what mental health is. The question of pluralism has been overlooked in the philosophy of mental health. The discussion to follow is an attempt to get us to take mental health pluralism seriously. To that end, in this essay I have three primary goals: (1) to give a precise account of what mental health pluralism is, (2) to show that the question of pluralism should not be neglected in debate about what mental health is, and (3) to argue for mental health pluralism. I also draw out some implications of this discussion for philosophy, science, and psychotherapy. (shrink)
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  40.  59
    A mental model analysis of young children's conditional reasoning with meaningful premises.Henry Markovits - 2000 - Thinking and Reasoning 6 (4):335 – 347.
    Mental model theory has been used to explain many differing phenomena in adult reasoning, including the extensively studied case of conditional reasoning. However, the current theory makes predictions about the development of conditional reasoning that are not consistent with data. In this article, young children's performance on conditional reasoning problems and the justifications given are analysed. A mental model account of conditional reasoning is proposed that assumes that (1) young children can reason with two models and (2) (...)
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  41.  32
    Some Consequences of Knowing Everything There Is to Know About One’s Mental States.Barbara Von Eckardt Klein - 1975 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (1):3 - 18.
    To say that mental phenomena are self-intimating means, roughly, that there is no more to them than what meets the "inner" eye. Gilbert Ryle was the first to emphasize this as one of the central features of the classical Cartesian picture of mind. He wrote.
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  42.  22
    Psychological Phenomena and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Discussions of Some Arguments in Philosophy of Mind.Pär Sundström - 1999 - Uppsala, Sweden: Acta University Umensis.
    The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person. To make (...)
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  43. The nature of mental imagery: Beyond a basic view.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Many philosophers treat mental imagery as a kind of perceptual representation – it is either a perceptual state, or a representation of a perceptual state. In the sciences, writers point to mental imagery by way of a standard gloss – mental imagery is said to be (often, early) perceptual processing not directly caused by sensory stimuli (Kosslyn et al. 1995). Philosophers sometimes adopt this gloss, which I will call the basic view. Bence Nanay endorses it, and appeals (...)
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  44.  19
    Computational Models of Miscommunication Phenomena.Matthew Purver, Julian Hough & Christine Howes - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2):425-451.
    Miscommunication phenomena such as repair in dialogue are important indicators of the quality of communication. Automatic detection is therefore a key step toward tools that can characterize communication quality and thus help in applications from call center management to mental health monitoring. However, most existing computational linguistic approaches to these phenomena are unsuitable for general use in this way, and particularly for analyzing human–human dialogue: Although models of other-repair are common in human-computer dialogue systems, they tend to (...)
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  45.  99
    Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.Jukka Varelius - 2009 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 16 (1):35-52.
    What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why we consider (...) disorder a significant phenomenon for us, have a common denominator: they refer to psychological capacity for autonomy. I present a conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder on the basis of that psychological capacity and argue that this way of understanding the nature of mental disorder avoids the main problems of the central contemporary theories of mental disorder. Then I explain why this conception of the nature of mental disorder is not undermined by anti-psychiatric criticisms to the effect that mental illness does not exist, that the mentally ill should not be treated differently from others, and that seeing problems of the mentally disordered as psychiatric problems is unjustified medicalization. I conclude by suggesting that the presented conceptual foundation for defining mental disorder would benefit from being complemented by results of empirical psychology. (shrink)
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  46.  11
    Mental Files in Flux.François Récanati - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book is a sequel to Recanati’s Mental Files (OUP 2012), and pursues the exploration of the mental file framework for thinking about concepts and singular reference. Mental files are based on 'epistemically rewarding' relations to objects in the environment. Standing in such relations to objects puts the subject in a position to gain information regarding them—information which goes into the file based on the relevant relation. Files do not merely store information about objects, however. They refer (...)
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  47.  37
    Spontaneous Anomalystic Phenomena, Pragmatic Information and Formal Representations of Uncertainty.Stefano Siccardi - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (2):287-301.
    I discuss the application of the Model of Pragmatic Information to the study of spontaneous anomalystic mental phenomena like telepathy, precognition, etc. In these phenomena the most important effects are related to anomalous information gain by the subjects. I consider the basic ideas of the Model, as they have been applied to experimental anomalystic phenomena and to spontaneous phenomena that have strong physical effects, like poltergeist cases, highlighting analogies and differences. Moreover, I point out that (...)
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  48. Physicalism and the problem of mental causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
    In this paper I argue that the problem of mental causation can be solved by distinguishing between classificatory mental properties, like being a pain, and instances of those properties.Antireductive physicalism allows only that the former be irreducibly mental. Consequently, properties like being a pain cannot have causal commerce with the physical without violating causal closure. But instances of painfulness, according to the token identity thesis, are identical with various physical tokens and can therefore have causal efficacy in (...)
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  49. Categorizing the Mental.Eric Hochstein - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):745-759.
    A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the (...)
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  50.  41
    Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning.Philip Johnson-Laird, Paolo Legrenzi, Vittorio Girotto, Maria Sonino Legrenzi & Jean-Paul Caverni - 1999 - Psychological Review 106 (1):62-88.
    This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which it (...)
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